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5The Global Study on Homicide 2013 seeks to shed 
light on the worst of crimes — the intentional kill-
ing of one human being by another. 
Beyond resulting in the deaths of nearly half a mil-
lion people in 2012, this form of violent crime has 
a broad impact on security — and the perception 
of security — across all societies. This study, which 
builds on the ground-breaking work of UNODC’s 
first Global Study on Homicide in 2011, is particu-
larly timely as the international community is 
engaged in defining the post-2015 development 
agenda. As United Nations Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-Moon has made clear, development progress 
cannot be achieved or sustained amid violence, 
insecurity and injustice.  
By improving understanding of the underlying 
patterns and trends related to different forms, set-
tings and risk factors of homicide at the global, 
regional, national and sub-national levels, this 
study can be a strategic tool in supporting govern-
ments’ efforts to address root causes and enhance 
criminal justice responses.
Alongside intentional homicide related to other 
criminal activities and socio-political agendas, the 
study examines homicide related to interpersonal 
conflict, which includes homicides perpetrated by 
intimate partners or family members. Unlike other 
forms of homicide, which vary significantly across 
regions and from year to year, intimate partner and 
family-related homicide remains persistent and 
prevalent. 
While the vast majority of global homicide victims 
are men, it is overwhelmingly women who die at 
the hands of their intimate partners or family 
members. Normative standards for improving 
criminal justice responses to eliminate violence 
against women have been agreed by all United 
Nations Member States; clearly more must be 
done to improve States’ capacities to effectively 
prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish all 
forms of violence against women.
With regard to different settings in which lethal 
violence occurs, the study indicates that homicide 
and violence in countries emerging from conflict 
can become concurrent contributors to instability 
and insecurity. If we want to build peace, interven-
tions must address not only the conflict itself but 
also surges in homicide resulting from organized 
crime and interpersonal violence, which can flour-
ish in settings with weak rule of law.
Specific risk factors such as alcohol and drug use 
and the availability of weapons are also examined 
in the study in order to improve understanding of 
how they shape patterns and prevalence of lethal 
violence. Deeper understanding of these enablers 
can inform and enhance policies aimed at prevent-
ing intentional homicides from happening in the 
first place.
Ultimately, efforts to prevent unlawful homicide 
will not be effective unless governments and the 
international community address those who are 
most at risk, of both offending or becoming a 
victim of homicide. More than half of all global 
homicide victims are under 30 years of age. Much 
of this violence takes place in urban areas. Effective 
policies and strategies must not only target at-risk 
young people but involve them and local 
communities to work together to break the cycle 
of violence. 
PREFACE
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I hope that the data and analysis contained in this 
study, along with the extensive tools developed by 
my Office to support States in preventing crime 
and improving criminal justice systems, can pro-
vide a solid basis to meet these challenges.  
Yury Fedotov
Executive Director
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
7Regions: In various sections, this study uses a 
number of regional and sub-regional designations. 
They are not official designations and they do not 
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on 
the part of UNODC concerning the legal status of 
any country, territory, city or area, or of its author-
ities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers 
or boundaries. The assignment of countries or 
areas to specific groupings is for statistical con-
venience and does not imply any assumption 
regarding political or other affiliation of countries 
or territories by the United Nations. The designa-
tions used in this study are based on the United 
Nations M.49 geographical regions for statistical 
use, which have been developed, used and main-
tained by the United Nations Statistical Division. 
They are defined as follows:
Africa
s  Eastern Africa: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar,  
Malawi, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, 
Réunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanza-
nia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
s  Middle Africa: Angola, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe.
s  Northern Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya,  
Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia.
s  Southern Africa: Botswana, Lesotho,  
Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.
s  Western Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo 
Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana,  
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali,  
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, and Togo.
Americas
s  Caribbean: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat,  
Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint  
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos  
Islands, and United States Virgin Islands.
s  Central America: Belize, Costa Rica, El  
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, and Panama.
s  Northern America: Bermuda, Canada, Green-
land, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, and United 
States of America.
s  South America: Argentina, Bolivia  
(Plurinational State of ), Brazil, Chile,  
Colombia, Ecuador, French Guiana, Guyana, 
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and  
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of ).
Asia
s  Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,  
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
s  Asia: China, Democratic People’s  
Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, China, Japan, 
Macao, China, Mongolia, Republic of Korea, 
and Taiwan Province of China.
s  South-Eastern Asia: Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s  
Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
EXPLANATORY NOTES
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Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,  
Timor-Leste, and Viet Nam.
s  Southern Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of ), 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
s  Western Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State 
of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, 
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
Europe
s  Eastern Europe: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech  
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Republic of 
Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation,  
Slovakia, and Ukraine.
s  Northern Europe: Denmark, Estonia,  
Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (some-
times disaggregated to United Kingdom 
(England and Wales), United Kingdom 
(Scotland), and United Kingdom (Northern 
Ireland)). Baltic countries refer to a sub-
region which includes Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania.
s  Southern Europe: Albania, Andorra,  
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece,  
Italy, Kosovo (in compliance with United Na-
tions Security Council Resolution 1244/99), 
Malta, Montenegro, Portugal, San Marino, 
Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, and the former  
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
s  Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,  
Monaco, Netherlands, and Switzerland.
Oceania
s  Australia and New Zealand: Australia, and 
New Zealand.
s  Melanesia: Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu.
s  Micronesia: Guam, Kiribati, Marshall  
Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of ), 
Nauru, and Palau.
s  Polynesia: Cook Islands, French Polynesia, 
Niue, Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu.
Maps: The boundaries and names shown and the 
designations used on maps do not imply official 
endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 
A dotted line represents approximately the line of 
control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by 
India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and 
Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the 
parties.
Population data: The data on population used in 
this study come from: United Nations, Depart-
ment of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division, World Population Prospects: The 2012 
Revision.
9Many types of killing exist, but not all of them are 
considered intentional and/or unlawful. Defined as 
“unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person 
by another person”,1 intentional homicide is the 
main focus of this study. For the sake of simplicity, 
however, the term “homicide” is used throughout 
as shorthand for “intentional homicide”.
The study of intentional homicide is relevant not 
only because the impact of the intentional killing 
of one human being by another is the ultimate 
crime, whose ripple effect goes far beyond the 
initial loss of human life and can create a climate 
1 UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). More in-depth expla-
nations of the definition of intentional homicide is given in 
chapter 6 (Data challenges) of this study.
of fear and uncertainty. Intentional homicide also 
victimizes the family and community of the victim, 
who can be considered secondary victims,2 and 
when justice is not served, impunity can lead to 
further victimization in the form of the denial of 
the basic human right to justice. 
Moreover, as the most readily measurable, clearly 
defined and most comparable indicator for meas-
uring violent deaths around the world, homicide 
is, in certain circumstances, both a reasonable 
proxy for violent crime as well as a robust indicator 
of levels of security within States.
2 According to the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (Annex, Para. 2), “vic-
tims” also include (where appropriate) the immediate family 
or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have 
suffered harm in intervening to assist the victim. (United 
Nations General Assembly (1985). A/RES/40/34.).
INTRODUCTION
VIOLENT DEATHS
Killings in 
ǁĂƌͬĐŽŶŇŝĐƚƐ
^ĞůĨͲŝŶŇŝĐƚĞĚ
ĚĞĂƚŚƐ;ƐƵŝĐŝĚĞƐͿ
EŽŶͲĐŽŶŇŝĐƚ
ĚĞĂƚŚƐ
/ŶƚĞŶƟŽŶĂů
ŚŽŵŝĐŝĚĞ EĞŐůŝŐĞŶƚ
EŽŶͲŶĞŐůŝŐĞŶƚ
<ŝůůŝŶŐƐŝŶƐĞůĨͲĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ Killings in 
ůĞŐĂůŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƟŽŶƐ
EŽŶͲŝŶƚĞŶƟŽŶĂůŚŽŵŝĐŝĚĞ
<ŝůůŝŶŐƐĚƵƌŝŶŐ
ĐŝǀŝůƵŶƌĞƐƚ
ZĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽŽƚŚĞƌĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůĂĐƟǀŝƟĞƐ /ŶƚĞƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ^ŽĐŝŽͲƉŽůŝƟĐĂů
Classifying violent deaths
Source: UNODC. 
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Within the broad range of violent deaths, the core 
element of intentional homicide is the complete 
liability of the direct perpetrator, which thus 
excludes killings directly related to war or con-
flicts, self-inflicted death (suicide), killings due to 
legal interventions or justifiable killings (such as 
self-defence), and those deaths caused when the 
perpetrator was reckless or negligent but did not 
intend to take a human life (non-intentional 
homicide). 
Due to the sheer magnitude of its violence, as well 
as the perceived number of lives lost, violence 
stemming from armed conflict receives a great deal 
of attention from the international community. 
Yet intentional homicide exists in every country, 
and as in many countries with high homicide 
levels it accounts for far more lives lost than those 
attributable to, for example, war or conflict, it also 
represents a major threat to civilian security. 
The right to life is a supreme normative impera-
tive, enshrined in both constitutional and interna-
tional law.3 The process and criteria for protecting 
against the unlawful taking of life, taking steps to 
safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction, 
and of assigning responsibility for violent deaths 
within that jurisdiction are key obligations of the 
State, predominantly through its criminal justice 
system. More broadly, the obligation to protect 
human life is the cornerstone of countries’ efforts 
to develop crime prevention policies. The provi-
sion of analytical tools for monitoring trends and 
patterns of homicide therefore plays a vital role in 
increasing the capacity of national authorities and 
the international community to understand and 
respond adequately to intentional homicide.
As this study shows, homicide is not merely a tool 
employed by violent criminals to achieve their 
material goals, and is not only restricted to fringe 
elements of society. As homicide affects people 
from all walks of life there is a need to look at 
lethal violence from different angles. For that 
reason, the Global Study on Homicide 2013 takes 
up the mantle of its 2011 predecessor by not only 
updating the global overview of intentional homi-
cide, but by also delving deeper into the under-
standing of its very nature. It benefits from the 
availability of new homicide data to provide fur-
3 United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (1982). General Comment No. 06: The right 
to life (article 6). Para. 1; Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, article 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, article 6.1; Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 
6; Geneva Conventions, Common article 3.1.a.
ther statistical evidence and analysis to help 
improve the understanding of trends and patterns 
in lethal violence and aid the development of pol-
icies to curb it.
The circumstances, motivations and relationships 
that drive homicide are multiple and often over-
lapping. But though the borders between these 
factors are often blurred, this study employs a 
comprehensive approach to broaden the field of 
study by classifying intentional homicide into 
three main typologies: homicide related to other 
criminal activities; to interpersonal conflict; and to 
socio-political agendas. 
It also looks at homicide and violence in the wake 
of conflict and in countries with a recent history of 
civil unrest, and examines the roles played in hom-
icide by various mechanisms, including weapons, 
and enabling factors, such as psychoactive sub-
stances, in order to assess how they can facilitate 
lethal violence. Last but not least, data on the 
criminal justice response to homicide are also pre-
sented as they can assess the capacity of the State 
to respond to homicide. Indeed, a relationship 
exists between levels of impunity and rates of hom-
icide, and while the relationship between security, 
justice and development may not necessarily be 
linear, there is increasing evidence that a lack of 
security, which is often associated with a weak 
criminal justice system, can block the path to 
development of countries and their populations.
Such analyses have been made possible due to the 
gradual expansion and consolidation of the 
UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset, 
though a number of challenges still exist, particu-
larly in terms of enhancing the coverage of country 
data and its disaggregation. In this area, coopera-
tion with other international and regional organi-
zations is fundamental, and the concrete measures 
taken for implementing joint data collections and 
developing common methodological standards, as 
well as coordinating technical assistance activities, 
are big steps in the right direction.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Through the filter of data from the global to the 
sub-national level, the Global Study on Homicide 
2013 gives a comprehensive overview of intentional 
homicide across the world. As homicide is one of 
the most comparable and accurate indicators for 
measuring violence, the aim of this study is to 
improve understanding of criminal violence by 
providing a wealth of information about where 
homicide occurs and with what intensity, about 
who is most at risk, why they are at risk and exactly 
how their lives are taken from them. Additionally, 
homicide patterns over time shed light on regional 
differences, especially when looking at long-term 
trends.  
As the international community looks towards the 
post-2015 development agenda, the connection 
between violence, security and development, 
within the broader context of the rule of law, is an 
important factor to be considered. Since its impact 
goes beyond the loss of human life and can create 
a climate of fear and uncertainty, intentional hom-
icide (and violent crime) is a threat to the popula-
tion. Homicide data can therefore play an 
important role in monitoring security and justice. 
Likewise, homicide data can enable the interna-
tional community to gain a better understanding 
of the complexity of homicide and the different 
ways it affects the population, which is why this 
study delves deeply into the very nature of inten-
tional homicide. In so doing, it posits a unique 
typology of homicide: homicide related to other 
criminal activities; interpersonal homicide; and 
socio-political homicide. The influence of cross-
cutting and enabling factors, such as killing mech-
anisms and the use of psychoactive substances 
(alcohol and illicit drugs), is also examined in 
order to gain a better understanding of the role 
they play in lethal violence. 
This analytical framework will help governments 
to develop strategies and policies for protecting 
those most at risk and addressing those most likely 
to offend. To that end, the criminal justice response 
of countries to homicide is also analysed here for 
the first time, as is violence in countries emerging 
from conflict, where violence related to crime and 
interpersonal issues can be just as devastating as 
violence relating to the conflict itself.  
The increasing availability of sub-national data has 
also broadened this study’s capacity to show varia-
tions, which are often marked, in the intensity of 
homicide within countries and to enable the iden-
tification of homicide “hot spots”, which warrant 
further monitoring, both within countries and 
sub-regions. Indeed, as this study shows, the study 
of intentional homicide is, to a large extent, the 
study of contrasts. For example: almost half of all 
homicides occur in countries that make up just 
over a tenth of the global population; some 95 per 
cent of homicide perpetrators at the global level are 
male; males also account for almost 8 out of every 
10 homicide victims; two thirds of the victims of 
homicides committed by intimate partners or 
family members globally are female; and half of all 
global homicide victims are under 30 years of age.
The polarization of homicide
Intentional homicide caused the deaths of almost 
half a million people (437,000) across the world in 
2012. More than a third of those (36 per cent) 
occurred in the Americas, 31 per cent in Africa and 
28 per cent in Asia, while Europe (5 per cent) and 
Oceania (0.3 per cent) accounted for the lowest 
shares of homicide at the regional level.
12
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The global average homicide rate stands at 6.2 per 
100,000 population, but Southern Africa and 
Central America have rates over four times higher 
than that (above 24 victims per 100,000 popula-
tion), making them the sub-regions with the high-
est homicide rates on record, followed by South 
America, Middle Africa and the Caribbean 
(between 16 and 23 homicides per 100,000 popu-
lation). Meanwhile, with rates some five times 
lower than the global average, Eastern Asia, South-
ern Europe and Western Europe are the sub-
regions with the lowest homicide levels.
Almost three billion people live in an expanding 
group of countries with relatively low homicide 
rates, many of which, particularly in Europe and 
Oceania, have continued to experience a decrease 
in their homicide rates since 1990. At the opposite 
end of the scale, almost 750 million people live in 
countries with high homicide levels, meaning that 
almost half of all homicides occur in countries that 
make up just 11 per cent of the global population 
and that personal security is still a major concern 
for more than 1 in 10 people on the planet.
A widening gap in homicide levels exists between 
countries with high homicide rates and those with 
low homicide rates. There are also notable dispari-
ties in homicide within regions and sub-regions, as 
individual countries follow different paths over 
time. For example, homicide rates in the southern 
part of South America are closer to the relatively 
low rates recorded in Europe, while the rates in the 
north of the sub-region are closer to the relatively 
high rates recorded in Central America. Likewise, 
at the sub-national level, the most populous city in 
the vast majority of countries generally records 
higher homicide rates than elsewhere, with notable 
exceptions being certain countries in Eastern 
Europe.
Certain regions and sub-regions have experienced 
sustained high levels of homicide. This is particu-
larly notable in the Americas, where homicide 
levels have been high, and in some cases increas-
ing, over the past decade. But this is not a new 
Homicide victims and population,  
by countries’ level of homicide per 100,000 
population (2012 or latest year)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). 
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pattern, as the Americas have had homicide rates 
five to eight times higher than those in Europe and 
Asia since the mid-1950s. The continuing high 
levels of homicide in the Americas are the legacy of 
decades of political and crime-related violence, 
which has hindered a decline in homicide levels in 
certain countries. However, homicide levels in 
some countries in the Americas, such as Brazil, are 
now stabilizing, albeit at a high level, while in 
other regions, countries with historically high 
homicide rates, such as South Africa, Lesotho, the 
Russian Federation and countries in Central Asia, 
are managing to break their own cycle of violence 
and have recorded decreases in their homicide 
rates. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, in countries 
with some of the lowest homicide rates in the 
world, mostly located in Europe and Eastern Asia, 
homicide levels continue to decline. Many of those 
countries had low levels of homicide in 1995 and 
have subsequently recorded continuous decreases 
in their homicide rates. On the other hand, a wor-
rying development is that homicide levels in 
Northern Africa are rising, probably as a result of 
political violence, which may in turn foster lethal 
violence related to criminal activities, and should 
be monitored. The same can be said for parts of 
Southern Asia and Eastern Africa.
The gender bias 
Polarization not only exists in terms of where hom-
icide occurs, but also in the sex of its victims and 
perpetrators. In the context of family and intimate 
partner relationships, women are considerably 
more at risk than men, yet 79 per cent of all hom-
icide victims globally are male. Moreover, some 95 
per cent of homicide perpetrators at the global 
level are also male; a share that is consistent across 
countries and regions, irrespective of the homicide 
typology or weapon used. 
The global male homicide rate is almost four times 
that of females (9.7 versus 2.7 per 100,000) and is 
highest in the Americas (29.3 per 100,000 males), 
where it is nearly seven times higher than in Asia, 
Europe and Oceania (all under 4.5 per 100,000 
males). This is due in large part to the higher levels 
of homicide related to organized crime and gangs 
in the Americas than in other regions. When fac-
toring in the finding that 43 per cent of all homi-
cide victims are aged 15-29, this means that more 
than one in seven of all homicide victims globally 
is a young male aged 15-29 living in the Americas. 
There is a regional and gender bias towards male 
victims in homicide related to organized crime and 
gangs, but interpersonal homicide in the form of 
intimate partner/family-related homicide is far 
more evenly distributed across regions and is, on 
average, remarkably stable at the global level. 
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However, intimate partner/family-related homi-
cide disproportionately affects women: two thirds 
of its victims globally are female (43,600 in 2012) 
and one third (20,000) are male. Almost half (47 
per cent) of all female victims of homicide in 2012 
were killed by their intimate partners or family 
members, compared to less than 6 per cent of male 
homicide victims. Thus while a large share of 
female homicide victims are murdered by people 
who are expected to care for them, the majority of 
men are killed by people they may not even know.
Youth at risk
Something that the majority of male and female 
homicide victims do have in common is their rela-
tive youth. The 15-29 and 30-44 age groups 
account for the vast majority of homicides glob-
ally, with almost half of all homicide victims aged 
15-29 and slightly less than a third aged 30-44. 
The homicide rate for male victims aged 15-29 in 
South America and Central America is more than 
four times the global average rate for that age 
group. The 30-44 age group is, however, at higher 
risk in some countries in Central America, the 
Caribbean and all sub-regions in Europe. The 
impact of this dynamic can be devastating for 
security and the economy, as the deaths of males in 
the 30-44 age group can have a disproportionate 
impact on families, the working population and 
perceptions of security. 
At the youngest end of the age spectrum, 36,000 
children under the age of 15 were the victims of 
homicide worldwide in 2012. Equating to 8 per 
cent of all homicide victims, this coupled with the 
share of victims in the 15-29 age group (43 per 
cent) means that more than half of all global hom-
icide victims are under 30 years of age.
The many faces of homicide
Based on elements including premeditation, moti-
vation, context, instrumentality and the relation-
ship between victim and perpetrator, this study 
identifies three distinct homicide typologies in 
order to shed light on different types of lethal vio-
lence: homicide related to other criminal activities; 
homicide related to interpersonal conflict; and 
homicide related to socio-political agendas. 
Homicide related to other criminal activities regis-
ters very different levels across the world’s regions, 
but there are currently very high levels of killings 
of that nature in areas of Central and South Amer-
ica, which are often linked to violence between 
Percentage distribution of victims of homicide, by sex and selected age group  
(2012 or latest year)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). 
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organized criminal groups. Overall, organized 
crime/gang-related homicide accounts for 30 per 
cent of homicides in the Americas, compared to 
less than 1 per cent in Asia, Europe and Oceania, 
but that does not necessarily mean that organized 
crime or gangs are more prevalent in the Americas 
than in other regions. Moreover, levels of organ-
ized crime/gang-related homicide can fluctuate 
dramatically, even in the short term, to the extent 
that they actually drive changes in homicide rates 
in some countries in Central America and the 
Caribbean. On the other hand, homicide commit-
ted during the course of other criminal acts appears 
to be more stable across the world, with homicide 
linked to robbery accounting for an average of 5 
per cent of all homicides in the Americas, Europe 
and Oceania each year.  
Not all homicide in the Americas is linked to other 
criminal activities, however: homicide related to 
interpersonal conflict also accounts for a signifi-
cant share of homicides. In Montevideo, Uruguay, 
for example, the share of interpersonal homicides 
is higher than the share of crime-related homi-
cides; and in Quito, Ecuador, the shares of those 
two different typologies are almost identical.1 
Interpersonal homicide accounts for a significant 
share of homicides around the world (for example, 
Costa Rica: 47 per cent; India: 48 per cent; 
Sweden: 54 per cent), and it has completely differ-
ent drivers to homicide related to other criminal 
activities, often being a means of resolving a con-
flict and/or punishing the victim through violence 
when relationships come under strain. Intimate 
partner/family-related homicide is one form of 
interpersonal homicide that affects every country, 
irrespective of affluence, development and both 
risk and protective factors, which can mitigate 
levels of lethal violence. Accounting for 14 per 
cent of all homicides globally, intimate partner/
family-related homicide has the greatest intensity 
in the Americas, whereas it accounts for a larger 
share of all homicides in Asia, Europe and Oce-
ania, where those most at risk are women aged 30 
and over. Other types of interpersonal homicide, 
such as property disputes or revenge-type killings, 
also occur all around the globe. 
More difficult to quantify than the other two 
typologies, homicide related to socio-political 
agendas is committed in order to exert influence 
over power relationships and to advance a particu-
lar agenda. This type of homicide can draw a lot of 
1 Banco Interamericano de Desarollo (2013).
attention due to its often shocking nature — as in 
the case of acts of terror leading to death — and 
can represent a substantive share of total homicides 
in specific contexts or regions, such as in post-
conflict settings or during periods of instability. 
War and conflict-related killings are also consid-
ered socio-political violence, but are not included 
in this category as they are outside the realm of 
intentional homicide.
External cross-cutting factors
A number of factors intervene in the process that 
leads to the commission of homicide. Ranging 
from the availability of a weapon (or lack of one) 
to the use of psychoactive substances, which may 
act as homicide “enablers”, such elements can 
shape patterns and levels of homicide, and when 
they are targeted by prevention policies, homicide 
can be reduced. 
Not all homicides involve them, but weapons do 
play a significant role in homicide. With their high 
level of lethality,2 firearms are the most widely used 
weapons, accounting for 4 out of every 10 homi-
cides at the global level, whereas “other means”, 
such as physical force and blunt objects, among 
others, kill just over a third of homicide victims, 
while sharp objects kill a quarter. 
The use of firearms is particularly prevalent in the 
Americas, where two thirds of homicides are com-
mitted with guns, whereas sharp objects are used 
more frequently in Oceania and Europe. However, 
not all high homicide areas are associated with a 
high prevalence of firearm homicide. For example, 
some sub-regions with relatively high homicide 
rates, such as Eastern Europe and Southern Africa, 
have a relatively low share of homicides by firearm, 
while others, such as Southern Europe and North-
ern Africa, have lower homicide rates but higher 
shares of homicides committed by firearm. 
In addition to weapons, the consumption of alco-
hol and/or illicit drugs increases one’s risk of 
becoming a victim or perpetrator of violence. In 
Sweden and Finland, for example, over half of all 
homicide offenders were intoxicated with alcohol 
when they committed homicide. In Australia, 
recent data suggests that nearly half of all homicide 
incidents were preceded by alcohol consumption 
2 Lethality of a weapon depends on the type and calibre of 
firearm. Whether or not a victim survives a gunshot wound is 
often dependent on other factors, such as the availability and 
efficiency of health care systems. For more, see Alvazzi del 
Frate, A. (2012).  Small Arms Survey, Moving Targets: chapter 
3.
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Homicide mechanism, by region (2012 or latest year)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) and IHME (2010). 
by the victim or the perpetrator, or both. Illicit 
drugs can affect homicide levels in different ways, 
but the psychopharmacological effects of certain 
illicit drugs, such as cocaine and amphetamine-
type stimulants, are more linked to violence than 
others and can have an impact on homicide similar 
to that caused by alcohol, as indicated by data 
from some countries. 
As well as violence associated with the consump-
tion of illicit drugs, violence associated with the 
functioning of illicit drug markets can also drive 
homicide levels, often due to competition between 
involved parties. Studies and available data indi-
cate that the cultivation, production, trafficking 
and sale of illicit drugs may be accompanied by 
high levels of violence and homicide. However, 
this relationship does not hold in all situations 
because the modus operandi of organized criminal 
groups, as well as the response by State authorities, 
can determine actual levels of homicidal violence 
involved in drug trafficking.
Homicide, violence and conﬂict 
In countries emerging from conflict, it is often dif-
ficult to disentangle lethal violence that is an after-
effect of conflict, or a lower-intensity continuation 
of conflict, from violence of a different nature, 
particularly if the conflict has not been fully 
resolved. Reducing violence in countries emerging 
from conflict goes beyond the need to address the 
roots of the conflict, to include the prevention of 
surges in violence resulting from organized crime 
and interpersonal violence, which can flourish in 
settings with weak rule of law.
This study presents findings from selected coun-
tries based on the availability of data, which show 
that crime is an important component of violence 
in countries emerging from conflict, and that vio-
lence related to crime can become a significant 
factor in the overall security situation in such 
countries. The analysis is based on the situations in 
Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
South Sudan, which have all had different experi-
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ences in the years following conflict on their soil, 
yet all struggle with crime and its enablers.  
In Afghanistan and Iraq, the conflict may be facil-
itating other types of violence, or masking the 
differences in the violence perpetrated by non-
parties to the conflict. In Afghanistan, civilian 
casualties related to the conflict have been decreas-
ing since 2010, while homicides have been increas-
ing. Iraq, which had an estimated homicide rate of 
8.0 per 100,000 population in 2012, has been 
experiencing a surge in conflict-related violence 
since early 2013, with most of the resulting deaths 
being of civilians.
Data for Haiti and South Sudan show that volatil-
ity caused by the conflict can undermine the 
implementation of the rule of law and can present 
opportunities for crime (whether organized or not) 
to take root. Haiti’s homicide rate doubled from 
5.1 in 2007 to 10.2 per 100,000 in 2012, much of 
it driven by high levels of violence and gang activ-
ity in the capital, Port-au-Prince, where 75 per 
cent of all Haiti’s homicides occurred. In South 
Sudan, high levels of firearm availability have 
increased the lethality associated with cattle raid-
ing, particularly in the Wunlit Triangle, where the 
homicide rate in 2013 was, at over 60 per 100,000 
population, among the highest in the world.
A gradual improvement in security is an encourag-
ing development in Sierra Leone and Liberia, 
where reconciliation processes and dedicated poli-
cies to tackle crime are resulting in a gradually 
improving security situation. Both countries con-
tinue to suffer homicide “hot spots” — particu-
larly in their capital cities — and much of the 
killing is linked to interpersonal violence. Respond-
ents to recent victimization surveys feared violent 
crime, but in Sierra Leone, although over 50 per 
cent of the surveyed population had experienced 
assault, most felt that the level of violent crime had 
decreased in the last three years. Liberians surveyed 
also felt that the Government had been successful 
in reducing crime, though mob justice was cited as 
a motivator for 15 per cent of homicides recorded 
there in 2012. 
Addressing crime and homicide in all its forms is 
crucial for countries emerging from conflict, as 
crime-related violence can escalate to levels similar 
to those of violence in times of conflict. Organized 
criminal groups can exploit power vacuums left 
when conflict ends and before strong institutions 
take hold, and impunity for crimes can further 
undermine the public’s trust in justice authorities.
Justice and prevention
Analysing the capacity of criminal justice systems 
to bring perpetrators of homicide to justice is an 
important element in the assessment of a core 
responsibility of the State, as well as in the under-
standing of a factor that contributes to homicide 
levels and trends. An effective criminal justice 
system that ensures rigorous investigation and fair 
adjudication of suspected homicide offenders is a 
pre-requisite for upholding the rule of law and 
achieving justice for homicide victims, while, con-
versely, the impunity of perpetrators can actually 
contribute to the perpetration of more homicides.
The efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal 
justice response can be measured by a number of 
indicators, such as homicide cases solved by the 
police, persons arrested for and persons convicted 
of homicide. These indicators are quantitative, 
however, and data of this type do not provide 
information about fundamental qualitative aspects 
of criminal justice administration, such as the 
Homicide rates in selected countries 
emerging from conﬂict (2007-2013)
Source: Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan (2013); WHO 
(2014); Ministry of Interior, South Sudan (2012); UNDPKO-
UNMISS (2013); UNDPKO-MINUSTAH (2013); Sierra 
Leone Police (2011); UNDPKO-UNMIL (2013).
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quality of investigations, the right to legal aid, the 
fairness of procedures or the duration of trials.
At the global level, police forces tend to respond 
promptly to homicide offences, to the extent that 
in a little over 60 per cent of cases they are able to 
identify and arrest one or several suspects for a 
particular homicide, allowing the case to be turned 
over to the prosecution service. Significant regional 
disparities do, however, exist: 80 and 85 per cent, 
respectively, of homicide cases are “cleared” in this 
way in Asia and Europe, and some 50 per cent in 
the Americas.
An important indication of the criminal justice 
response to homicide is the conviction rate, which, 
at the global level, leads to 43 perpetrators being 
convicted for every 100 victims of intentional 
homicide. However, disparities across regions are 
even greater than in the case of the clearance rates 
mentioned above, with a conviction rate of 24 per 
100 victims in the Americas, 48 in Asia and 81 in 
Europe. 
The level of impunity for homicide in the Ameri-
cas is thus rather high, which may be partly due to 
the fact that the region’s high intensity of homicide 
is a drain on criminal justice resources. Moreover, 
homicides in the Americas are often connected to 
organized crime or gang activity, which usually 
have lower clearance and conviction rates in com-
parison to other homicide typologies like intimate 
partner/family-related homicide, or other types of 
interpersonal homicide. The downward trend in 
the conviction rate in the Americas in recent years 
is particularly alarming as rising homicide trends 
since 2007 have not been paralleled by similar 
levels of convictions, meaning that impunity 
related to homicide has grown in the Americas in 
recent years.  
Homicide and violence also play an important role 
in the final stage of the criminal justice process. 
Irrespective of their different levels of homicide, the 
share of homicide offenders among the total prison 
population is not markedly different across regions: 
in Europe and the Americas it is between 7 and 10 
per cent, whereas it is slightly lower in Asia (4 per 
cent). In terms of overall prison populations, shares 
of homicide offenders are conspicuous and they 
pose specific management challenges to prison 
administrations. For example, in countries with 
available data in the Americas, the homicide rate 
per 100,000 prisoners is three times higher than 
the homicide rate in the general population.
Throughout this study, examples of policy and 
legislation are offered to demonstrate the effective-
ness and impact of targeted intervention pro-
grammes and strategies for preventing and reducing 
homicide at various levels. For example, global 
treaties such as the Arms Trade Treaty, which was 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
in April 2013 and aims to regulate and improve 
the regulation of the global trade in conventional 
arms in order to prevent, disrupt and eradicate the 
illicit trade in such weapons, are enacted by the 
international community to contribute to the pre-
vention of  lethal violence. 
At the national level, firearm and knife legislation 
restricting availability, accessibility and use has 
been implemented in various countries with vary-
ing degrees of success in preventing or reducing 
homicides committed with such weapons. Munic-
ipal policies, including those restricting the open-
ing hours of premises licensed to sell alcohol, and 
others monitoring the victims of intimate partner/
family-related violence, have proved effective at 
Persons suspected and persons convicted 
per 100 homicides, by region (2011 or  
latest year) 
Note: Data on three countries in Africa and Oceania are included in the 
global total but not shown separately. 
Source: UN-CTS.
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cially in parts of Africa, Asia and Oceania, are now 
necessary to fill remaining gaps.
Chapter by chapter
The study is structured into six chapters, as well as 
two annexes that present the methodology and 
data, and a comprehensive list of references for 
each chapter.
Chapter 1 provides a snapshot of intentional hom-
icide from the global to the sub-national level, as 
well as from the perspective of age and sex, and 
homicide trends from 1955 to the present day. 
Chapter 2 posits a classification of homicide that 
splits homicide into three distinct typologies in 
order to shed light on different forms of violent 
crime: homicide related to other criminal activi-
ties; homicide related to interpersonal conflict; and 
homicide related to socio-political agendas.
Chapter 3 analyses homicide mechanisms and 
enablers by looking at various weapons and the 
role of psychoactive substances. It also presents an 
overview of the systemic violence associated with 
illicit drug markets. 
Chapter 4 looks at homicide and violence in coun-
tries with recent experience of conflict so as to 
provide insight into the challenges associated with 
the legacy of violence and to understand the role 
of the different homicide typologies in such 
settings.
Chapter 5 focuses on the response of the criminal 
justice system to homicide in terms of cases solved 
by the police, persons arrested for and persons 
convicted of homicide. It also looks into homicide 
in prison settings.  
Chapter 6 presents the challenges faced when 
researching homicide, particularly in relation to 
the availability, quality and comparability of hom-
icide data.
reducing the number of homicides in the areas in 
which they have been implemented. Furthermore, 
policing strategies implemented at the neighbour-
hood level have also demonstrated great success in 
targeting violence “hot spots” and in improving 
community safety.
Data challenges
Policies and prevention strategies like those men-
tioned above benefit from the collection of reliable 
data and the analysis of homicide and other crime 
statistics, which deepen the understanding of the 
drivers of violence and can inform policymakers 
about how best to direct limited resources towards 
tackling violent crime.
The Global Study on Homicide 2013 is based on 
the UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset, 
compiled from a variety of national and interna-
tional sources, covering 219 countries and territo-
ries. These data are derived from either criminal 
justice or public health systems, each of which 
records data on intentional homicide in different 
ways. As a result, data are of differing validity, 
accuracy, international comparability and cover-
age, but this study emphasizes the strengths of 
both sources.
Since the publication of the Global Study on Hom-
icide 2011, there has been an improvement in the 
availability of data on intentional homicide. The 
number of countries and territories for which con-
sistent data on the number of homicide victims, as 
well as the breakdown by age, sex, mechanism of 
killing and the context in which the homicide 
occurred, has increased and a longer time series is 
available in many cases. There is, however, more 
work to be done to continue this improvement. 
Ongoing methodological work to develop the 
International Classification of Crime for Statistical 
Purposes (ICCS) will provide, for the first time, an 
internationally agreed definition and classification 
of intentional homicide, and therefore guide the 
production of homicide data by national statistical 
systems. At the national level, further efforts will 
be needed to coordinate and harmonize the pro-
duction of homicide statistics by all relevant stake-
holders, from both the criminal justice and public 
health sector. 
The progress made over the last decade in produc-
ing and collecting data on homicide has made it 
possible for such data to be widely used to monitor 
security and crime at the global, regional and 
national levels. Further and focused efforts, espe-
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1. THE BIG PICTURE
This chapter provides a snapshot of intentional 
homicide through an increasingly focused lens. 
Beginning at the global level and ending at the sub-
national level, it subsequently looks at homicide 
from the perspective of age and sex before analysing 
homicide trends from 1955 to the present. Whether 
across regions, sub-regions and countries, age and 
sex groups, and even over time, the picture of hom-
icide it reveals is one of marked contrasts. 
The global and regional picture
UNODC estimates that deaths resulting from 
intentional homicide amounted to a total of 
437,0001 at the global level in 2012. The largest 
share of those was registered in the Americas (36 
per cent) and large shares were also recorded in 
Africa and Asia (31 per cent and 28 per cent, 
respectively). Europe (5 per cent) and Oceania 
(0.3 per cent) accounted for the lowest shares of 
homicide by region.
Between 2010 and 2012 the number of homicide 
victims decreased by 11-14 per cent in Oceania 
and Europe, and increased by 8.5 per cent in the 
Americas, yet the fact that UNODC’s 2012 global 
estimate is lower than its previous estimate in 2010 
(468,000 victims) is almost entirely due to meth-
odological revisions of the estimation procedure2 
1 The global count of victims of intentional homicide, based 
on sources available at the country level, varies between a low 
estimate of 324,000 victims and a high estimate of 518,000 
victims (see Methodological annex for more information on 
the calculation of estimate intervals).
2 Due to a lack of national data on homicides in many African 
countries and a number of countries in Asia, UNODC makes 
use of estimates produced by the World Health Organization 
(WHO). Such data result from indirect estimation methods 
of the number of deaths resulting from all causes, including 
homicide (see Methodological annex for further information). 
These methods were substantially reviewed by the WHO to 
of homicide victims in Africa and some countries 
in Asia.
The total estimated number of homicides in 2012 
leads to an average global homicide rate of 6.2 per 
100,000 population (see figure 1.2).3 But dispari-
ties in regional homicide rates are large and clearly 
point to a high intensity of homicidal violence in 
the Americas, whereas in Asia, Europe and Oce-
ania, homicide rates fall below the global average.
produce the 2012 estimates.
3 The global homicide rate is provided with an interval esti-
mate, with a low estimate of 4.6 and a high estimate of 7.4 
victims of homicide per 100,000 population.
Fig. 1.1: Total number of homicides,  
by region (2012 or latest year)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). The bars repre-
sent total homicide counts based on the source selected at the 
country level, with low and high estimates derived from total 
counts based on additional sources existing at the country level.
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The sub-regional and national 
picture
With averages of over 25 victims per 100,000 pop-
ulation, Southern Africa and Central America are 
the sub-regions with the highest homicide rates on 
record, followed by South America, Middle Africa 
and the Caribbean, with average rates of between 
16 and 23 homicides per 100,000 population (see 
figure 1.3). This sub-regional picture has hardly 
changed since 2011. Likewise, as discussed later in 
this chapter, the fact that homicide rates are sig-
nificantly higher in the Americas in comparison to 
other regions is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, 
according to available time series since 1955, the 
Americas have consistently experienced homicide 
levels five to eight times higher than those in 
Europe or Asia (see figure 1.17, page 35). 
In addition to the entire region of Oceania, sub-
regions with relatively low rates of homicide (less 
than 3 per 100,000 population) include all the 
sub-regions of Europe (with the exception of East-
ern Europe, which has a medium rate of homicide) 
and Eastern Asia.
Sub-regional averages can, however, hide dispari-
ties in homicide rates at the national level. As map 
1.1 demonstrates, for example, countries in the 
southern part of South America, such as Argen-
tina, Chile and Uruguay, have considerably lower 
levels of homicide than countries further north, 
such as Brazil, Colombia and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela. Eastern Europe and South-
Eastern Asia are other examples of sub-regions that 
show large disparities at the national level (see 
figure 1.5). For example, in the former, though 
decreasing, the Russian Federation has a homicide 
rate slightly less than double the sub-regional aver-
age (9.2 versus 5.8 per 100,000 population); in the 
latter, the Philippines has a homicide rate slightly 
more than double the sub-regional average (8.8 
versus 4.3 per 100,000 population).
Countries with high levels of homicide bear a dis-
proportionately heavy burden of homicide, as they 
are home to only 11 per cent of the 2012 global 
population yet they account for 46 per cent of all 
homicide victims (200,000 homicides out of a 
population of 750 million). This means that three 
quarters of a billion people live in countries with 
serious security concerns, all of which are located 
in either Africa or the Americas (see figure 1.4). 
Some of those countries actually have very high 
homicide rates, above 30 per 100,000 population, 
which are higher than rates of conflict-related kill-
ings in some conflict zones. For example, in 2012, 
the rates of intentional homicide and of civilian 
casualties were 6.5 and 9.34 per 100,000 popula-
tion in Afghanistan, and 8.0 and 10.05 per 100,000 
in Iraq, both situations of ongoing conflict. Even 
when combining these two rates, the levels of kill-
ings recorded in both countries in 2012 were well 
below 30 per 100,000 population.6 
4 Based on United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA). Afghanistan 2013 Annual Report: Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict.
5 Based on data from United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq 
(UNAMI), Human Rights Division.
6 Rates of intentional homicide and of civilian casualties are not 
directly comparable in both Afghanistan and Iraq, since a cer-
Fig. 1.2: Homicide rates, by region 
(2012 or latest year)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). The bars repre-
sent population-weighted homicide rates based on the source 
selected at the country level, with low and high estimates 
derived from homicide rates based on additional sources existing 
at the country level.
Criminal justice versus public health 
sources
Data on homicide stem predominantly from two main types of source. “Crimi-
nal justice” data on homicide are typically recorded by the police, based on 
information collected when they receive or investigate details about a crime. De-
pending on national legislation and practices, data on homicide can be directly 
generated by police forces or public prosecutors. “Public health” data reflect 
information collected by the public health or medical service of a country and, 
at the global level, from a dataset produced by the World Health Organization 
(WHO). In countries with accurate registration systems, the two sources pro-
vide very similar results, but discrepancies do exist where coverage and quality of 
administrative records are poor. UNODC homicide estimates are built by select-
ing a source at the country level as the basis for sub-regional, regional and global 
estimates (see Methodological annex). The discrepancy between criminal justice 
and public health data is used to create the high-low estimates represented by 
the range intervals in the graphs depicting regional homicide counts and rates. 
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tain degree of overlap between the two respective counts may 
exist (i.e. certain killings can be counted both as intentional 
homicide and as civilian casualties).
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Fig. 1.3: Homicide rates, by sub-region (2012 or latest year) 
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). The bars represent population-weighted homicide rates based on the source selected at 
the country level, with low and high estimates derived from homicide rates based on additional sources existing at the country level.
Map 1.1: Homicide rates, by country or territory (2012 or latest year)
 
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undeter-
mined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has 
not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the 
Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
24
 GLOBAL STUDY on Homicide
Number of homicides
34,200
2.9 billion3.4 billion0.75 billion
202,200200,300
WŽƉƵůĂƟŽŶ
Countries with low 
homicide rates (<3)
Countries with medium 
homicide rates (3-20)
Countries with high 
homicide rates (>20)
Fig. 1.4: Homicide victims and population, by countries’ level of homicide per 100,000 
population (2012 or latest year)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
Fig. 1.5: Homicide rates at the national level, selected countries, by sub-region  
(2012 or latest year)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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By almost symmetrical contrast to the situation in 
countries with high homicide rates, 42 per cent of 
the global population lives in countries with low 
homicide rates that account for only 8 per cent of 
global homicide victims (34,000 victims out of a 
population of 2.9 billion).  
The sub-national picture
Just as regional and sub-regional homicide rates 
and trends can disguise variations in levels of hom-
icide at the national level, trends in national hom-
icide rates can also mask differences at the 
sub-national level that are important from a policy 
and prevention perspective. For example, so-called 
homicide “hot spots”, which drive increases or 
changes in overall aggregated rates of homicide, 
can remain hidden in the overall national rate of 
homicide, which is why it is also important to 
bring homicide at the local level into focus. 
Known factors that influence levels of lethal vio-
lence can have different manifestations at the local 
level. They include risk factors like unemploy-
ment, poor standards of education, the presence of 
youth gangs and organized crime, poverty and 
inequality, and accessibility to firearms, but also 
protective factors that may be enhanced through 
the implementation of prevention policies. These 
factors can lead to very different outcomes in terms 
of violence and crime, since they operate in differ-
ent areas and in different ways within any given 
country.
Sub-national data are not available for all coun-
tries, but for those countries that do have such 
data, sub-national variations are particularly visible 
in the Americas, as well as in countries in other 
regions, such as India, the Russian Federation and 
South Africa (see map 1.2).
Accounting for security and justice in the post-2015  
development agenda 
As their impact goes far beyond the loss of human life and can create a climate of fear and uncertainty, inten-
tional homicide and violent crime represent a threat to civilian security, which is additional to any threat caused 
by violence stemming from armed conflict. There is increasing evidence that a lack of security, which is often 
associated with a weak criminal justice system, can block the path to development of countries and their popula-
tions. Indeed, statistical evidence indicates that countries with low homicide rates tend to attain higher levels of 
human development.a
After the landmark experience of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) — the global framework for de-
velopment in the 2000-2015 period — the international community is now engaged in the elaboration of the 
political and analytical basis for the post-2015 development agenda. The inclusion of security and justice in the new 
development framework, as seen in the broader context of the rule of law, has been recognized and promoted by 
the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda,b the Rio+20 declarationc and the 
United Nations General Assembly, as well as a variety of other initiatives.d 
Member States will soon define the political agenda and the goals that will form the basis of the post-2015 devel-
opment agenda. If security and justice are to be part of the agenda, appropriate metrics are needed to create the 
evidence-based understanding of trends. To that end, a framework based on a shortlist of targets and a basket of 
indicators is needed. Those indicators could be selected on the basis of their applicability in international or specific 
national contexts, data availability and measurability of the relevant indicator, as well as the ability to demonstrate 
progress in a particular dimension of justice or security.e Among existing ways to measure progress in security and 
justice, intentional homicide indicators could provide an important measure because of their potential for analysis 
relating to dimensions of security, including armed and gender-based violence, and their high degree of statistical 
feasibility. Homicide is the most readily measurable, clearly defined and most comparable indicator for measuring 
violent deaths around the world.f
a See, for example, World Bank (2011). World Development Report; and UNODC (2011). Global Study on Homicide.
b High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (2013). 
c United Nations General Assembly (2012). A/RES/68/288; United Nations General Assembly (2013). A/RES/68/188.
d See, for example, Muggah, R. and G. Milante (2013); and Saferworld (2013). 
e For more, see UNODC (2013a). Accounting for security and justice in the post-2015 development agenda.
f  For example, in UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013), time series since 1995 are currently available for 106  
 countries, while time series data for nine African countries from 2004 are available.
26
 GLOBAL STUDY on Homicide
Map 1.2: Homicide rates at the sub-national level (2012 or latest year)
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undeter-
mined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has 
not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the 
Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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Brazil: Stability in the national homicide rate masks disparities at the  
sub-national level
A good example of stability in a country’s 
national homicide rate disguising dispari-
ties in homicide rates within its territory is 
Brazil, where, although the national homi-
cide rate has changed little over the last 30 
years, there have been significant changes 
within its different states. Homicide rates 
have declined in the States (and cities) of 
Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, but they have 
risen in other parts of the country, particu-
larly the north and north-east. As homi-
cides in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo States 
decreased (by 29 per cent and 11 per cent, 
respectively) from 2007 to 2011, the homi-
cide rate increased by almost 150 per cent 
in Paraiba and by half in Bahia.* An excep-
tion to these trends is the north-eastern 
State of Pernambuco, which experienced 
a decrease in its homicide rate during that 
time period, though it is still at a high level.
* Ministry of Justice, Brazil (2012). Anuário Brasileiro 
de Segurança Pública.
Map 1.3: Percentage change in sub-national homicide rates, Brazil  
(2007-2011)
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations.
Source: Ministry of Justice, Brazil (2012).
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Countries in Europe have some of the lowest hom-
icide rates in the world, but sub-national data can 
paint some interesting pictures within those coun-
tries and in certain trans-border regions (see map 
1.4). The most significant differences lie in the 
west-to-east geographical distribution of homi-
cide, as homicide rates increase eastwards across 
Europe, and there are also higher homicide rates in 
certain parts of Northern Europe. Available data 
indicate that this phenomenon is associated with 
patterns of alcohol consumption (see chapter 3), 
among other factors. 
While homicide rates are generally low in the rest 
of Europe, certain spots with consistently higher 
homicide rates over time can be noted.  At the 
national level, they include Albania and Montene-
gro. Sub-nationally they can be found in the 
Algarve, the southernmost part of Portugal, which 
has a homicide rate of 2.5 per 100,000; in the 
southern tip of Italy, whose homicide rate is attrib-
utable to the prevalence of Mafia-related killings 
(see chapter 2.1); on the French island of Corsica; 
and in certain more densely-populated urban areas 
that have higher homicide rates than the rest of 
their respective countries, such as Amsterdam, 
Brussels, Prague and Vienna.
Homicide rate
< 1.00
1.00  - 1.49
1.50  - 2.49
2.50  - 6.99
>= 7.00
Map 1.4: Homicide rates at the sub-national level, Europe (2012 or latest year)
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent  
undetermined boundaries.
 
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
Urban homicide
Urban areas tend to have higher rates of homicide 
than rural areas, even though cities tend to be 
home to both homicide risk and protective factors. 
For example, cities can play host to many of the 
enablers of homicide, such as high levels of income 
inequality, the potential for anonymity within a 
dense population and the existence of gangs or 
organized criminal groups. But cities are also 
usually home to numerous factors that can help 
prevent homicide, such as higher levels of policing, 
better access to services like medical care and 
educational facilities, and even infrastructural 
elements such as street lighting and closed-circuit 
television, which allow for better monitoring of 
public safety. The presence of certain protective 
factors can often offset risk factors, but every city, 
and indeed every neighbourhood, has unique 
characteristics that can have an influence on 
homicide.
The urban nature of homicide is particularly 
noticeable in Central America, the Caribbean 
and much of Africa. For example, settlements 
of more than 50,000 inhabitants record a dispro-
portionate number of homicides in countries in 
Central America. In Guatemala, 68 per cent of all 
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homicides in 2008 took place in such settlements, 
which housed 58 per cent of the population, while 
in El Salvador, 63 per cent of all homicides in 
2010 took place in such settlements, which housed 
51 per cent of the population.7 In many cities in 
the Americas, high levels of the aforementioned 
risk factors converge and, given the concentration 
of homicide in large cities and particular sub-
national areas, there is a resulting need to develop 
locally-oriented policies to target those risk factors 
and implement protective factors that specifically 
address those needs.
7 Nowak, M. (2012). Urban Armed Violence, Research Note 23, 
Small Arms Survey.
By contrast, some countries have higher national 
average homicide rates than their largest cities (see 
Statistical annex). For example, in selected coun-
tries in Eastern Europe, this phenomenon is also 
visible as a trend across time. Available data for 
four countries and their capital cities demonstrate 
that, from 2004 to 2011, the largest urban areas 
had homicide rates considerably lower than the 
national rate (see figure 1.6). An explanation could 
be that it is an inverted reflection of the situation 
regarding risk and protective factors in cities, in 
that rural areas often have lower levels of policing 
and less access to health and social services than 
cities. They also tend to be further from emer-
gency and rescue services, and may be dispropor-
tionately affected in periods of social and economic 
change.8 
The demographics of homicide 
victims
Globally, 79 per cent of all homicide victims are 
male and the global average male homicide rate9 is, 
at 9.7 per 100,000, almost four times the global 
average female rate (2.7 per 100,000 females). 
Both Africa and the Americas have male and 
female homicide rates above the global average, 
but the Americas has the highest male homicide 
rate, while Africa has the highest female homicide 
rate (see figure 1.7).
As maps 1.5 and 1.6 demonstrate, male homicide 
rates are consistently higher than female homicide 
rates in every country across the world. Yet, as 
discussed in chapter 2.2, some countries in Eastern 
Asia and Europe are nearing gender parity in terms 
of the share of victims killed, though many of 
those countries do have particularly low rates of 
both male and female homicide.
Probably due to regional differences in the preva-
lence of different homicide typologies, the age-
related picture changes across regions. However, 
the 15-29 and 30-44 age groups account for the 
vast majority of homicides globally, with 43 per 
cent of all homicide victims aged 15-29 and 30 per 
cent aged 30-44. 
It is in the Americas that the greatest concentration 
of victims is aged 15-29, both male and female. At 
the sub-regional level, the homicide rate for male 
victims aged 15-29 in South America and Central 
8 For more, see Kaylen, M.T. (2012),  in Handbook of European 
Homicide Research: Patterns, Explanations and Country Studies. 
9 The male homicide rate is calculated based on a population 
of 100,000 males, while the female homicide rate is based on 
a population of 100,000 females.
Fig. 1.6: National and capital city homicide rates, selected 
countries, Eastern Europe (2004-2011)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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Map 1.5: Male homicide rate, by country or territory (2012 or latest year)
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undeter-
mined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has 
not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the 
Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
Map 1.6: Female homicide rate, by country or territory (2012 or latest year)
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undeter-
mined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has 
not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the 
Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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America is more than four times the global average 
rate for that age group, which may be due to higher 
levels of gang-related homicide in the Americas 
than in other regions (see chapter 2.1). To put this 
into perspective, more than one in seven (15 per 
cent) homicide victims globally is a young male 
between 15 and 29 years of age living in the Amer-
icas (see figure 1.9).
In contrast to the regional average, the 30-44 age 
group in Central America and the Caribbean is at 
a higher risk of homicide than other age groups. 
For example, in El Salvador, Honduras and Jamaica, 
the male homicide rate in the 30-44 age group is 
higher than in the 15-29 age group and while the 
number of victims is greater in the 15-29 male age 
group, the rate indicates that the homicide risk for 
males aged 30-44 is higher (see figure 1.10).10 In 
Honduras, this means that almost 1 in every 280 
males in the 30-44 age group falls victim to inten-
tional homicide every year, compared to 1 in 360 
males aged 15-29. The impact of this dynamic can 
be devastating for security and the economy, as the 
deaths of males in the older of the two age groups 
can have a disproportionate impact on families, the 
working population and perceptions of security.
In Europe, males aged 30-44 and 45-59 have a 
higher risk of falling victim to homicide than their 
younger counterparts (see figure 1.11). This differ-
ence may be explained by the relatively greater 
10 This is due to the population structure of those countries, 
which have a high proportion of youth aged 15-29, meaning 
that the denominator is a larger number for the younger age 
group when calculating rates by age group.
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Fig. 1.8: Global homicide rate, by sex and age group  
(2012 or latest year)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
Fig. 1.9: Percentage distribution of homicide victims, by sex and selected age groups 
(2012 or latest year)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
31
THE BIG PICTURE
importance of interpersonal homicide than homi-
cide related to other criminal activities in Europe 
(see chapter 2.2), as well as other risk factors such 
as alcohol consumption. By contrast, the pattern 
for female homicide victims remains quite stable 
throughout the older age groups in Europe, 
although women aged 30 and above are at a slightly 
higher risk than younger women. The uniformity 
of homicide rates for female victims aged 30 and 
above in Europe may be related to their exposure 
to the risk of intimate partner/family-related hom-
icide, which disproportionately affects women (see 
chapter 2.2).
The pattern of older age groups being more at risk 
of homicide applies to a range of countries in Asia, 
Europe and Oceania (see figure 1.12). For exam-
ple, in selected sample countries with available sex 
and age data, over three quarters of homicide vic-
tims are aged 30 and above, which largely holds for 
both male and female victims. However, within 
sub-regions there are outliers that have signifi-
cantly different homicide age profiles from their 
neighbouring States. For example, over 90 per cent 
of male homicide victims in Hungary are aged 30 
and above, whereas the share in Eastern Europe as 
a whole is 75 per cent.  
At the youngest end of the age spectrum, 36,000 
children under the age of 15 were the victims of 
homicide at the global level in 2012. Equating to 
Fig. 1.10:  Male homicide rate, by age 
group, selected countries,  
Americas (2012 or latest year)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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and age group, selected countries  
(2012 or latest year)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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8.2 per cent of all homicide victims, this coupled 
with the share of victims in the 15-29 age group 
means that more than half of all global homicide 
victims are under 30 years of age.
At the global level, the sex differentials are not as 
pronounced in the youngest age group as they are 
in older age groups. At the regional level, homicide 
rates are fairly similar for boy and girl victims in 
Asia, Europe and Oceania, whereas some dispari-
ties between the sexes are already evident at an 
early age in the Americas, with boys already being 
more at risk than girls (see figure 1.13). 
Homicide trends
The overall trend in the global homicide rate may 
be a decreasing one, but it is actually an amalgam 
of very diverse, sometimes even opposing, regional 
and sub-regional trends. For example, trend analy-
sis of the last five years shows the stability of hom-
icide rates in much of Asia and Oceania, as well as 
in all of the sub-regions of Europe, with the excep-
tion of Eastern Europe, which has experienced a 
consistent decrease (see figure 1.14). On the other 
hand, homicide levels have increased in Eastern 
and Northern Africa, while the decrease in homi-
cide levels in Southern Africa has also suffered a 
recent setback. In other sub-regions with relatively 
high homicide levels, the homicide rate appears to 
have stabilized in the Caribbean, albeit at a high 
level; in South America it has fluctuated; and the 
increasing trend in homicide in Central America 
has come to a halt. 
Africa
Data for trend analysis in Africa are only available 
for a handful of countries and for a relatively short 
period of time (since 2004). The limited data 
available for Northern Africa point to a recent 
sharp increase in homicide in the sub-region, 
which is a new and alarming trend largely associ-
ated with increased social and political instability, 
and should be closely monitored. Increases in 
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Fig. 1.13: Homicide rates of males and females aged 0-14, by 
region (2012 or latest year)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
Fig. 1.14:  Homicide rates, by sub-region (2008-2012)
 
 
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
Note: Number of countries is denoted in brackets. Homicide trends are not available for any country in Central or Western Africa.
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homicide rates have also been observed in Eastern 
Africa, with Kenya and Uganda both showing 
increases since 2004. Southern Africa has one of 
the highest homicide rates in the world, but the 
homicide rate in South Africa decreased steadily 
between 1995 and 2011 by more than 50 per cent 
(from 64.9 to 30.0 per 100,000 population), 
though it experienced a slight increase back to 31 
per 100,000 population in 2012 (see figure 1.15). 
Time series data is only available for a shorter 
period in other countries, but Lesotho and 
Namibia have sustained elevated rates of homicide.
Americas
The overall regional increase in homicide in the 
Americas over the past few years has occurred 
despite diverging trends in the region’s four sub-
regions. With the exception of a spike in 2001 
caused by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
Northern America has experienced a continuous 
decline in homicide rates that has accelerated in 
the last five years. South America now has the 
same homicide rate as in 1995, which is the result 
of very different trends at the country level. For 
example, Colombia’s homicide rate has been 
decreasing since 1996 but remains at a very high 
level, while the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is 
the only country in South America that has had a 
consistently increasing homicide rate since 1995. 
Other countries in the region have quite stable 
homicide rates, but at different levels: Brazil’s 
homicide rate is quite stable and high, while  hom-
icide rates in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are 
stable and lower, which gives them homicide pro-
files closer to those of European countries. 
Central America experienced a declining homicide 
rate from 1995 to 2004, followed by a marked 
increase from 2007, often related to drug traffick-
ing and high levels of organized crime-related vio-
lence, which has resulted in one of the highest 
sub-regional homicide rates in the world (26.5 per 
100,000 population). Over the last 12 years, the 
Caribbean has experienced an increase in its hom-
icide rate, whose fluctuations are also linked to 
changes in drug trafficking patterns and gang vio-
lence. Much of the high rate in these sub-regions 
can be attributed to very high rates of homicide 
in the “Northern Triangle” (El Salvador, Guate-
mala and Honduras), as well as in Jamaica.11 In 
terms of addressing the escalating levels of violence 
in Central America and the Caribbean, recent 
11 See UNODC (2013b). World Drug Report; and UNODC 
(2011). Global Study on Homicide.
Fig. 1.15: Homicide rates, by sub-region, selected countries,  
Africa (2004-2012)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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developments include the decline in El Salvador’s 
homicide rate by 40 per cent since 2012, following 
a gang truce in that country (see chapter 2.1).12 
Furthermore, Jamaica’s homicide rate has also 
decreased by 35 per cent since 2009, which may be 
attributable to a significant drop in crime-related 
homicides.13
Asia
The homicide rate in Asia has been steadily 
decreasing since 1995, with significant decreases in 
the continent’s various sub-regions. Central Asian 
countries have seen their homicide rates decline, 
from comparably higher levels, by one to two 
thirds in the past decade, but an isolated peak 
occurred in 2010, which coincided with a period 
of civil unrest in Kyrgystan. In Eastern Asia, the 
sub-region with the lowest homicide rates in the 
world, Japan and Hong Kong, China have consist-
ently had rates below 1 per 100,000 population. 
Southern and South-Eastern Asia have also seen an 
overall decrease in homicidal violence in countries 
where data are available. The sub-regional rate for 
South-Eastern Asia peaked in 2003 due to an 
increase in Thailand associated with the fight 
against drug trafficking,14 while the decreasing 
trend in the Philippines has also helped drive the 
decrease in the sub-region’s homicide rate. In 
Southern Asia, the stability of the homicide rate in 
the most populous country, India, masks increases 
in the rates of other countries in the region, nota-
bly Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Europe
Homicide levels in Europe have decreased or 
remained stable at low rates in many countries over 
the time period in question, with the exception of 
the 1997 spike in Albania during a period of civil 
unrest. Significant developments are most notable 
in the decline in Eastern Europe’s homicide rate, 
driven largely by the rate’s decline in the Russian 
Federation since 2001. The improvement in socio-
economic conditions in many Eastern European 
countries is likely to have contributed to the con-
tinual decrease in homicide rates in the sub-region. 
This phenomenon can also be seen in Northern 
Europe, where the Baltic countries have experi-
enced a 50 per cent decline in their homicide rates 
in the past decade. Homicide rates in other coun-
tries in Europe have remained low and steady, and 
12 Government of El Salvador (2013). 
13 UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
14 Mutebi, A.M. (2004), in Asian Survey 44(1).
Fig. 1.16: Homicide rates, by sub-region (1995-2012) 
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). Lines represent population-weighted average 
homicide rate.
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the sub-regions of Western and Southern Europe 
have very low rates of homicide, of around 1 per 
100,000 population.
Long-term homicide trends
An additional perspective can be gained by situat-
ing levels of homicide within a historical context. 
The analysis of long-term homicide trends is also 
useful for identifying patterns which, irrespective 
of fluctuations in the short-to-mid-term, may 
point to the different drivers of violence in differ-
ent countries. 
Although not indicative of global trends, available 
data for a selected number of countries provide 
important insights into homicide levels since 1955 
(see figure 1.17). On average, in five countries in 
the Americas with available data,15 homicide rates 
have been consistently and significantly higher 
than those recorded in European countries. Today, 
countries in the Americas with homicide rates 
significantly higher than the global average are 
revisiting the region’s previous experience of lethal 
violence, whereas the countries in Europe with 
available data have long-term homicide levels in 
line with those in the few countries in Asia/Oce-
ania for which trend data are available.
In the period under examination, individual coun-
tries followed different trajectories. In the Ameri-
15 The five countries are Chile, Colombia, Mexico, the United 
States of America and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
Fig. 1.17: Homicide rates, selected regions (1955-2012, three-year moving average)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) and WHO Mortality Database.
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cas, for example, Colombia’s long history of violent 
political conflicts and struggles with organized 
criminal groups tended to coincide with periods of 
high homicide rates, especially in the 1950s and 
1990s. But those rates have seen a sharp downward 
turn in the last decade, largely due to increases in 
stability and prosperity, as well as the decline in the 
threat from armed criminal and revolutionary 
groups. On the other hand, the sudden increase in 
Mexico’s homicide rate since 2007 has come after 
a steadily declining trend, from comparably high 
levels in the mid-1950s. 
The long-term experience of many of the countries 
in the Americas included here, though very differ-
ent in levels, trends and timing, still indicates that 
they have rarely recorded homicide rates lower 
than 10 per 100,000. But one country in the 
Americas with a different story to tell is Chile, 
which has never recorded a homicide rate above 5 
per 100,000 population since 1955 and, while the 
country experienced some peaks in homicide in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, its homicide rate 
has never reached levels recorded elsewhere in the 
region (see figure 1.18).
The period of stability that most European coun-
tries entered after the mid-1950s is reflected in 
stable and low homicide rates (see figure 1.19), 
which have usually remained at a very low level 
(below 2 per 100,000). Some notable exceptions 
exist, both in terms of peaks recorded by individ-
ual countries (France: Algerian war around 1960; 
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Italy: years of terrorism and Mafia-related violence 
in the early 1980s and early 1990s) as well as in the 
overall trends of individual countries such as Fin-
land and Hungary, two countries that have had 
parallel homicide trends but for two periods of 
major political change that affected Hungary (the 
civil revolution in 1956 and the regime transition 
in the early 1990s).
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The few countries/territories in Asia and Oceania 
for which long-term data are available have been 
characterised by very stable social and economic 
situations, which are reflected in low homicide 
levels, although there have been some fluctuations 
in the case of Hong Kong, China and New Zea-
land, mostly due to low numbers of homicide 
victims and small population sizes (see figure 1.20).
Fig. 1.18: Homicide rate, selected countries, the Americas (1955-2012, three-year moving 
average)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) and WHO Mortality Database.
Fig. 1.19: Homicide rate, selected countries, Europe (1955-2012, three-year moving
average)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) and WHO Mortality Database.
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With no notable fluctuations, the homicide rate in 
Japan has decreased steadily since 1955 to reach 
one of the lowest levels in the world. The country’s 
homicide rate is associated with a stable and pros-
perous society with low inequality and high levels 
of development. Young Japanese males now 
commit only a tenth of the homicides committed 
by their predecessors in 1955, and the age and sex 
distribution of victims tend to be uniform across 
age groups.16 This has been attributed by some 
researchers to, amongst other factors, extremely 
low levels of gun ownership (1 in 175 households),17 
a greater chance of detection (according to police 
data, 98 per cent of homicide cases are solved),18 
the rejection of violence after the Second World 
War, the growth of affluence without the accom-
panying concentrations of poverty common in 
many highly developed countries, and the stigma 
of arrest for any crime in Japanese society.19 
16 Dai, M. (2013), in Handbook of Asian Criminology. P. 18.
17 Johnson, D.T. (2006), in Social Science Japan Journal 9.
18 This data includes attempted homicides. Ministry of Justice, 
Research and Training Institute, Japan (2011). 
19 Park, W.K. (2006). Trends in crime rates in postwar Japan: a 
structural perspective. 
Fig. 1.20: Homicide rate, selected countries, Asia and Oceania (1955-2012, three-year  
moving average)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) and WHO Mortality Database.
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
19
55
 - 
19
57
19
57
 - 
19
59
19
59
 - 
19
61
19
61
 - 
19
63
19
63
 - 
19
65
19
65
 - 
19
67
19
67
 - 
19
69
19
69
 - 
19
71
19
71
 - 
19
73
19
73
 - 
19
75
19
75
 - 
19
77
19
77
 - 
19
79
19
79
 - 
19
81
19
81
 - 
19
83
19
83
 - 
19
85
19
85
 - 
19
87
19
87
 - 
19
89
19
89
 - 
19
91
19
91
 - 
19
93
19
93
 - 
19
95
19
95
 - 
19
97
19
97
 - 
19
99
19
99
 - 
20
01
20
01
 - 
20
03
20
03
 - 
20
05
20
05
 - 
20
07
20
07
 - 
20
09
20
09
 - 
20
11
Ra
te
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
 p
op
ul
at
io
n
China, Hong Kong SAR Japan New Zealand

39
2. THE MANY FACES OF HOMICIDE
The study of why people kill other people is vital 
from a policy perspective, as without such knowl-
edge it is very difficult to implement appropriate 
strategies and policies for the prevention and 
reduction of homicide. A number of homicide 
types can be identified on the basis of elements 
such as premeditation, motivation, context, instru-
mentality and perpetrator-victim relationship, 
which all play roles of varying magnitudes in dif-
ferent forms of homicide. That said, developing 
homicide typologies is a complex business, not 
least because they sometimes overlap and, in real 
life, homicide drivers can be multiple. Indeed, 
further research and methodological work is 
needed to help develop a comprehensive categori-
zation of homicide,1 but some of its typologies, 
which are particularly relevant from the crime 
prevention perspective, can already be identified in 
the following manner: 
s  Homicide related to other criminal activities
s  Interpersonal homicide
s  Socio-political homicide
Homicide related to other criminal 
activities 
The first of the three typologies is homicide com-
mitted in relation to other criminal activities that 
are aimed, directly or indirectly, at obtaining illicit 
profits. Within such a broad category, two distinct 
types of homicide can be identified: those commit-
1 The International Classification of Crime for Statistical Pur-
poses (ICCS), currently under development in a process led 
by UNODC, will provide tools to build a consistent catego-
rization of intentional homicide.
ted by organized criminal groups;2 and those com-
mitted while perpetrating other, more conventional 
criminal acts such as robbery. Although the main 
goal of organized criminal groups is to generate 
illicit profit, they may commit homicide for a 
variety of reasons, from the elimination of rivals 
and State representatives, to shows of strength and 
territorial control. In such cases, homicides are 
instrumental to achieving longer-term criminal 
2 An “organized criminal group” is defined by the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(2000) as a structured group of three or more persons, exist-
ing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of 
committing one or more serious crimes or offences…in order 
to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other mate-
rial benefit. (See United Nations (2000). Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, article 2.).
Fig. 2.1: A classiﬁcation of intentional homicide
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goals and are typically the result of premeditation 
and purpose. On the other hand, while organized 
criminal groups may also commit conventional 
crimes, homicides perpetrated during other crimi-
nal acts have different drivers: homicide does not 
represent the primary goal of most criminals, 
though it may be perpetrated in order to accom-
plish the original crime and/or avoid detection.
Interpersonal homicide
Central to the definition of the second homicide 
typology is the fact that homicide is not instru-
mental to the accomplishment of a secondary goal, 
but is rather a means of resolving a conflict and/or 
punishing the victim through violence when rela-
tionships come under strain (including from fric-
tion due to social and cultural norms). The two 
main categories in this typology are homicide 
related to intimate partner or family relationships, 
in which victim and perpetrator are relatives, share 
the same household and/or an intimate relation-
ship; and other interpersonal homicide, in which 
the victim and perpetrator may or may not know 
each other. The relationship in intimate partner/
family-related homicide is distinguished from the 
relationship in the other interpersonal homicide 
category by the level of emotional attachment and 
other links, often of an economic or legal nature, 
between victim and perpetrator. Homicides within 
this typology can be the result of a premeditated 
design or of a random act of violence, but the 
nature of the relationship between perpetrator and 
victim is a fundamental feature of this crime. 
Straddling the divide between the private and 
public spheres, much of this type of violence is 
attributed to the very nature of coexisting with and 
among others. 
Socio-political homicide
The third typology encompasses homicides that 
originate in the public sphere and are typically 
committed as an instrument for advancing social 
or political agendas. Power relationships, including 
among social, ethnic and political groups, are 
involved and homicide is committed in order to 
exert influence over those relationships, whether 
directly or indirectly. People are killed for what 
they represent and/or for the message that such 
killings can convey to the general public or to 
specific sub-sectors. In contrast to interpersonal 
homicide, the victims of this typology are often 
anonymous to its perpetrators, or at least the 
nature of the relationship between them is not a 
consideration in the decision to kill. Often the 
result of premeditation and organization, homi-
cides of this type include those resulting from acts 
of terrorism and hate crime, amongst many others. 
War and conflict-related killings are also consid-
ered acts of socio-political violence, but are not 
included in this category as they are outside the 
realm of intentional homicide.
Homicide typologies: data  
challenges and regional patterns
Just as countries are affected by different types of 
violence, the three homicide typologies affect a 
country’s overall homicide rate in different ways. 
Global analysis of such differences is hampered by 
insufficient statistical information as not many 
countries produce or disseminate data on motives 
for homicide, and important differences exist as to 
the criteria used for determining motivation when 
they do. This makes it difficult to identify homi-
cide drivers and the relative prevalence of each of 
the homicide typologies in a comprehensive 
manner, whether at the country or regional level. 
Where data is available, different types of homi-
cide can be linked to the differences in homicide 
levels between some regions. For example, homi-
cide related to other criminal activities seems to be 
largely a phenomenon in the Americas, with 30 
per cent of homicides in the region being linked to 
organized crime or gangs. In five countries with 
available trend data in the sub-regions of Central 
America and the Caribbean, homicide linked to 
other criminal activities drives overall national 
homicide rates. 
While homicide linked to robbery is a very stable 
share of all homicides (about 5 per cent of all 
homicides in the Americas, Europe and Oceania 
each year), homicides linked to gangs or organized 
crime tend to be more variable over time and more 
diverse across countries. This suggests that organ-
ized crime or gang-related homicides can produce 
sudden changes in the homicide level of a given 
country; an example being the sharp (40 per cent) 
decline in homicides in El Salvador in the course 
of a single year (see chapter 2.1), or the rapid 
increase in the homicide rate in Central America 
between 2007 and 2011. Those most at risk from 
this type of homicide are males, particularly young 
males aged 15-29 in the Americas.
By contrast, intimate partner/family-related homi-
cide affects every region and country across the 
globe, accounting for one in seven (14 per cent) of 
all homicides in 2012. Although its intensity is 
41
THE MANY FACES OF HOMICIDE
greater in the Americas, this type of homicide 
accounts for a greater share of total homicides in 
Asia, Europe and Oceania. Unlike other types of 
killing, it disproportionately affects women: two 
thirds of all victims of this type of homicide are 
women, and almost half (47 per cent) of all female 
victims of homicide are killed by their intimate 
partners or family members. Those most at risk 
from this type of homicide are adult women aged 
30 and over.
Other types of interpersonal homicide may include 
those resulting from conflicts relating to issues 
such as property disputes or revenge-type killings, 
or even from random acts that may be solely the 
result of the victim being in the wrong place at the 
wrong time. From limited available data, it appears 
that other interpersonal-type homicides occur at 
all latitudes, though for different reasons (such as 
land disputes or urban violence). 
Very limited statistical information is available on 
killings motivated by social or political agendas 
(such as hate crimes or acts of terrorism). This 
typology of homicide can represent a substantive 
share of total homicides in specific contexts or 
regions, such as in post-conflict settings or coun-
tries experiencing social, economic or political 
upheaval. However, national definitions and 
recording practices may differ substantially and 
determine if and how such homicides are reflected 
in statistics.3
3  Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (2013). 
Fig. 2.2: Shares of homicide, by typology, selected countries (2001-2012)
 
Source: UNODC elaboration of data from the Jamaica Constabulary Force (2008-2011); UNODC elaboration of data from the Sección de Estadistica, Departa-
mento de Planificación, Costa Rica (2013); National Crime Records Bureau, India, (2001-2012); European Homicide Monitor (2003-2006). 
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A sample of countries with available data on hom-
icide by type (see figure 2.2) illustrates that the 
proportions of homicide related to the various 
typologies can differ greatly across countries and 
regions. Homicides related to other criminal activ-
ities make up the vast majority of homicides in 
Jamaica and less than half of all homicides in Costa 
Rica. The share of interpersonal homicides is high 
in selected European countries and in India, but a 
large share of unknown homicide contexts leaves 
room for uncertainty.
As demonstrated by the variety of regional and 
national experiences analysed in this study, there is 
no “one-size-fits-all” approach to tackling homi-
cide. Better understanding of motivations, con-
texts and relationships between perpetrators and 
victims will facilitate targeted strategies and poli-
cies to decrease homicide around the world. 
2.1 HOMICIDE RELATED TO OTHER 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
Due to its direct impact on public security, homi-
cide committed by “professional” criminals often 
attracts the full attention of law enforcement agen-
cies and the criminal justice system. But the rela-
tionship between other criminal activities, 
particularly the most clandestine among them, 
and homicidal violence is not a straightforward 
one. Homicides committed while perpetrating 
other crimes such as robbery (homicide is not the 
primary goal) show constant trends and levels 
across regions, while trends and levels of homicides 
related to organized criminal groups (homicide is 
instrumental and premeditated) vary over time 
and by region. 
The share of homicides related to organized crim-
inal groups out of total homicides is highest in the 
Americas and lowest in Asia. In developed coun-
tries with low homicide rates, homicides related to 
organized criminal groups are stable or decreasing, 
whereas they are on the increase in countries with 
high homicide rates. Also of note is the extreme 
gender bias towards male victims in homicides 
related to organized criminal groups. In the Amer-
icas, for example, 96 per cent of the victims of this 
type of homicide are male. 
Organized crime/gang-related 
homicide
When looking at proportions of homicides related 
to gangs and organized criminal groups (according 
to national police statistics from several countries 
in three regions), a relatively clear pattern emerges. 
The median proportion of organized crime/gang-
related homicides is highest in the Americas and 
lowest in Asia (see figure 2.1.1), though these fig-
ures should be interpreted with caution because of 
the existence of different criteria in the classifica-
tion of homicides linked to organized crime.4 
Moreover, the fact that organized crime/gang-
related homicides are more prevalent in the Amer-
icas does not necessarily mean that organized 
crime or gangs are more prevalent there than in 
Europe or Asia. Rather, violence is often linked to 
competition between involved parties, such as 
organized criminal groups, or between them and 
the State, with regard to control over territory or 
illicit activities, including trafficking. Such groups 
in the Americas may be experiencing higher levels 
4 The attribution of homicide to “organized crime” or “gang” 
depends on national penal legislation, practices by law 
enforcement agencies and accuracy in compiling statistics. 
For example, in one country, a homicide is defined as gang-
related if the suspect is known to be a gang member, while 
in another country, the classification can be related to crime-
scene criteria such as the modalities of killing, weapon used, 
number of perpetrators, etc. 
Organized criminal group 
or gang?
Significant efforts have been made to distinguish 
between organized criminal groups, gangs and drug 
trafficking groups.a  They frequently overlap and it is 
often difficult to draw a distinction between them 
due to the heterogeneity and dynamics of the phe-
nomena in different regions. Much of the debate 
centres on the degree of organization or sophistica-
tion in the operations of the group and how such 
groups use violence. Gangs are thought to be less 
sophisticated than organized criminal groups and 
to focus their use of violence on short-term, more 
tactical goals and delinquency, whereas organized 
criminal groups are characterized as profit-driven, 
relatively sophisticated criminal enterprises that use 
violence strategically in order to further their goals 
and to assert power. Despite the use of violence be-
ing a key characteristic of organized criminal groups, 
it is preferably used as a last resort, as violence tends 
to draw attention to their operations. Organized 
criminal groups aim to keep a low profile in order to 
protect their illicit activities from law enforcement 
attention, but will use violence instrumentally to 
protect their interests.  
a  The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (2000) provides a definition of an organized criminal group 
(see article 2). For a more in-depth look at the theoretical distinc-
tions between these groups, see also UNODC (2011). Global 
Study on Homicide. P. 48.
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of conflict with each other, or with the State, than 
organized criminal groups in other regions, which, 
though they may also be active, may have reached 
a level of stability or control over their territory 
and resources that does not generate the same level 
of visible violence.
Across the world, trends in organized crime/gang-
related homicide vary considerably. In selected 
developed countries (see figure 2.1.2), in a frame-
work of relatively low homicide rates,5 the trend in 
such killings has been quite stable and slowly 
decreasing, and rates of organized crime/gang-
related killings have decreased to below 0.3 per 
100,000 population since 2006. In Italy, there has 
been a 50 per cent decline in this type of homicide 
since 2007, with organized crime-related rates of 
homicide decreasing from 0.2 to less than 0.1 per 
100,000 population. 
The picture is different in Central America and the 
Caribbean (see figure 2.1.3) where, in a context of 
high homicide levels, countries reporting on hom-
icides linked to gangs and organized criminal 
groups often show increasing trends, particularly 
the Bahamas, Belize, El Salvador and Honduras.
5 The group of developed countries considered here has an 
average homicide rate below 0.8 per 100,000, with the excep-
tion of the United States, which in the last five years has had 
an average homicide rate of 4.9 per 100,000 population. 
(UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013)).
Levels of violence related to organized criminal 
groups and gangs have been linked to a variety of 
different dynamics across different countries. For 
example, while some countries in Central America 
and the Caribbean have had a strong presence of 
Fig. 2.1.1: Percentage of organized crime/
gang-related homicides out of 
total homicides, by region (2011 
or latest year)
Note: The bars refer to the median percentage of homicides involving 
gangs or organized criminal groups, with the low and high estimates 
derived from the first and third percentage quartiles within each region.
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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organized criminal groups and gangs for years, the 
surge in homicide levels in Central America in 
recent years is largely a result of violence related to 
the control of drug trafficking routes, to turf wars 
between criminal groups and to conflict between 
organized criminal groups and the State. 
Italy: Maﬁa-related crime
Although many of their activities take place out-
side the law, from the perspective of organized 
criminal groups, these activities are still business 
activities. As in conventional business, the main 
goal of organized criminal groups is to maximize 
their profits, which means being pragmatic and 
adaptable, particularly in terms of the amount of 
attention they draw from law enforcement agen-
cies. The term “pax mafiosa” has been used to refer 
to situations when organized criminal groups max-
imize their efforts to avoid the use of violence, 
which can result in low levels of violent crime even 
though levels of other crime may be high. Indeed, 
the relationship between organized criminal groups 
and homicidal violence is not symmetrical and 
though a high level of violence caused by organ-
ized criminal groups is a clear indicator of their 
presence, a lack of such violence is more difficult 
to interpret.
A case in point is Italy, where the story of organ-
ized crime-related homicide is not only one of 
declining trends, but also of varying relationships 
between crime and the presence of Mafia-type 
associations.6 Despite having fallen by over 80 per 
6 In Italy, an association is said to be of a “Mafia-type” when the 
participants take advantage of the intimidating power of the 
cent from 1992 to 2012 (see figure 2.1.4), Mafia-
related homicides currently make up a significant 
proportion (approximately 10-15 per cent) of all 
homicides in Italy. In 2012, there were 70 reported 
Mafia-related homicides, all of which occurred in 
the southern regions of Calabria, Campania, 
Puglia and Sicily, where Mafia-type associations 
are traditionally considered to have a foothold.7 
A declining rate of Mafia-related killings does not 
mean, per se, that Mafia-type associations are nec-
essarily loosening their grip in certain Italian 
regions. Such organizations typically operate in a 
covert manner, thus the assessment of the scope 
and intensity of their activities is extremely chal-
lenging. However, by using a number of direct and 
indirect indicators, a composite indicator of the 
presence of Mafia-type associations has been 
recently proposed. Using four variables to cover 
different dimensions of Mafia activity, including 
persons charged for being associated with the 
Mafia and assets confiscated from organized crim-
inal groups, the “Mafia Index”8 measures the pres-
association ties, and of the resulting conditions of submission 
and silence (omertà), to commit criminal offences, to directly 
and indirectly acquire management or control of economic 
activities, licences, authorizations, public contracts and ser-
vices, or to obtain unlawful profits or advantages for them-
selves or any other person, or with a view to preventing or 
limiting the freedom to vote, or getting votes for themselves 
or other persons, on the occasion of an election (Government 
of Italy (1930). Italian Criminal Code, Article 416. Association 
to commit crimes).
7 ISTAT, Italy (2012). 
8 Ministry of Interior, Transcrime, Italy (2013). The Mafia 
Index is a composite index that measures the presence of 
Mafia-type associations in Italy, by covering various dimen-
sions of a Mafia organization. Those dimensions include per-
sons charged for Mafia associations, Mafia-related murders, 
Fig. 2.1.4: Number of homicides in Italy, by Maﬁa-type association (1992-2012)
Source: Massari, M. (2013); Small Arms Survey; Ministry of Interior, Transcrime, Italy (2013).
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Map. 2.1.1: Number of Maﬁa-related homicides and revised  
Maﬁa Index scores, by province (2010-2011) 
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official 
endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
* Note: A revised Mafia Index, which excludes Mafia-related homicides for the calculation of the Mafia 
Index at the provincial level, is used in this map.
Source: ISTAT, Italy (2012); Ministry of Interior, Transcrime, Italy (2013). 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
DĂĮĂ/ŶĚĞǆΎ
0.00 - 0.99
1.00 - 4.99
5.00 - 9.99
10.00 - 19.99
20.00 - 29.99
>= 30
not available
! 1
! 2
! 3
! 4-9
! 10-19
! 20+
EƵŵďĞƌŽĨDĂĮĂͲƌĞůĂƚĞĚ
ŚŽŵŝĐŝĚĞƐ
SWITZERLAND h^dZ/
SLOVENIA
BOSNIA
AND 
HERZEGOVINACROATIA
FRANCE
ence of Mafia-type associations at the provincial 
level in Italy. By mapping the presence and activi-
ties of Mafia-type associations, it indicates that the 
infiltration of such groups is not limited to south-
ern Italy, as areas in the centre and north of the 
country also show signs of Mafia activity (see map 
2.1.1).9
Mafia-related homicides are still concentrated in 
areas where there is a strong Mafia presence (high 
Mafia Index). But while there is generally a link 
between homicide and organized criminal groups, 
there are areas with a significant presence of Mafia-
type associations without Mafia-related homicides. 
As such, provinces with high levels of Mafia-related 
homicides have a high Mafia presence, but a high 
Mafia presence does not necessarily result in organ-
ized crime-related homicides.
El Salvador: the gang “truce” and  
decreasing homicide rates 
The experience of Italy shows that organized 
crime-related homicide is not just a function of the 
presence of organized crime per se. In contrast to 
other types of homicide, trends in organized crime-
related homicide are exposed to sudden changes as 
a consequence of power shifts between organized 
criminal groups, conflicts between those groups or 
between them and State authorities. But organized 
criminal groups are clearly also susceptible to the 
effect of specific policies aimed at fighting or miti-
gating violence stemming from their activities.
Central America’s gang-related homicides have 
been driving the extremely high levels of  homicide 
in the sub-region. In El Salvador, major changes in 
homicidal violence took place after a “truce” 
between two major gangs was agreed upon in 
March 2012. The truce, brokered by local govern-
ment, the international community and religious 
leaders, had an immediate impact on homicide 
levels (see figure 2.1.5).10 
The long-term impact of the truce cannot yet be 
evaluated, but the most welcome effect has been 
the dramatic drop in the homicide rate. In 2011 
city councils that were dissolved for Mafia infiltration, assets 
confiscated from organized crime, as well as other variables 
derived from reports of the National Anti-Mafia Depart-
ment and the Anti-Mafia Investigation Department from 
2000-2011.
9 The map is based on a revised Mafia Index, which does not 
include Mafia-related homicides. This is to avoid autocor-
relation effects in the analysis of Mafia-related homicides and 
Mafia presence, as measured by the Mafia Index.
10 Government of El Salvador (2013). 
and January-February 2012, prior to the truce, the 
average monthly homicide rate was 6.0 per 
100,000 population, a value close to the global 
annual homicide rate, meaning that people were 
killed at the same rate on a monthly basis in El 
Fig. 2.1.5: Monthly homicide rate, El Salvador (2010-2013)
Source: National Police of El Salvador (2013).
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Salvador as in one year at the global level. After the 
truce, however, the monthly homicide rate was 
more than halved (averaging 2.8 per 100,000 pop-
ulation) from March 2012 to February 2013. This 
sudden reduction provides an indirect quantifica-
tion of the homicidal violence that could be 
directly attributed to gang-related conflict in the 
period before the truce. In parallel with the decline 
in homicides since the truce, there also appears to 
have been a slight decline in some other criminal 
activities, according to data on crime reported (see 
figure 2.1.6). 
For example, levels of extortion, a crime typically 
associated with gangs, appear to have decreased 
slightly since the truce but are still extremely high 
throughout the country, particularly its eastern 
region (see map 2.1.2).
Despite an overall decline in violent crime rates, 
especially the homicide rate, the situation remains 
fluid and fragile. According to surveys in 2012 and 
2013, just over 50 per cent of the population felt 
that the truce had helped to reduce crime,11 sug-
gesting that the benefits of the truce have yet to be 
perceived by the population with an intensity 
reflecting the drop in the homicide rate.
Elsewhere in Central America, gang truces have 
seen mixed results. For example, in Honduras, a 
truce agreement has been in place since May 2013 
but, in contrast to the situation in El Salvador, the 
11 Instituto Universitario de Opinion Publica (2013). Data 
relates to the sum of answers “a lot”, “some” and “a little” 
to the question “In your opinion, how much has the truce 
between gangs reduced crime?” 
number of homicides did not decrease in the period 
immediately following the truce.12 This may be 
attributable to differences in the gangs themselves, 
as gangs in Honduras may be less organized and 
less hierarchical than those in El Salvador, possibly 
making it more difficult for gang leaders to impose 
their will over the various factions. 
12 Instituto Universitario de Democracia, Paz y Seguridad 
(2013). In the month following the truce, there were 614 
murders, an increase from the 599 murders in the month 
preceding the truce. 
Map. 2.1.2: Homicide and extortion rates, by department, El Salvador (2011 and 2012) 
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Source: UNODC elaboration of El Salvador National Police (2013) data.
Fig. 2.1.6: Rates of selected crimes,  
El Salvador (2007-2013)
*Note: Data for 2013 based on data from January-August 2013.
Source: National Police of El Salvador (2013).
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Conventional crime and homicide
Despite the fact that homicide may be considered 
a possible outcome of a criminal action, it does not 
represent the primary goal of the majority of crim-
inals. For that reason, homicides linked to more 
conventional types of crime such as robbery or 
burglary are of a different nature from homicides 
linked to organized crime, for which homicide can 
often be a strategic element of its modus operandi.
In 37 countries with available data, roughly 5 per 
cent of all homicides were linked to robbery in 
2012. This percentage holds true for the three 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: progress in prevention 
Brazil has made significant inroads in combating gangs and related violence in recent years. In particular, an innova-
tive programme known as Unidades de Policia Pacificadora (Pacifying Police Units (UPPs)) has been instituted in 
favelas, or slums, in Rio de Janeiro, which have become the base of operations for many organized criminal groups 
and, with competing criminal factions vying for territory, are also traditionally the most violent parts of the city.
UPPs have been instituted in several favelas since 2008/2009 to provide traditional community “proximity” po-
licing, while consolidating State control over those communities and linking them to State social services. As of 
November 2013, 34 units were in operation in 226 communities, benefiting over 1.5 million people. UPP officials 
are given specialized education and training, notably in human rights and modern policing techniques, with the aim 
of taking control back from the gangs and promoting long-term security.a
Official data attest to a decrease in homicide rates, as well as robbery rates, since the UPP programme began. The 
trend in homicide incidents was decreasing in the areas now controlled by UPPs prior to their implementation 
(see figure 2.1.7), but those areas have experienced a continued decline in the number of homicides since the pro-
gramme commenced and they all show a greater decrease than the one recorded in the city of Rio de Janeiro over 
the same period of time. It is noteworthy that the number of reported sexual assaults in the same period signifi-
cantly increased in communities where UPPs operate (by almost 200 per cent). This latter trend may be attributed 
to higher rates of reporting of those crimes, which may be interpreted as growing trust in the police, or be due to 
better recording practices. 
There is also broad support for the UPPs from favela residents. For example, 66 per cent of those surveyed in Santa 
Marta and Cidade de Deus approved of the programme in 2009. In 2010, 93 per cent of people resident in UPP 
areas felt safer, while 70 per cent of residents of communities without UPPs would have liked to have had the pro-
gramme implemented in their neighbourhood.b The installation of UPPs is an important acknowledgement that 
social inclusion and community development are key components in preventing crime. They facilitate or promote 
security and access to social services, as well as help create opportunities for social and economic development. 
 
a United Nations. Human Rights Council (2010). A/HRC/14/24/Add.4. Para. 21. 
b Getulio Vargas Foundation, in United Nations Human Rights Council (2010). Op. Cit. Para. 22.
Fig. 2.1.7: Trend in homicides in UPP areas of operation and the city of Rio de Janeiro, 
(2007-2012)
Note: Data for UPPs starting in 2009 include Cidade de Deus, Batam, Chapeu Mangueira and Pavao Pavaozinho, as well as for Santa Marta 
(which commenced 19 December 2008); data for UPPs starting in 2010 include Andarai, Borel, Formiga, Macacos, Providencia, Salgueiro, 
Tabajaras and Turano; data for UPPs starting in 2011 include Coroa, Fallet e Fogueteiro; Escondidinho e Prazeres; Mangueria; Sao Carlos; and 
Sao Joao Quieto e Matriz.
Source: Instituto de Segurança Publica, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (2013).
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regions for which data are available, the Americas, 
Asia and Europe, where, at 5.2, 5.2 and 5.3 per 
cent of all homicides, respectively, it is remarkably 
similar.
When looking at data from a smaller selection of 
countries for which trend data on homicide linked 
to robbery are available, the homicide rate gener-
ally decreased from 2005 to 2011, as per the global 
trend, whereas the rate of homicide linked to rob-
bery bucked that trend by remaining stable (see 
figure 2.1.8). As such, the share of homicides 
linked to robbery slightly increased from 2005 to 
2011. Contrary to fluctuations that are often 
recorded in trends in organized crime-related 
homicide, killings during robberies show a higher 
degree of stability.
Homicide in Latin American 
cities
Homicide linked to other criminal activities, and par-
ticularly to criminal groups, garners significant attention 
in the Americas, but considerable levels of other types of 
homicide also exist there. Based on data available for five 
cities in South America, homicide levels are lowest in the 
cities of Montevideo (Uruguay) and Santiago (Chile), 
in the southern part of the sub-region, but the propor-
tion of homicides that the different typologies account 
for varies considerably. In Santiago, the vast majority of 
homicides are linked to other criminal activities, while 
the share of interpersonal homicides is higher in Monte-
video. In Quito (Ecuador), the share of homicides attrib-
uted to the interpersonal and crime-related typologies 
are nearly identicala (see figure 2.1.9). 
In those cities, homicides due to assaults and robber-
ies, as well as vengeance-related killings, are considered 
to be included in the typology of homicide linked to 
other criminal activities, while interpersonal homicide 
encompasses homicides resulting from inter-family and 
inter-couple homicide, femicide, and homicides linked 
to sexual crimes.  
a Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (2013). 
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Fig. 2.1.9: Average share of homicides, by typology;  
and homicide rates, by selected cities,   
South America (2008-2011)
Source: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (2013). 
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2.2 INTERPERSONAL HOMICIDE
Straddling the divide between the private and 
public spheres, much of this type of lethal violence 
is attributed to the very nature of coexisting with 
others. Central to its definition is the fact that 
interpersonal homicide is not instrumental to the 
accomplishment of a secondary goal, but is rather 
a means of resolving a conflict and/or punishing 
the victim through violence when relationships 
come under strain (including from friction due to 
social and cultural norms). 
Its two main sub-types, intimate partner/family-
related homicide and homicide related to other 
interpersonal conflicts are distinguished from each 
other by the nature of the relationship between 
perpetrator and victim. This means that in homi-
cides related to intimate partners or family mem-
bers, the relationship between victim and 
perpetrator is characterized by an emotional 
attachment, as well as other links, often of an eco-
nomic or legal nature, whereas the perpetrator and 
victim in other interpersonal-related homicide 
may or may not know each other.   
In contrast to the rates of other forms of homicide, 
which can vary significantly from year to year, the 
average rate of homicide by intimate partners or 
family members is relatively stable at the global 
level, though regional trends can differ remarkably. 
Although this type of homicide affects people in all 
regions, it disproportionately affects women to the 
extent that, in some countries, most female victims 
of homicide are killed by their intimate partners or 
family members. Indeed, at the global level, almost 
half of female homicide victims are killed by their 
family members or intimate partners, whereas the 
figure for men is just over 1 in 20 homicide vic-
tims. With bitter irony, women run the highest 
risk of being killed by those who are expected to 
care for and even protect them.
As clear and consistent data on other types of 
interpersonal homicide, including property- or 
revenge-related killings, are less readily available, 
such a broad category of lethal violence is difficult 
to examine. A snapshot of mass murder, which 
spans both types of interpersonal homicide is, 
however, provided.
Intimate partner/family-related 
homicide
Conflicts and violence within families and couples 
contribute significantly to shaping patterns of 
homicide.13 Given the intimate nature of such 
relationships, and the daily interaction, stresses 
and intricacies of emotional, financial and cultural 
ties, it is not surprising that a large share of known-
context homicides are of this type. Based on avail-
able data, rates of intimate partner/family-related 
homicide at the regional level range from 0.6 to 
1.7 per 100,000 population, with some significant 
variations (see figure 2.2.1). 
Although the rate of intimate partner/family-
related homicide is higher in Africa and the Amer-
icas than in other regions, it accounts for a larger 
share of total homicide victims in Asia, Europe and 
Oceania than in Africa and the Americas (see 
figure 2.2.2). This is due to the fact that in regions 
with high homicide rates, other types of homicide 
(such as that related to other criminal activities) 
are more prevalent. 
Unlike the rates of other forms of homicide, which 
can vary significantly from year to year, intimate 
partner/family-related homicide is, on average, 
remarkably stable at the global level, though more 
significant differences are visible at the regional 
level. In the 32 countries with available trend data, 
the average rate of intimate partner/family-related 
homicide remained constant from 2006 to 2011, 
whereas the total homicide rate in the same group 
of countries decreased by 15 per cent (see figure 
2.2.3). 
13 For more, see Campbell, J.C. (2007), in Trauma, Violence and 
Abuse 8(3); and Weizman-Henelius, G. (2012), in Journal of 
Interpersonal Violence 27(8).
Fig. 2.2.1: Intimate partner/family-related homicide rate,  
by region (2012 or latest year)
Note: Rate estimates based on data for 4 countries in Africa, 14 countries in the Americas; 9 countries  
in Asia; 21 countries in Europe; and 3 countries in Oceania.
Source: Elaboration based on UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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Fig. 2.2.2: Number and share of victims of intimate partner/family-related homicide out of total homicide  
victims, by region (2012 or latest year)
Note: estimates based on data for 4 countries in Africa, 14 countries in the Americas; 9 countries in Asia; 21 countries in Europe; and 3 countries in Oceania.
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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The enduring risk factors for intimate partner/
family-related homicide may explain some of the 
stability of its prevalence. When not addressed 
through non-violent mechanisms of reconcilia-
tion, conflicts and disputes between individuals 
living in family contexts or as couples can have 
violent outcomes, especially when certain con-
comitant factors or enablers are at play, such as 
power relations based on gender, or patterns of 
alcohol use (see chapter 3). Factors of that nature 
tend not to change in the short term. 
However, while intimate partner/family-related 
homicide appears to be very stable at the global 
level, this disguises nuances across regions (the 
Americas, Asia and Oceania, and Europe 2006-
2011) (see figure 2.2.4). For example, female 
victim rates of intimate partner/family-related 
homicide are consistently higher than male rates 
for this type of homicide, and there is more fluc-
tuation than can be seen at the global level. In 
promising trends, levels of intimate partner/fam-
ily-related homicide for both sexes are decreasing 
in selected countries in Asia and Oceania for which 
data are available.
Intimate partner/family-related 
homicide as a component of  
violence against women
Violence against women is a very broad concept 
that encompasses forms of physical, sexual and 
psychological violence.14 According to the Beijing 
Declaration, violence against women “is a manifes-
tation of the historically unequal power relations 
between men and women, which have led to dom-
ination over and discrimination against women by 
men and to the prevention of women’s full 
advancement.”15 There are multiple challenges to 
measuring all forms of violence against women 
because of its complexity, the high “dark figure” 
that affects data based on victim reports to author-
ities (law enforcement and public health), the dif-
ferent means and criteria for collecting data on 
victimization which may not be comparable, and 
the difficulty of accurately measuring certain types 
of violence against women (such as psychological 
violence).16
14 Violence against women means any act of gender-based vio-
lence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or 
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats 
of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, 
whether occurring in public or in private life. United Nations 
General Assembly (1994). A/RES/48/104. 
15 United Nations (1996). The Beijing Declaration.  Para. 73f.
16 For more information on those challenges, see Jansen, 
H.A.F.M. (2012). Prevalence surveys on violence against 
women: Challenges around indicators, data collection and use. 
UNWOMEN.
Fig. 2.2.3: Total homicide rate and intimate 
partner/family-related homicide 
rate, selected countries  
(2006-2011) 
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
Intimate partner/family-related homicide: 
progress in prevention  
In the United States of America, various programmes termed “high-risk 
team networks”a or “lethality assessment programmes”b have emerged at 
State-level to coordinate the sharing of information among law enforce-
ment, social and health services about those experiencing intimate 
partner or family-related violence (mainly women) who are at risk of 
being killed at the hands of intimate partners or family members.c 
These programmes are based on the concept that there are several pre-
dictors of intimate partner and family-related homicide; among them, 
previous physical abuse, attempted strangulation, threats with weapons, 
stalking, sexual assault, and obsessive jealous and controlling behaviour.d 
When people experiencing such violence seek help from various services 
such as law enforcement or health care, those services screen them and, 
through a risk assessment tool, identify cases with a high likelihood of 
reoccurrence or of lethal assault. Individual intervention plans may 
involve everything from monitoring offenders to sharing information 
across the many disciplines of law, justice, health and social services, to 
working preventatively to protect those experiencing violence and their 
families. Such measures seem to show a good degree of effectiveness; for 
example, over the eight years this model has been in place in the State 
of Massachusetts, 92 per cent of the 106 high-risk individuals identified 
have reported no subsequent assault and there have been no homicides.e
a  See, for example, Jeanne Geiger Crisis Center. Domestic violence high risk team network. 
b  Maryland Network Against Domestic Violence. Lethality Assessment Program – Maryland Model. 
c  Hanson, B. (2013). Preventing and Reducing Domestic Violence Homicides. United States  
 Department of Justice. 
d  Campbell, J.C., et al. (2003), in American Journal of Public Health 93(7). 
e  Jeanne Geiger Crisis Center. Op.Cit.0.00
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The killing of women on the basis of their gender 
represents the ultimate form of violence against 
women. In some countries, legislation recognizes 
the vulnerability of women to violence and makes 
a link between homicide and violence against 
women.17 Terms such as “femicide” or “femini-
cide” have been used to define the gender-related 
killing of women, which itself can take many 
forms. For example, “honour”-related killings, 
dowry-related killings, as well as witchcraft or sor-
cery-related killings, are direct forms of gender-
related homicide that almost exclusively target 
women, whereas more indirect forms include other 
types of killings that may not be counted as homi-
cides.18 Such homicides are poorly captured by 
official statistics, which rarely provide information 
on homicide motives. But what does emerge from 
available statistical evidence relating to the rela-
tionship between victims and offenders is that a 
significant portion of lethal violence against 
women takes place in a domestic environment. 
Given the aforementioned challenges of measuring 
gender-related violence in a comprehensive manner, 
exploring intimate partner/family-related homicide 
is one way of gaining a clearer understanding of the 
killing of women due to gender motives.19 In con-
trast to other types of homicide in which the vic-
tims are predominantly men, the percentage of 
female homicide victims resulting from intimate 
partner/family-related homicide is much higher 
than the corresponding percentage of male victims 
in all regions. Homicide of this type is the ultimate 
consequence of unequal power relationships 
between men and women in the private sphere, 
which it serves to reinforce and sustain.20 Intimate 
17 For example, in Mexico, the General Law on Women’s Access 
to a Life Free of Violence (2007) defines femicide violence as 
“the most extreme form of gender violence against women, 
produced by the violation of their human rights in public and 
private spheres and formed by the set of misogynist actions 
that can lead to the impunity of society and the State and 
culminate in the homicide and other forms of violent death 
of women.” (article 21).
18 United Nations General Assembly (2012). A/HRC/20/16. 
Para. 15-16.
19 There are two main theoretical approaches in intimate partner 
homicide research, notably the “gender perspective” that sees 
intimate partner violence, particularly against women, as an 
instrument used by men to maintain their dominance in a 
patriarchal society, where gender roles and relationships are 
often crystallized in certain practices and where violence may 
be a tool to enforce them. The other perspective, the “violence 
perspective” suggests that the motivation for homicide against 
intimate partners is no different from the motivation for other 
types of violence, such as individual defiance or social disad-
vantage. For more, see Kivivuori, J. and M. Lehti (2012), in 
Homicide Studies 16 (1): 60.
20 Fulu, E. et al. (2013). Why do some men use violence against 
women and how can we prevent it? UNDP, UNFPA, UN 
Fig. 2.2.4: Intimate partner/family-related 
homicide rate, by sex, Americas, 
Asia and Oceania, and Europe 
(2006-2011)
 
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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partner/family-related homicide represents a small 
share of total acts of violence against women, but 
its very nature, as well as the fact that data on inti-
mate partner/family-related homicide are increas-
ingly available and comparable, make such 
indicators extremely valuable for understanding 
and monitoring patterns of violence against 
women.  
It is estimated that of all the women killed in 2012 
(93,000 women), 43,600 (47 per cent) were killed 
by their family members or intimate partners, 
whereas 20,000 of all male homicide victims (6 per 
cent) were killed by such perpetrators. Thus, at the 
global level, more than twice as many women as 
men are killed by their intimate partners or family 
members. In absolute terms, the highest numbers 
of such killings of women take place in Asia and 
Africa (see figure 2.2.5), but their relative share in 
the total number of female homicides in each 
region tells a slightly different story.
Of particular note is the fact that most (over 50 
per cent) female victims of homicide in Asia, 
Europe and Oceania (see figure 2.2.6) are killed by 
their intimate partners or family members. As 
such, the killing of women in those regions is 
effectively a function of intimate partner/family-
related violence and, in some countries in those 
regions, the elimination of intimate partner/family 
member homicides would substantially reduce the 
total number of female homicides.
WOMEN and UNV.
Intimate partner versus family- 
related homicide
A clearer picture of the burden of lethal violence 
borne by women can be drawn when sex-disaggre-
gated homicide data are available that can distin-
guish homicides committed by intimate partners 
from those perpetrated by other family members. 
In 18 countries (mostly in Europe),21 almost equal 
shares of victims are killed by intimate partners (53 
21 UNECE Statistical Division Database.
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Fig. 2.2.5: Number of female victims of intimate partner/family-
related homicide, by region (2012 or latest year)
Note: Estimates based on data for 4 countries in Africa, 14 countries in the Americas;  
9 countries in Asia; 21 countries in Europe; and 3 countries in Oceania.
Source: Elaboration based on UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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Fig. 2.2.6: Male and female victims of intimate partner/family-related homicide as a per-
centage of total male and total female homicide victims, by region (latest year)
Note: Estimates based on data for 4 countries in Africa, 14 countries in the Americas; 9 countries in Asia; 21 countries in Europe; and 3 countries in 
Oceania.
Source: Elaboration based on UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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per 100,000 population), female victims consti-
tute an increasing share of total victims and, in 
some of those countries, the share of male and 
female victims appears to be reaching parity. For 
example, in Japan and Hong Kong, China, which 
have some of the lowest homicide rates in the 
world (0.3 and 0.4 per 100,000 population in 
2011-2012, respectively), females account for just 
over half of all victims of homicide (see figure 
2.2.8). 
per cent) and by other family members (47 per 
cent). There is, however, far greater disparity in the 
sex distribution of victims killed by these perpetra-
tors, with 79 per cent of victims killed by their 
intimate partners being women (see figure 2.2.7). 
Homicide and gender parity 
Available data suggest that in countries with very 
low (and decreasing) homicide rates (less than 1 
Fig. 2.2.7: Average percentage of male 
and female victims of types of 
intimate partner/family-related 
homicide, selected countries  
(latest year)
Source: UNECE Statistical Division Database.
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South Africa: the enduring nature of  
intimate partner homicide
An example of the enduring nature of intimate partner homicide can be seen in 
the recent experience of South Africa, a country with a high homicide rate (31 
per 100,000 population in 2012). The South African Medical Research Council 
conducted a study of female homicide for two points in time, 1999 and 2009, 
and found a substantial (50 per cent) decrease in the overall rate of female homi-
cide over the 10-year period, but less of a decrease in the rate of females killed 
by their intimate partners.a  The rate of female homicide was 12.9 per 100,000 
females in 2009, a little over half of the 24.7 in 1999, while the rate of women 
killed by their intimate partners decreased 36 per cent over the decade (8.8 to 
5.6 per 100,000 females). The decrease is encouraging but South Africa’s female 
homicide rate is still five times the global rate (2.6 per 100,000 women) and in-
timate partner homicide now accounts for 57 per cent of total female homicides 
in the country. 
a Abrahams, N. et al. (2012), in South African Medical Research Council Research Brief.
“Honour killings”: there is 
no honour in homicide
“In the name of preserving family “honour”, women and 
girls are shot, stoned, burned alive, strangled, smothered 
and knifed to death with horrifying regularity.” — Navi 
Pillay, United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, 8 March 2010.a
“Honour”-related homicides are the killings of (most-
ly) women or girls by a member of their family for an 
actual or presumed act of sexual or behavioural trans-
gression (such as adultery, sexual intercourse or preg-
nancy outside marriage, refusal to enter an arranged 
marriage, wearing certain clothing or engaging in activi-
ties deemed unsuitable) that is perceived to bring shame 
upon their family. Such killings are the ultimate mani-
festation of discrimination against women and girls; the 
ultimate act of gender-based violence. 
It is a challenge to differentiate statistics on “honour 
killings” from the broader field of statistics on female 
homicide, as data on this particular motive for homi-
cide are not generated by most police forces. Qualitative 
studies and interviews on the dynamics and acceptance 
of “honour killings” have been produced, but little re-
liable quantitative data is available.b For example, in 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, media coverage and the Crown Prosecution 
Service documented an average of 12 “honour kill-
ings”, which were investigated by the police, each year 
between 1998 and 2007.c  
 “Honour” crimes may not be specific categories with-
in legal systems, but in some countries they may be 
treated distinctly from non-“honour”-based violence 
against women.d In the last few years, several countries 
have repealed aspects of their criminal and penal codes 
that provided for mitigated sentences for perpetrators 
of “honour killings”, and the practice is increasingly 
criminalized.e 
a  UN OHCHR (2010).  
b  See, for example, UNDP and UNFPA (2007); Oberwittler, D. and 
Kasselt, J. (2011); Eisner, M. and L. Ghuneim (2013), in Aggressive 
Behaviour 39(5). 
c  Crown Prosecution Service (2007); Crown Prosecution Service 
(2007), in United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women.  
d  United Nations  General Assembly (2002). A/57/169.  
e  United Nations  General Assembly (2012). A/HRC/20/16.
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In another group of countries with low homicide 
rates, made up entirely of European countries, the 
pattern is the same. The homicide trend is also a 
downward one, but the pace of the decrease is 
noticeably faster for rates of male homicide than 
for rates of female homicide, and the historical 
gender gap is closing (see figure 2.2.9). If such 
trends continue, in years to come, there could be 
more female homicide victims than male victims 
in a number of countries.
Yet while some countries with very low homicide 
rates are approaching gender parity in terms of 
homicide victimization, the same cannot be said 
for homicide offenders. There remains an imbal-
ance from a perpetrator perspective, with the vast 
majority of formal suspects22 of intentional homi-
cide being men (for more, see chapter 5). The 
overwhelming pattern is still that men kill both 
men and women (see figure 2.2.10), irrespective of 
the increasing gender parity of the victims in some 
countries. 
Even in some of the world’s safest and most devel-
oped countries, it appears that homicide is very 
much the tip of the iceberg when it comes to vio-
lence against women. Although the decrease in 
22 Suspects brought into formal contact with the police may 
include persons suspected of, or arrested and cautioned for, a 
criminal offence by the police, at the national level. 
female homicide victims (see figure 2.2.9) is a 
positive trend in itself, its slow pace highlights the 
difficulty of eradicating practices and behaviours 
that are all too often ingrained in cultural and 
societal norms around the world. Available data 
show that even in countries with very low homi-
cide rates,  a significant share of women have expe-
rienced physical and/or sexual violence. For 
example, at some point in their lifetime, roughly a 
quarter to a third of women in the Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Germany, New Zealand, Norway 
and the United Kingdom have experienced physi-
cal and/or sexual violence at the hands of their 
intimate partner.23 
23  See UNWOMEN (2011).
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Fig. 2.2.9: Average homicide rate, by sex, six European  
countries with homicide rates below 1.0 per  
100,000 population in 2011 (2000-2011)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
Ra
te
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
 p
op
ul
at
io
n
Fig. 2.2.10: Percentage distribution of suspects brought  
 into formal contact with police for completed  
 intentional homicide, by sex, selected low- 
 homicide countries (2009-2011)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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Intimate partner violence in Japan
The experience of Japan indicates that in a context of very low levels of homicidal violence, additional efforts may still be required to address 
intimate partner and family-related violence. Every three years, the Japanese Cabinet Office conducts a “Survey on Violence between Men and 
Women.” In the 2002 survey, 4.4 per cent of female respondents reported that the spousal violence they experienced was severe enough to make 
them fear for their life.a In subsequent surveys in 2005 and 2008, over 10 per cent of married women and approximately 3 per cent of married 
men reported that they experienced either “physical assault”, “mental harassment or frightening threats”, or “sexual coercion” by their spouse 
on many occasions.b More than one in five married women and approximately 15 per cent of married men reported having experienced spousal 
abuse on one or two occasions (see figure 2.2.11).
In response to these new findings about the particular vulnerability of women, in the same period, Japan enacted several laws designed to pro-
tect women and prevent domestic violence.c Since the enactment of those laws, more arrests for intimate partner violence have occurred. This 
could indicate that women who survive such violence feel more empowered by the protection provided by the laws, and, as a result, an increase 
in the number of arrests for non-lethal spousal violence has occurred (see figure 2.2.12). It is noteworthy that the homicide rate of women killed 
by their husbands and the corresponding number of husbands arrested for this crime was very stable over the time period, reaffirming the global 
trend in the stability of intimate partner homicide.
a Cabinet Office, Japan (2004). P. 31. 
b “Spouse” includes common-law partners, spouses living separately, and also ex-spouses. In the 2008 survey, this term was also expanded to include  
  current partners (boyfriend/girlfriend). 
c For example, the Law on Proscribing Stalking Behaviour and Assisting Victims (enacted 2000), and the Act on the Prevention of Spousal Violence and       
  Protection of Victims (enacted 2001).
Fig. 2.2.11: Percentage distribution of  
 victimization experience of  
 spousal abuse, by sex, Japan  
 (2008)
Source: Cabinet Office, Japan (2009). P. 34. 
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in Finland and Sweden.24 Despite the notoriety of 
this type of killings, there is no universal definition 
for what actually constitutes “mass murder”, but 
for most purposes the term denotes the wilful 
homicide of at least four persons. A common form 
of mass murder is familicide,25 which, due to its 
relationship-driven nature, actually spans both 
components of interpersonal homicide. In availa-
ble data for both Finland and the United King-
dom, for example, most murders of four or more 
people have been familicides.26 Other, more public, 
acts of mass murder, often called rampage or 
“spree” killings, have occurred in schools and 
workplaces around the world. 
24 Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States (2013); and Euro-
pean Homicide Monitor.
25 “Familicide” refers to the killing of multiple family members. 
In its most common form, it is the killing of an intimate part-
ner and child(ren), but may also include the killing of parents 
and/or siblings. While typically considered a form of intimate 
partner homicide, given the number of victims in such events, 
this type of homicide is often “mass murder”.
26 Government of the United Kingdom (2012); and National 
Research Institute of Legal Policy, Finnish Homicide Moni-
toring System (2011).
Other interpersonal homicide
The previous section deals with homicide in the 
private or family sphere, but many forms of lethal 
violence, which are not connected to other crimi-
nal activities or socio-political violence, also exist 
outside domestic relationships. This type of lethal 
violence can be attributed to the very nature of 
coexisting with others and the concomitant fric-
tions and differences that exist in some relation-
ships. It may, for example, be rooted in disputes 
between neighbours, revenge-related killings or 
may result from random and seemingly unpro-
voked acts in which the victim is simply in the 
wrong place at the wrong time. Some types of 
interpersonal homicide particularly affect women, 
especially when linked with forms of sexual vio-
lence, and they should be considered a component 
of violence against women in general. 
The division between what can be considered 
“other interpersonal” homicide or socio-political 
homicide (as discussed in the last section of this 
chapter) is not always clear, but the former is the 
case when killing is not instrumental to the 
achievement of a further goal, and when the per-
sonal dimension drives the homicidal act. Such 
acts can happen outside in the street, or inside 
public spaces or establishments, and even at the 
home of the perpetrator or victim. But the motives 
that lead to homicides in the public sphere are not 
often recorded, which is why specific data relating 
to much “other interpersonal” homicide are diffi-
cult to come by.
Mass murder
No other type of homicide generates such public 
fear or stupefaction at its meaninglessness as that 
involving multiple victims. Due to its often shock-
ing and sensational nature, particularly of so-called 
“rampage killings”, mass murder also captures the 
attention of the public, the media and policymak-
ers the world over, which no doubt colours percep-
tions of the prevalence and patterns of such events. 
Also affecting the view of mass murder is the fact 
that some such incidents bridge the divide between 
the “other interpersonal” and socio-political homi-
cide typologies, since, depending on the number 
of victims, deaths due to acts of terror can also be 
considered mass murder.
Mass homicides may have a high profile, but they 
are actually low-frequency events, accounting, for 
example, for less than 1 per cent of all homicide 
cases in the United States and less than 3 per cent 
Other interpersonal homicide in India
As denoted in figure 2.2 in the introduction to chapter 2, roughly one in every 
five homicides (21 per cent) in India is linked to selected forms of other inter-
personal-type homicides. From 2000 to 2012, over half of all such homicides 
were the result of property-related disputes (54 per cent) and the remainder were 
associated with personal vendettas (46 per cent). Homicides motivated by per-
sonal vendetta have decreased by 40 per cent since 2000, while property-related 
disputes have decreased by 25 per cent. 
Fig. 2.2.13: Rate of homicide motivated by personal   
 vendetta or property-related disputes,  
 India (2000-2012) 
Source: National Crime Records Bureau, India. (2012).
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As technology now enables instant access to global 
news, awareness of mass murder events has 
increased, but mass murder is not a new phenom-
enon. In the United States alone, some 909 mass 
killings were documented between 1900 and 
1999,27 with the frequency of mass public shoot-
ings, the most visible form of mass murder, increas-
ing in the 1960s. More recently, between 2002 and 
2011, there was an average of 32 acts of mass 
27 Duwe. G. (2004), in Justice Quarterly, 21.
murder per year; a relatively stable trend in spite of 
the overall declining trend for all homicides. All 
those mass murder events resulted in more than 
1500 victims over 10 years, which is a small frac-
tion of all homicides that occur in the United 
States.28 The fact that an average of 70 per cent of 
all mass murders in that time period involved fire-
arms29 points to the accessibility of firearms as 
being a decisive element in their perpetration.
2.3 SOCIO-POLITICAL HOMICIDE
In contrast to the two other homicide typologies, 
this type of homicide can be seen to be the out-
come of the socio-political agenda of its 
perpetrator(s). As its name implies, socio-political 
homicide may be politically motivated, or particu-
lar individuals or groups may be targeted due to 
their race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexuality or 
status, amongst others. For example, homicides 
linked to hate crimes or acts of terror are both 
considered to be part of this typology. In all such 
cases, a social dimension (such as the management 
of diversity in society) or a power-related struggle 
comes into play. 
Data availability on socio-political homicide is 
very limited, either because some killings of this 
nature are often excluded from homicide counts at 
the country level or, when included, they cannot 
be statistically identified due to a lack of informa-
tion about the motive and context of such killings. 
For these reasons, this section provides a snapshot 
of some of their manifestations.
Hate Crimes
Crimes motivated by the perpetrator’s bias against 
the victim’s race, religion, ethnic origin, sexual 
orientation or disability, amongst others, hate 
crimes can also be thought of as products of social 
prejudice. Ingrained attitudes may promote an 
atmosphere that condones violence against mar-
ginalized segments of society, often resulting in 
“message crimes” that instil fear or terror based on 
prejudicial attitudes.30 As they not only affect indi-
28 Some mass homicides are not represented in the data because 
they have been reported by law enforcement agencies in sepa-
rate records, with a maximum of 11 victims per record. For 
example, an incident with 32 victims was reported as 4 sepa-
rate incidents, with 10 victims each in the “first” three inci-
dents and two in the “fourth” incident. The net result is that 
these data somewhat over-count the number of mass murder 
incidents and somewhat undercount the average number of 
victims per mass murder incident.
29 Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States (2013).
30 Mouzos, J. and S. Thompson (2000), in Australian Institute 
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Fig. 2.2.14: Number of homicide cases with four or more  
 victims; and related number of victims,  
 United States (2002-2011)
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States (2013).
Fig. 2.2.15: Average percentage distribution of homicide cases,  
 by number of victims, United States (2002-2011)
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States (2013).
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vidual victims, but also members of the victim’s 
group and even society as a whole, such crimes are 
threats to social cohesion.31 
Hate crimes can consist of a variety of violent and 
non-violent crimes, ranging from threats and rob-
bery to rape, with homicide their most extreme 
manifestation. Accurately identifying, classifying 
and recording a homicide as a hate crime can be 
particularly challenging, as it requires the determi-
nation of a causal link between an offender’s preju-
dice towards the victim and their act of lethal 
violence. 
There are relatively few cases of known hate crime-
related homicide, and studies of this issue are few 
in number. For example, gender-based killing due 
to sexual orientation and gender identity is a phe-
nomenon that has only recently been documented 
and only very limited, often anecdotal, data are 
available.32 That said, the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbi-
trary Executions has documented murders believed 
to have been committed on the grounds of sexual 
orientation or gender identity.33 Furthermore, 
according to the United Nations Special Rappor-
teur on Violence Against Women, homicides of 
transgender people were documented in 816 cases 
in 55 countries between January 2008 and Decem-
ber 2011.34 Many of those homicides are believed 
to be the result of hate-based violence, but data on 
motivation are extremely limited, thus it is not 
possible to identify all of them as being specifically 
due to the victim’s identification as transgender. In 
South Africa, information from case studies has 
indicated that 31 lesbians have been murdered in 
homophobic attacks since 1998.35 An academic 
study in Australia that examined gay-hate related 
homicides in New South Wales identified approxi-
mately four gay men killed due to their sexual 
orientation each year over the 10-year period cov-
ered by the study (1989-1999).36 
of Criminology: Trends and Issues in crime and criminal justice. 
No. 155.
31 Bleich, E. (2007), in American Behavioural Scientist, 51. Also, 
for example, in some case law, family members of victims were 
also considered victims, and sometimes granted compensa-
tion. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (2009).
32 United Nations General Assembly (2012). A/HRC/20/16.
33 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council 
(2013) A/HRC/24/23. 
34 United Nations General Assembly (2012). Op.Cit.
35 Wesley, T. (2012), in BUWA! A Journal on African Women’s 
Experiences. 
36 Mouzos, J. and S. Thompson. (2000). Op.Cit.
Other social prejudices, such as those based on 
race, religion or ethnic origin, can also result in 
lethal violence. When looking at the scarce data 
available, it can be noted that in three European 
countries which do have data, foreign residents are 
over-represented among homicide victims (see 
figure 2.3.1). Such data cannot be strictly inter-
preted as hate crime-related, as it is not known 
whether those victims were specifically targeted 
due to their membership of a racial, ethnic or reli-
gious group, but it does indicate that foreign resi-
dents can face a higher risk of victimization than 
the general population. 
As mentioned earlier, homicide is the most extreme 
manifestation of hate-related violence. Other than 
lethal violence, crimes motivated by bias or preju-
dice are also difficult to identify, as many victims 
of hate crimes are reluctant to report them, which 
means that many hate crimes remain invisible.37 
Acts of terror 
Often resulting in multiple victims, acts of terror 
leading to death are a global phenomenon but also 
a challenging category to examine statistically, as 
very few countries produce data on such deaths. 
Those with multiple victims, which result in mass 
murder incidents, may be classified in different 
ways based on varying definitions.  
37 For an overview of hate crimes in Europe, see European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2012). 
Fig. 2.3.1: Homicide rate among total population and among  
foreign residents, selected European countries (2010)
Source: UN-CTS (2011); data on Austria include attempted homicides.
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From a conceptual perspective, the label “inten-
tional homicide” is certainly broad enough to 
encompass such deaths, and whilst perpetrators 
may face additional charges, such as acts of terror-
ism, acts against the State, or even crimes against 
humanity, the core act still concerns the unlawful 
intentional killing of another. That said, in national 
recording practices, such deaths are not always 
recorded and counted as intentional homicide, or 
in other cases, though considered as such, a spe-
cific statistical count is not available.38 
Unlawful killings by law  
enforcement authorities 
Some of the most challenging incidents to identify 
and account for statistically as “intentional homi-
cide” are unlawful killings by law enforcement 
authorities, including the police. The State has an 
obligation to safeguard life:39 the use of lethal force 
by the police is strictly limited by international 
human rights law and relevant standards, and is to 
be applied only in situations where it is necessary 
to protect life.40 Deaths occurring as a result of the 
necessary and proportionate use of force by law 
enforcement officers do not constitute unlawful 
killings. Unplanned killings that result from exces-
sive use of force in law enforcement operations 
may be unlawful, although they would not qualify 
38 Country practice varies as to whether such deaths are included 
in police homicide statistics. For example, neither the 3,000+ 
victims of the attacks on the United States on 11 Septem-
ber 2001, nor the nearly 200 killed in terrorist attacks on 
11 March 2004 in Madrid were recorded as homicides in 
national criminal justice statistics. By contrast, the 52 victims 
of the 7 July 2005 London bombings and the 77 victims of 
the terror events of 22 July 2011 in Norway were included in 
official police statistics as homicides. Homicide statistics in 
India include murder related to “terrorist/extremist” violence.
39 This obligation of the State consists of three main aspects: a) 
the duty to refrain, by its agents, from unlawful killing; b) 
the duty to investigate suspicious deaths; and c) in certain 
circumstances, a positive obligation to take steps to prevent 
the avoidable loss of life. (For example, see European Court 
of Human Rights (2013); Ovey, C. and R. White (2002).
40 Principle 9 of the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and 
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990) provides for 
instance: “Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms 
against persons except in self-defence or defence of others 
against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to 
prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involv-
ing grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such a 
danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her 
escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to 
achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use 
of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in 
order to protect life.” Article 3 of the Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials, adopted by the General Assembly in 
its resolution 34/169, states that “Law enforcement officials 
may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent 
required for the performance of their duty.” Principle 3 of the 
Interpol Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials states 
that “Officers must never knowingly use more force than is 
reasonable, nor should they abuse their authority.”
as intentional homicides in the absence of any ele-
ment of intentionality.
Among the special procedures of the Human 
Rights Council, the United Nations Special Rap-
porteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions holds the mandate for examining situ-
ations of unlawful killing by the police, among 
other situations of extrajudicial, summary or arbi-
trary executions.41 For example, killings by the 
police may occur in situations where the police are 
not pursuing law enforcement objectives, such as 
attempts at extortion that may escalate into extra-
judicial killings; engaging in “social cleansing” 
operations and intentionally killing criminals or 
members of marginalized groups; or in even more 
extreme situations, where police are operating as a 
militia or death squad.42 All such cases should be 
counted as intentional homicides, consistently 
with the standard definition, but little statistical 
information is available on such homicides, often 
due to a lack of recording and tracking, as well as 
a lack of investigation into the nature of the kill-
ings, all of which hamper data collection efforts. 
Findings, conclusions and recommendations of 
the United Nations Special Rapporteur are sub-
mitted to the Human Rights Council and the 
General Assembly, and constitute both a source of 
data and examples.43
Mob violence/Vigilantism
Cases of “vigilante” or “mob” violence have been 
reported in different places around the world. The 
nature of these acts can vary widely, but at their 
core they are “killings carried out in violation of 
the law by private individuals with the purported 
aim of crime control, or the control of perceived 
deviant or immoral behaviour.”44 
Although vigilantism has occurred across the 
world, recent studies have focused on this phe-
nomenon in Africa, the Americas and Asia.45 For 
example, in Uganda in 2010, there were 438 fatal-
ities due to acts of mob justice, accounting for 25 
41 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council 
(2011). A/HRC/RES/17/5
42 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council 
(2010). A/HRC/14/24/Add.8. Para. 9.
43 See, for example, United Nations General Assembly, Human 
Rights Council. Reports of the Special Rapporteur on extra-
judicial, summary or arbitrary executions. For example: A/
HRC/21/49; A/HRC/22/67; A/HRC/23/51.
44 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council 
(2009). A/64/187. Para. 15.
45 See United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Coun-
cil (2009).  
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per cent of all homicides in the country.46 The 
most common victims of mob violence are sus-
pected criminals, generally young males, especially 
those suspected of committing theft.47 Other tar-
gets of “vigilante justice” include suspected mur-
derers, members of gangs or organized criminal 
groups, suspected or convicted sexual offenders, 
suspected “witches” and street children.48
Mob violence can indicate a population’s lack of 
faith or trust in the rule of law and its implement-
ing institutions to provide justice. If people feel the 
criminal justice system is not legitimate, is corrupt 
or unresponsive, they may feel obliged to take mat-
ters into their own hands to enforce laws. For 
example, in a study of formal and informal dispute 
resolution systems in poorer, rural areas of South 
America, vigilantism appeared to be five times 
greater in communities where informal mecha-
nisms of justice were not functioning.49
Shooting the messengers:  
the killing of journalists and  
humanitarian aid workers
As professionals who often work in insecure envi-
ronments, mostly in response to natural or man-
made disasters, journalists and aid workers are 
both prone to certain risks that can threaten their 
safety and even their lives.
Journalists, as purveyors of information who seek 
out and report the news from around the world, 
often venture into the darkest corners to shed light 
on current events. A considerable number of them 
are subjected to intimidation, physical violence, 
kidnapping or illegal detention in direct relation to 
their work and, in extreme cases, they can be killed 
because of their professional activity. Some are 
killed in war or conflict zones or in situations of 
civil unrest, while others are the specific targets of 
homicidal violence. 
It is challenging to disentangle the various motives 
behind such killings, but some data are available. 
According to UNESCO, since 1992 there have 
been 984 documented cases of  killings of journal-
ists, with over 600 of them occurring in the last 10 
years.50 UNESCO has also drawn attention to the 
46 Ugandan Police Force (2011). P. 7.
47 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council 
(2009). Para. 58.
48 Ibid.  Para. 64.
49 UNDP (2006). P. 14.
50 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council 
fact that there is often impunity for many of the 
abuses against journalists,51 which, in conjunction 
with a climate of violence, generates censorship, 
depriving citizens of the information they need to 
make informed decisions.
Besides UNESCO, the Committee to Protect 
Journalists (CPJ)52 also tracks events around the 
world in which journalists are killed because of 
their professional activities. The statistics kept by 
each organization differ due to varying definitions 
as to who exactly is considered a journalist and 
what is considered a “killing in the line of duty”53 
(2013). Para. 5; and UNESCO (2013). UNESCO condemns 
the killing of journalists. 
51 See United Nations (2012). Second Inter-Agency Meeting on 
the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity.
52 The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) is an independ-
ent, non-profit organization that promotes press freedom 
worldwide.
53 CPJ keeps statistics on the death of every journalist whom it 
is reasonably certain was killed in direct reprisal for his or her 
work; was killed in crossfire during combat situations; or was 
killed while carrying out a dangerous assignment such as cov-
erage of a street protest. Journalists killed in accidents such as 
car or plane crashes are not included. UNESCO uses a broad 
definition and it refers to the killing of reporters, camera 
operators, photojournalists, television presenters, columnists, 
editors, broadcasters, radio presenters and other members of 
the media. Given these definitions, it is not always possible to 
differentiate between journalists who were victims of inten-
tional homicide and those who were victims of war/conflict, 
based on these sources.
Fig. 2.3.2: Number of journalists killed, by region (2006-2012)
Source: UNESCO. Facts and Figures of Killed Journalists from 2006-2012.
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(see figure 2.3.3). In spite of these differences, the 
overall trends are similar, indicating an increase in 
the last year. According to UNESCO data, the 
number of killings of journalists reached a record 
high in 2012 (122 journalists killed) (see figure 
2.3.2). Over half of those were killed in Asia, more 
than half of them in the Syrian Arab Republic 
alone.54 Some 20 per cent of the journalists killed 
in 2012 were killed in Africa, two-thirds of them 
in Somalia. South America, Central America and 
the Caribbean each accounted for 8 per cent of all 
such killings.55
Many journalists are killed in contexts of armed 
conflict, as demonstrated by the large share of 
deaths occurring in Asia (particularly in Afghani-
stan, Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic), but a 
large amount of killings and attacks occur outside 
such situations. Most of those killed have been 
covering politics, war or corruption (see figure 
2.3.4),56 and, according to UNESCO, 95 per cent 
of all journalists killed since 2006 were local 
reporters, rather than foreign correspondents.57 
Print journalists made up the largest share of jour-
nalists killed between 2006 and 2012 (43 per 
cent), followed by television journalists (28 per 
54 See UNESCO (2012).
55 Ibid.
56 See United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Coun-
cil (2013). 
57 UNESCO. Facts and Figures of Killed Journalists from 2006-
2012.
cent).58 The killing of photojournalists has 
increased in the last few years, with over a third of 
the journalists killed in 2012 being camera opera-
tors or photographers.59 
A significant share of journalists have been killed 
by organized criminal groups (see figure 2.3.5): 
according to the CPJ, of all the killings that spe-
cifically targeted journalists between 1992 and 
2013, some 13 per cent were committed by crimi-
nal groups. Investigative journalism can become a 
real threat for criminal groups, some of which do 
not hesitate to exert violence and intimidation on 
the media in order to maintain a climate of silence 
around their illicit activities. It is even more alarm-
ing that no perpetrator was convicted in 77 per 
cent of those cases: impunity has an incrementally 
negative effect on the freedom and independence 
of  journalists.  
Most humanitarian organizations are accustomed 
to operating in violent settings, and violence 
against aid workers has always been a challenge to 
humanitarian access. Like journalists, aid work-
ers60 can be subjected to physical attacks in direct 
58 Ibid.
59 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council 
(2012). Para. 35.
60 Aid workers, as defined by the Aid Worker Security Data-
base, are the employees and personnel of not-for-profit aid 
agencies, including both national and international staff, 
which provide material and technical assistance in humanitar-
ian relief contexts. These include various locally contracted 
staff (e.g. transportation, security, etc.), as well as relief and 
multi-mandated (relief and development) organizations, such 
Fig. 2.3.3: Number of journalists killed in 
the line of duty (2003-2012)
Source: UNESCO and Committee to Protect Journalists.
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relation to their work, which result in kidnapping, 
serious injury or even death. According to the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), based on data 
from the Aid Worker Security Database,61 the 
magnitude of the violence and the types of threats 
faced by aid workers have changed over the years.62
The Aid Worker Security Database does not 
disaggregate data by context and cannot provide 
information specifically on intentional homicides, 
but it does denote an increase in attacks against aid 
workers over the last decade (see figure 2.3.6), and 
a fluctuating though slightly increasing number of 
such workers killed in attacks. The increase in 
incidents against aid personnel has taken place in 
a period and context in which the number of 
humanitarian workers has also grown. However, 
the increase in attacks has surpassed the growth in 
numbers of aid workers, thus indicating an 
increased exposure to risk for humanitarian 
workers.63 
In 2008, 127 aid workers were killed; the highest 
number on record. The decrease in killings of aid 
workers between 2008 and 2012 can be attributed 
in large part to improvements by aid organizations 
in security awareness and management systems, 
which allow for more effective risk assessment and 
mitigation by staff in the field.64 Since 2009, six 
countries (Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Soma-
lia, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic) have 
accounted for 75 per cent of all aid workers killed. 
Attacks on aid workers have become more sophis-
ticated in recent years, and the tactics and weapons 
used, such as heavy explosives and improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), have become more 
lethal.65 In 2013, attacks in Afghanistan, Nigeria 
and Pakistan have accounted for a significant share 
as non-governmental organizations, the International Red 
Cross/Red Crescent, donor agencies and the agencies of the 
United Nations that belong to the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (FAO, OCHA, UNDP, 
UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO), as well as 
the International Organization for Migration and the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The definition 
of “aid worker” does not include United Nations peacekeep-
ing personnel, human rights workers, election monitors, or 
purely political, religious or advocacy organizations.
61 The Aid Worker Security Database collects data on deliber-
ate acts of violence affecting aid workers all over the world, 
through systematic media filtering or through information 
provided by affected aid organizations.
62 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UNOCHA) (2011). 
63 United Nations (2009). S/2012/376. Annex, Para. 32.
64 UNOCHA (2011).
65 Ibid.
of the increase in humanitarian workers killed 
during the course of the year.66
The killing of journalists and humanitarian aid 
workers has consequences beyond the loss of indi-
vidual lives. The killing of journalists can be con-
sidered an attack on the human right to free 
expression, the foundation of strong democracy 
and the need for an informed, active and engaged 
66 Aid Worker Security Database.
Fig. 2.3.5: Number of journalist victims of homicide perpetrated 
by organized criminal groups, by region (1992-2013)
Note: Data for 2013 up to 13 November 2013.
Source: Committee to Protect Journalists.
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citizenry to access the information necessary to 
reach their full potential.67 Violence against aid 
workers greatly restricts access and mobility on the 
ground and often results in suspended, reduced or 
even terminated humanitarian activities, thus plac-
ing the lives and well-being of the hundreds of 
thousands of vulnerable people who depend on 
them at risk.68
67 UNESCO. UN Plan of action on the safety of journalists and 
the issue of impunity. CI-12/CONF.202/6.
68 United Nations (2009). S/2012/376. Annex, Para. 38.
3. HOMICIDE MECHANISMS  
AND ENABLERS
65
As established in the previous chapter, homicide in 
all its types is the result of the specific internal 
motivations and objectives of its perpetrator(s). 
However, a number of intermediate factors that cut 
across all typologies can also play a role in the pro-
cess that leads someone to commit homicide. To 
show how different homicide mechanisms, whether 
including a weapon or not, are used across the 
world, and to assess to what extent different types 
of homicide can be associated with different killing 
instruments, this chapter analyses how homicides 
are perpetrated. The role of psychoactive sub-
stances, such as illicit drugs and alcohol, as homi-
cide “enablers” is also considered. A better 
understanding of the influence of such elements in 
facilitating homicide can be of great value for the 
development of homicide prevention policies, 
which, when appropriately targeted at such ele-
ments, can reduce violence before it becomes lethal.
Homicide mechanisms around  
the world
Not all homicides involve them, but weapons do 
play a significant role in homicide. With their high 
level of lethality,1 firearms are the most widely used 
weapons, accounting for 177,000 (41 per cent) of 
the total 437,000 homicides globally in 2012. 
“Other means”, such as physical force and blunt 
objects, among others, killed just over a third of 
homicide victims, while sharp objects were respon-
sible for just under a quarter (24 per cent).2 
1 Lethality of a firearm depends on the type and calibre of the 
weapon. Whether a victim survives a gunshot wound is often 
dependent on other factors, such as the availability and effi-
ciency of health care systems. For more, see Alvazzi del Frate, 
A. (2012) Small Arms Survey. Moving Targets, chapter 3.
2 Data calculated on the basis of UNODC Homicide Statistics 
(2013). Whenever data on homicide mechanism were not 
The type of mechanism used to commit homicide 
depends on a number of factors, including the will 
of the perpetrator(s), the socio-demographic char-
acteristics of both perpetrator and victim, the 
accessibility of weapons and the legislation for 
controlling them, which tends to increase in sever-
ity according to the lethality of the weapon. This 
results in wide variations in the type of weapons 
used to commit homicide at the regional level (see 
figure 3.1). For example, in the Americas, firearms 
are the most prevalent killing mechanism, while in 
Oceania, sharp objects are the most widely used 
weapons in homicides. In both Asia and Europe, 
the “other” category of homicide mechanism, 
which includes blunt objects, poisoning, strangu-
lation and physical assault,3 amongst others, 
accounts for the largest share of homicides. In 
Africa, firearms and sharp objects account for 
almost equal proportions of homicides, but this 
should be interpreted with caution as the share of 
homicide by type of weapon is estimated on the 
basis of statistical models.
High levels of homicide are not always associated 
with high shares of killings by firearm. For example, 
although firearms are consistently used in a large 
proportion of homicides in the Americas, where 
countries with the highest homicide rates also 
record the highest share of homicides by firearm, 
the picture is more varied in other regions. Indeed, 
some sub-regions with relatively high homicide 
rates have a relatively low share of homicides by 
firearm, such as Eastern Europe and Southern 
Africa, while others have lower homicide rates but 
available from criminal justice sources, estimates of the share 
of homicide by mechanism were based on IHME (2012).
3 WHO International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems 10th Revision (ICD-10).
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Fig. 3.1: Homicide mechanism, by region (2012 or latest year)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) and IHME (2012).
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Homicide typologies and  
mechanisms in South Africa
A South African study examined homicide inci-
dents from 2001-2005 in parts of three cities that 
were experiencing high homicide rates.a Firearm 
homicide was more strongly associated with the 
killing of strangers, while sharp objects accounted 
for a higher share of homicides committed by 
intimate partners/family members and by 
acquaintances of the victims (see figure 3.2). In 
the same vein, a large majority (70 per cent) of 
homicides linked to interpersonal conflicts, such 
as those related to arguments or disputes, were 
committed with sharp objects. In another finding, 
firearm homicides outnumbered sharp object 
homicides by a factor of five in the case of homi-
cides linked to other criminal activities.
a Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
(CSVR), South Africa (2010).
Fig. 3.2: Percentage distribution of  
homicides, by perpetrator and 
mechanism, three cities,  
South Africa (2001-2005) 
Note: the three cities included in the study are Cape Town, Durban 
and Gauteng.
Source: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 
South Africa (2010).
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higher shares of homicides by firearm, such as 
Southern Europe and Northern Africa (see map 
3.1). This seems to confirm that a complex mixture 
of factors influences homicide levels, the homicide 
mechanism being only one of many elements that 
combine to determine homicide levels and trends.
Homicide mechanism and typology
In the identification of patterns of association 
between types of homicide and weapons used, 
detailed and comprehensive statistical information 
is needed in order to disaggregate killing mecha-
nism by type of homicide (or vice versa). However, 
from available information, it is not possible to 
derive a general understanding of patterns of asso-
ciation between homicide mechanisms and homi-
cide typologies. 
Studies conducted in high-income countries, which 
tend to have lower levels of homicide, have shown 
strong correlations between gun availability in the 
home and female homicide rates, but a slightly 
weaker correlation with male homicide rates.4 As a 
4 See Hemenway, D., T. Shinoda-Tagawa and M. Miller 
(2002), in Journal of the American Medical Women’s Association 
57; Killias, M., J. van Kesteren, and M. Rindlisbacher (2001), 
in Canadian Journal of Criminology 43; Geneva Declaration 
Secretariat (2011). P. 131; Shaw, M. (2013). Small Arms 
Survey. Everyday Dangers, chapter 2.
result, having a gun in the home places women at 
a higher risk of victimization, particularly in the 
home, where they are more likely to be killed by 
their intimate partners or family members.5
The hypothesis that firearm homicide is not only 
prevalent in homicide related to other criminal 
activities is further supported when considering 
the respective trends in gun homicides and other 
violent crime in the United States. All forms of 
violent crime have significantly decreased in the 
United States in the last 20 years, but while the 
respective trends in firearm homicide, non-fatal 
firearm victimization,6 violent victimization and 
serious violent victimization7 followed a similar 
path in the 1990s, the pace of decline in firearm 
homicide has slowed remarkably since 2000 (see 
figure 3.3). 
5 UNODC (2011). Global Study on Homicide. P. 58.
6 This refers to the victimization rate of people who have been 
the victim of violent crime (rape, sexual assault, robbery, 
aggravated and simple assault) during which the perpetrator(s) 
had showed or used a firearm (see Planty M. and J. Truman 
(2013), United States Bureau of Justice Statistics). 
7 This refers to the victimization rate of people who have been 
the victim of serious violent crime, which includes rape, 
sexual assault, robbery and aggravated assault (see Lauritsen 
J.L. and M.L. Rezey (2013), United States Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics; and Truman J., Langton L. and M. Planty 
M.(2013), United States Bureau of Justice Statistics).
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Map 3.1: Percentage distribution of homicide mechanisms, by sub-region (2012 or latest year) 
 
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). 
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The above data indicate that homicide trends 
(both firearm and non-firearm homicide) do not 
necessarily follow similar trends and patterns to 
those of other violent crime. The various homicide 
types, as presented in chapter 2 of this study, can 
follow different trends and the overall evolution of 
homicide levels combines the respective trends in 
all homicide types. The divergence between trends 
in homicide and other violent crime in the United 
States suggests that while homicide may share 
some of the drivers of other forms of violent crime, 
it may also have enablers that are specific to it. 
The role that firearm availability, accessibility or 
ownership may play in affecting levels of firearm 
homicide is a heavily debated research and policy 
issue. Hypotheses about the impact of the preva-
lence of firearm ownership and, more generally, of 
gun availability8 on homicide tend to fall into two 
8 Availability, accessibility and ownership of firearms are closely 
related terms but with different connotations. In this study, 
firearm availability refers to the overall stock of firearms 
directly available to civilians, military, armed groups, etc. 
independently of the type of entitlement; firearm accessibility 
reflects the overall availability but also the existence of possible 
limitations to access and use of firearms (for example, due 
categories. One suggests that easy access to fire-
arms may facilitate the commission of homicide in 
a variety of ways, including by fostering violent 
confrontations and by increasing their lethality, as 
well as, on a different note, by facilitating the com-
mission of crimes and the execution of targeted 
killings. The second hypothesis suggests, on the 
other hand, that widespread availability of firearms 
may be a deterrent to assault and aggressions, in 
that it may reduce the leverage and motivation of 
an armed perpetrator. A number of methodologi-
cal challenges, starting with the shortage of data on 
firearm availability, make it difficult to provide 
definitive answers in either direction.9 
In some countries, available quantitative evidence 
points to the prevalence of firearm ownership as 
being positively related to the level of firearm 
violence. For example, the experience of several 
European countries, all of them characterized by 
to prescriptions on storage or carrying of weapons); firearm 
(private) ownership refers to the percentage of households in 
a country owning at least one gun. Gun ownership is often 
measured through the permanent presence of a gun in the 
household.
9 There is a lack of specific data on how many firearms used in 
homicides were obtained legally and how many were obtained 
illegally. For more on these hypotheses and related meth-
odological challenges, see UNODC (2011). Global Study on 
Homicide. P. 43.
Fig. 3.3: Trends in ﬁrearm and non-ﬁrearm 
homicide rates, violent and seri-
ous violent victimization rates, 
and non-fatal ﬁrearm victimization 
rate, United States (1993-2012)
Note: Due to methodological changes in the 2006 NCVS, caution 
should be used when comparing 2006 estimates to other years.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States (2013); 
Truman, J. Langton L. and M. Planty (2013); Lauritsen, J.L. 
and M.L. Rezey (2013); and Planty, M. and J. Truman (2013). 
Fig. 3.4: Firearm homicide rate and per-
centage of households owning at 
least one gun, selected European 
countries (2004 or 2005)
Note: Firearm homicide rate is based on the median homicide by firearm 
rate for each country grouping.
Source: European Crime and Safety Survey (EU ICS) and  
International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS). 
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low firearm homicide rates, points to a certain level 
of association between firearm ownership and 
firearm homicide. When grouping the countries 
into low, medium and high levels of household 
gun ownership, results indicate that countries with 
higher levels of firearm ownership also have higher 
firearm homicide rates (see figure 3.4). 
Homicide by sharp object
Instruments with sharp edges account for 24 per 
cent of all homicides globally. Many homicides 
result from cuts or slashes caused by sharp objects, 
such as knives, machetes, razors, swords and bayo-
nets, as well as broken glass, but sharp objects, 
including less conventional examples such as 
screwdrivers, ice picks or stilettos, can also be used 
to stab or puncture. Such instruments are relatively 
easy to obtain and to conceal. 
In some countries, especially those with low levels 
of homicide, sharp objects significantly outweigh 
other mechanisms of killing. For example, in Aus-
tralia, the number of homicide victims who die 
from stab wounds has been consistently higher 
than the number of victims killed by firearms,10 
(see figure 3.5) and knife homicide also affects 
young people aged 18-24 more than firearm hom-
icide.11 In terms of homicide typologies, sharp 
objects account for the largest share of homicides 
in Australia committed by intimate partners/
family members or by acquaintances, while beat-
ings and physical violence accounts for the domi-
nant share of homicides committed by strangers 
(see figure 3.6). 
In the United Kingdom, sharp objects are the most 
common method of killing. In England and Wales 
they accounted for two out of every five homicides 
in 2011/201212 (see figure 3.7) and, similarly, 
sharp objects have been the most common method 
10 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013). 
11 Bartels, L. (2011a), in Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal 
Justice, Australian Institute of Criminology.
12 Government of the United Kingdom. (2012). Home Office 
Statistical Bulletin 02/12. 
International firearm control: the Arms Trade Treaty
The illicit trade in small arms is a serious problem that requires global action. Around the world, civil-
ian populations are trapped in situations of violence, from conflict and crime, and they are often the 
ones suffering the misuse of arms by armed groups, including organized criminal groups.
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in April 2013,a is 
designed to regulate and improve the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms, with 
the intention of preventing, disrupting and eradicating the illicit trade in such arms and thwarting their 
diversion. The ATT will be closely linked to the successful implementation and provisions of the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols, notably the Firearms 
Protocol, which obliges countries to establish strict transfer control measures and enforcement provi-
sions, as well as to criminalize the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms, their parts, compo-
nents and ammunition, among several other measures.b 
The ATT introduces a set of measures designed to prevent diversions of conventional arms by prohib-
iting the authorization of arms transfers under certain circumstances, including where there is knowl-
edge that arms would be used to perpetrate war crimes, genocide, attacks against civilians, and other 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Where the prohibitions do not apply, States must perform 
a comprehensive risk assessment and examine possible risk mitigation measures. The assessment explic-
itly requires States to evaluate whether there is a risk of serious violations of international human rights 
or humanitarian law, or of contravening conventions relating to terrorism and organized crime. 
International cooperation and assistance are emphasized throughout the ATT as means to ensure that 
all States can effectively implement and enforce its provisions. All relevant United Nations entities, 
international and regional organizations have made commitments to support the ATT’s implementa-
tion and contribute to the achievement of its ultimate objectives: the eradication of violence and pres-
ervation of peace.
a United Nations General Assembly (2013). A/CONF.217/2013/L.3.
b For more on the Firearms Protocol, see United Nations General Assembly (2001). Resolution 55/255 Annex; and UNODC 
(2011). Global Study on Homicide. P. 42.
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of killing in Scotland for the last ten years (see 
figure 3.8).13 In the United Kingdom overall, fire-
arms account for a very small percentage of all 
homicides, with victims being twice as likely to be 
killed by a blunt instrument, almost four times as 
likely to be punched or kicked to death, and more 
than ten times as likely to be stabbed or killed with 
a sharp object than with a firearm.14 
Several small-scale studies on the phenomenon of 
knife-carrying by young people,15 indicate that its 
associated factors are similar to those relating to 
why people own firearms. For example, out of fear, 
a sense of vulnerability, and for self-defence. Other 
factors that influence knife-carrying include a his-
tory of victimization, exposure to violence, engag-
ing in risky behaviour such as drug use or gang 
membership, socio-economic disadvantage, lack of 
employment and/or opportunities. A sense of fear, 
particularly regarding being in public spaces and at 
night, influence knife carrying in young people in 
Australia.16 In Scotland and Australia, the most 
common age at which youth begin to carry knives 
is 13-14, and this has a strong influence on youth 
carrying knives throughout their teens.17 Such 
13 Scottish Government (2011).
14 Home Office, Office for National Statistics, United Kingdom 
(2013). 
15 See for example Bannister, J. et al. (2010); and Phillips, A. and 
V. Chamberlain (2006).
16 Brown, J. and J. Sutton (2007), in Australian Journal of Guid-
ance and Counselling 17.
17 McVie, S. (2010), in Scottish Government Social Research; 
Australian Institute of Criminology (2009).
Fig. 3.5: Homicide rates, by homicide 
mechanism, Australia (2001-2012)
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012a). 
Fig. 3.6: Homicide mechanism, by  
homicide perpetrator, Australia 
(2008-2010)
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012b); and Australian 
Institute of Criminology (2013). 
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results suggest that early intervention targeted at 
young people carrying weapons could have a 
strong preventative impact, as could crime preven-
tion strategies that enhance the perception of 
safety of young people.18
Psychoactive substances
From death to chronic illness and addiction, the 
consumption of psychoactive substances outside of 
medical control can have a plethora of negative 
health effects. Moreover, the use of intoxicants can 
have consequences beyond the impact on the indi-
vidual consumer, as the consumption of alcohol 
and illicit drugs are cross-cutting facilitators for all 
types of violence. Both can increase the risk of 
becoming a victim or perpetrator of violence, and 
several links exist between the consumption of 
psychoactive substances and interpersonal vio-
lence. The first of those is “psychopharmacologi-
cal”: as a result of the ingestion of specific 
substances, such as illicit drugs or alcohol, indi-
viduals may experience changes in their physiolog-
ical functioning that typically restrain behaviour. 
The second is “economic-compulsive”: addicted or 
dependent individuals commit crimes in order to 
fund their alcohol or illicit drug use.19 The illicit 
trafficking of drugs has an additional element that 
links violence with drugs, as “systemic” or “struc-
tural” violence is an inherent component of the 
18 Bartels, L. (2011b), Australian Institute of Criminology.
19 These explanations are based on WHO (2009). Interpersonal 
violence and illicit drug use; and WHO (2006). Interpersonal 
violence and alcohol. 
illicit drug market and is used to enforce payment, 
resolve competition and to punish.20 
The psychopharmacological explanation relates 
directly to the interpersonal homicide typology, 
but economic-compulsive and systemic or struc-
tural violence are more closely tied to the typology 
of homicidal violence linked to other criminal 
activities. But it is often difficult to disentangle the 
relationship between these different explanations 
for spikes or drops in violence, as the use of psy-
choactive substances is commonly associated with 
other risk-taking behaviours and social conditions 
(such as poverty), making associations challenging 
to isolate. Individual, situational and socio-cul-
tural factors also come into play, and very few 
countries have available data on the nature of the 
crimes committed while under the influence of 
alcohol or illicit drugs.
20 Goldstein, P. (1985), in Journal of Drug Issues 14. 
Measures to control  
knife-carrying in the  
United Kingdom
Noting the severity of knife-related homicide, 
particularly among young people, the United 
Kingdom enacted the Violent Crime Reduction 
Act in 2006. Among its many provisions, it 
included raising the minimum age for buying a 
knife from 16 to 18 years of age, and increasing 
the maximum sentence for carrying a knife 
without good reason from two to four yearsa In 
addition, the United Kingdom launched the 
“Tackling Knives Action Programme (TKAP)” 
in 2008, in response to a number of knife hom-
icides involving teenage victims. Police in areas 
of greatest concern introduced a range of 
enforcement, education and prevention initia-
tives aimed at reducing youth knife violence. 
The programme ran from June 2008 to March 
2010 and demonstrated positive reductions in 
the number of homicide victims and suspects in 
the areas in which it was implemented, though 
the reductions were not proportionately higher 
in programme areas than elsewhere, as reduc-
tions of serious youth violence were noted 
across the country from 2007 to 2010.b
a Government of the United Kingdom (2006). Violent   
 Crime Reduction Act.
b For more on the TKAP, see Ward, L, Nicholas S. and M.  
 Willoughby (2011).
Fig. 3.8: Average percentage of homicides, 
by homicide mechanism, Scotland 
(2003-2013)
Source: Scottish Government (2013). 
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Alcohol
A serious threat to public health in many coun-
tries, alcohol can affect different types of interper-
sonal violence, including various types of 
interpersonal homicide. The link between alcohol 
and violence involves a causal chain that binds 
together alcohol consumption and other afore-
mentioned factors to form a relationship that may 
be more conditional than deterministic.21 While 
violence levels, including homicide rates, are influ-
enced by the volume of alcohol consumption, they 
are even more influenced by patterns of alcohol 
consumption, with a number of studies indicating, 
for example, that hazardous drinking patterns are 
strongly associated with homicide rates.22 
Findings made by the European Homicide Moni-
tor suggest that 82 per cent of homicide offenders 
in Finland in 2003-2006 were intoxicated with 
alcohol when they committed murder, whereas 
that was the case for slightly more than half of 
homicide offenders in Sweden.23 This research also 
suggests that the difference between total homicide 
rates in Finland and Sweden can to a large extent 
be attributed to alcohol-related homicides (see 
figure 3.9).24 
Australia also has available data on the consump-
tion of alcohol by homicide victims and offenders. 
In 2008-2010, nearly half of all homicide inci-
dents were preceded by alcohol consumption by 
the victim or the perpetrator, or both.25 Elsewhere, 
in cases reviewed in the southern Indian State of 
Odisha from 2006-2011, 30.2 per cent of homi-
cide victims were found to have a positive blood 
alcohol content.26
The consumption of alcohol, particularly at 
“harmful” levels, is a major risk factor for homi-
cides between partners. As an example, a Finnish 
study on intimate partner homicides between 
21 For a review of the many elements involved in the relationship 
between alcohol and violence, see Bye, E.K. (2012), in Hand-
book of European Homicide Research: Patterns, explanations and 
country studies. 
22 See Rossow, I. (2000), National Institute for Alcohol and 
Drug Research, Norway; Bye, E. K. (2008), in Homicide 
Studies 12(1); Rehm, J., et al. (2004), World Health Organi-
zation.
23 Homicide in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden: A first study 
on the European Homicide Monitor data (2011). 
24 Lehti, M. and J. Kivivuori, (2005), in Nordisk alcohol- and 
narko-tikatidskrift, 22. Pp. 5-18.
25 Australian Institute of Criminology (2013). 
26 Mohanty, S. et al. (2013), in Forensic Medicine and Anatomy 
Research 1(2).
2002 and 2010 showed that 73 per cent of all male 
offenders and 77 per cent of all female offenders 
were under the influence of alcohol at the time of 
the homicide. The study also noted that 62 per 
cent of the victims of male offenders and 77 per 
cent of the victims of female offenders were also 
intoxicated with alcohol.27
Links between these phenomena are manifold and 
research has suggested that the use of alcohol 
increases both the occurrence and severity of inti-
mate partner violence for the following reasons: 
alcohol use has a direct effect on both cognitive 
and physical function, reducing inhibition and 
leaving people less capable of negotiating a non-
violent resolution to conflicts within relationships; 
excessive drinking by one partner can exacerbate 
financial difficulties, childcare problems, infidelity 
or other family stressors, resulting in increased ten-
sions in a relationships and the potential risk of 
violence between partners; and individual and 
societal beliefs that alcohol causes aggression can 
excuse or condone violent behaviour after drink-
ing, and the use of alcohol can be an excuse for 
violent behaviour. 
27 Kivivuori, J. and M. Lehti (2012), in Homicide Studies 16 (1): 
P.60.
Fig. 3.9: Annual victimization rates of 
alcohol-related and non-alcohol-
related homicides, Finland and 
Sweden (2003-2006)
Source: European Homicide Monitor. 
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Illicit drugs
As with alcohol consumption, the use of illicit 
drugs can increase the risk of becoming a victim or 
a perpetrator of violence. However, different drugs 
have different psychopharmacological effects, with 
some, such as cocaine and amphetamines, being 
more related to violence than others.28 In addition, 
in contrast to alcohol, the production and distri-
bution of illicit drugs can also generate a great deal 
of violence.
It is particularly challenging to disentangle the 
various components of illicit drug-related homi-
cide, as this type of violence is the product of the 
28 WHO (2009). Interpersonal violence and illicit drug use. 
interaction of a variety of different complex causes 
and underlying factors. The mechanisms linking 
illicit drugs to homicide are not universal and they 
vary, not only from one drug type to another but 
also across nations and communities. Efforts to 
intervene will often also affect other components 
of the interactive system (supply and demand),29 
but a review of all aspects of the drug-related illicit 
economy (cultivation, production, distribution, 
transit and sale) would be necessary for a compre-
hensive assessment, as these components also trig-
ger other crimes and violence in connection with 
the safeguarding of criminal activities, including 
disputes between rival criminal factions.
29 Office of National Drug Control Policy, United States 
(2013). P. 31. 
Alcohol-related policy  
strategies
Policy strategies that involve limiting the availabil-
ity of alcohol have proved effective in reducing 
violence. Studies have demonstrated that licensed 
premises can become “hot spots” for violent 
behaviour, and strategies to prevent heavy con-
sumption in bars and pubs are particularly rele-
vant for the reduction of violence. This has proved 
to be the case in cities that have experienced high 
levels of violence. Starting with Bogota, in 1995, 
several cities in Colombia that were experiencing 
high levels of violence adopted so-called “dry 
laws” that restrict the sale of alcohol in bars and 
restaurants during certain hours. For example, 
Cali had a very high homicide rate, with alcohol 
being associated with an increase in the number of 
homicides.a A variety of policies, from relatively 
lax to very restrictive, limiting the sale of alcohol 
in public places were enacted over several different 
periods throughout 2004-2008. Research demon-
strated an increased risk of homicide during peri-
ods when the less restrictive policies were in effect, 
which was consistent across all homicides, includ-
ing those by firearm and by sharp object.b 
Similar policies in the Americas and Europe have 
had similar effects,c suggesting that longer alcohol 
sales hours may lead to increased levels of alcohol 
consumption and subsequently to more violence.
a Concha-Eastman, A. et al. (2002), in Pan American Journal 
of Public Health 12.
b Sanchez, A. I. et al. (2011), in International Journal of Epi-
demiology 2011.
c Biderman, C., J. M.P. de Mello and A. A. Schneider (2006), 
in The Economic Journal 120 (543); Duailibi, S. et al. (2007), 
in American Journal of Public Health 97(12); Pacific Institute 
for Research and Evaluation (2004); Rossow, I. and T.  
Norstrom (2011), in Addiction 107.
Fig. 3.10: Homicide rates during various 
time restrictions on alcohol  
sales, Cali, Colombia (2004-2008)
Source: Sanchez. A.I. et al. (2011). 
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Lax 
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Very few countries produce data on the nature of 
crimes committed while under the influence of 
illicit drugs. But when looking specifically at the 
influence of drug intoxication on homicide, about 
20 per cent of male homicide offenders in Finland 
and Sweden in 2003-2006 were under the influ-
ence of illicit or psychosomatic drugs, often com-
bined with alcohol, when they committed homicide 
(see figure 3.11),30 whereas the percentages of 
female perpetrators intoxicated with illicit drugs 
were lower. Moreover, the fact that significant per-
centages of homicide victims were under the influ-
ence of illicit drugs is indicative of the multiple 
effects that illicit drugs can have on violence. 
In addition to the pharmacological link between 
illicit drug consumption and homicide, significant 
violence is also associated with crimes motivated 
by the need for drug users to purchase often expen-
sive drugs. As mentioned earlier, a third distinct 
source of violence arises from illicit drug markets 
(a systemic, or structural relationship), in which 
violence is used as a tool. The relationship between 
drug markets, trafficking routes, organized crimi-
nal groups, anti-drug efforts and violence is being 
increasingly studied in an attempt to identify pat-
30 Homicide in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden: A first study 
on the European Homicide Monitor data (2011). 
terns of association and/or causality links, includ-
ing reverse causality (i.e. more violence in a given 
region reduces opportunities for legal activities). 
Another objective is to underline the reality that 
lethal violence and drug trafficking often share 
underlying causes, such as weak rule of law and 
fragile institutions that can both enable illicit 
activities and provide impunity for violence. 
The systemic effect of drugs on violence can take 
many forms at different levels, from the cultivation 
and production of illicit drugs through the traf-
ficking process to the retail level. The violence 
associated with the production of drugs in some 
countries appears to be considerable. Recent stud-
ies have found, for example, that drug production 
activities in Colombia accounted for a significant 
share of the country’s homicides in 2010.31 Com-
petition between illegal armed groups, and with 
the Government, over control of territories suita-
ble for coca cultivation and cocaine production 
can result in lethal violence. For example, as 
cocaine cultivation shifted from Peru and Bolivia 
to Colombia in the early 1990s, surges in violence 
occurred between competing factions involved 
in coca cultivation and cocaine production, and 
violence increased after 2000, particularly in 
31 Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013a). 
Fig. 3.11: Percentage of adult homicide  
victims and offenders under the 
inﬂuence of drugs at time of crime 
(2003-2006)
Source: European Homicide Monitor.
Fig. 3.12: Homicide rates, by type of  
municipality, Colombia (1990-2008)
Source: Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013b). 
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municipalities with significant coca cultivation32 
(see figure 3.12).33 
The transit phase of transnational drug trafficking 
also generates a significant amount of crime and 
violence, as homicides are frequently associated 
with organizations involved in the movement of 
drugs.34 It has been widely speculated that drug 
trafficking is responsible for the high levels of vio-
lence in Central America, but while there has been 
research into that particular nexus, no evidence 
can prove a direct link between the two crimes. For 
every area that has high levels of both drug traf-
ficking and homicide, there are others with low 
levels of trafficking and high homicide, and yet 
others with low levels of homicide and high levels 
of trafficking.35
As discussed in the Global Study on Homicide 
2011,36 it is likely that changes in drug markets 
drive lethal violence, rather than violence being 
driven by overall levels of trafficking flows. A 
recent study, giving a slightly different perspective, 
found that while interdiction efforts in Colombia 
(based on increased seizures starting in 2007) had 
an immediate effect on drug trafficking activities 
in Mexico, creating a negative supply shock, com-
petition in drug trafficking activities in Mexico 
had an extended effect on violence, with a strong 
relationship between homicide rates and the 
number of cartels in a given municipality in 2007-
2010. One of the key findings of the study is that 
the presence of each additional cartel in a particu-
lar location results in a doubling of the homicide 
rate, which suggests that the main channel relating 
the drug trade to violence is competition between 
cartels over the control of territory, as there was a 
milder effect on fighting between authorities and 
traffickers due to the supply shocks from Colom-
bian seizures.37
With regard to retail markets for illicit drugs, the 
literature on drug-related violence focuses largely 
on the Americas and suggests that there is strong 
32 Municipalities dedicated to coca cultivation with at least 10 
hectares (on average) between 1990-2008 (using only the 
years for which cultivation figures are available). (Mejia, D. 
and P. Restrepo (2013b).
33 Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013b). Pp. 4-5.
34 UNODC (2013). World Drug Report. P. 48; Organization of 
American States (2013). P. 75; UNODC (2011). Global Study 
on Homicide. Pp. 51-53.
35 Organization of American States (2013). P. 78.
36 UNODC (2011). Global Study on Homicide. Pp. 51-52.
37 Castillo, J.C., Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013).
evidence that cocaine (including crack cocaine) was 
associated with homicide, particularly gun 
homicides related to drug retail markets in the 
1980s and 1990s, in the United States.38 This 
serves as a reminder of how specific such phenomena 
are to their particular context: in Western Europe, 
for example, the emergence of crack cocaine (such 
as in Spain and the United Kingdom) has not 
generated a similar upturn in violence.
38 Fryer, R.G. et al. (2013), in Economic Inquiry 51.

4. HOMICIDE, VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT
77
In countries with recent experience of conflict, it is 
often difficult to disentangle violence that is an 
after-effect of conflict, or a lower-intensity con-
tinuation of conflict, from violence related to other 
criminal activities. The formal end of an armed 
conflict does not necessarily translate into an 
immediate cessation of all hostilities, and attempts 
to distinguish between conflict and non-conflict 
violence need to account for the reality of situa-
tions in which various types of violence are often 
indistinguishable and overlapping.1 
Understanding the nature of lethal violence and 
crime in post-conflict2 countries or countries 
emerging from conflict is important for clarifying 
the actual challenges those countries face, as well 
as for bolstering their stability in the aftermath. 
Reducing violence in such settings goes beyond 
the need to address the roots of the conflict, to 
include the prevention of surges in violence result-
ing from organized crime and interpersonal vio-
lence, which can flourish in settings with weak 
institutions and weak rule of law. 
Homicides in those settings can result from vio-
lence linked to other criminal activities, interper-
sonal conflict or socio-political agendas, the three 
typologies put forth in chapter 2 of this study. A 
significant share of homicides in post-conflict set-
tings is related to other criminal activities, which 
can flourish when law enforcement institutions are 
1 See Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2011). 
2 There are different interpretations of this term, but while 
“post-conflict” is, in effect, a process, for the purposes of this 
study, it refers to the aftermath of conflict, usually a post-war 
situation. It can, however, also apply to the aftermath of inter-
nal rebellions or other situations that do not fit as neatly into 
standard conceptions of war. This definition of a post-conflict 
State is from UNDP (2005). P. 178.
weak. In addition to conventional crime, the inci-
dence of organized crime-related violence is 
increasingly plausible in several countries with 
recent experiences of conflict, but it is difficult to 
quantify. Research has started to explore the rela-
tionship between post-conflict recovery and the 
onset of transnational organized crime and related 
violence,3 the perpetrators of which have proved 
adept at illicitly exploiting gaps in the rule of law. 
Examples of this include changes in drug traffick-
ing routes to exploit post-conflict and vulnerable 
settings in West Africa in the mid-2000s,4 as well 
as the exploitation of natural resources and associ-
ated violence in several post-conflict countries.5 
Criminal activities, including transnational organ-
ized crime, deplete the social and economic capital 
that could be used to develop the economy and 
improve social cohesion, and can contribute to 
violence that may trigger instability or a return to 
armed conflict. 
Interpersonal violence in post-conflict settings, 
which often carries the legacy of a conflict, can 
easily escalate, particularly when an enduring sense 
of impunity pervades such situations. Violence 
may have become a way of life, a social norm, for 
people living in and through armed conflict. For 
instance, interpersonal disputes over land owner-
ship and resources such as livestock can be particu-
larly violent in States where non-violent conflict 
resolution mechanisms are weak or non-existent. 
In such contexts, both men and women can be 
victimized by violence of a physical and sexual 
nature, both within the family and the community 
3 World Bank (2011). World Development Report, chapter 1.
4 See UNODC (2013b); and UNODC (2009). 
5 See, for example, UNODC (2011b). 
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at large. Violence is often nourished by the ready 
availability and abundance of firearms and other 
weapons, not to mention the willingness of a des-
perate, traumatized, displaced and unemployed 
young population to use them — many of whom 
may already be hardened by the violence of the 
former conflict.
Homicide of a socio-political nature, which is 
often linked to power-related agendas, may also be 
dominant in some States with recent experiences 
of conflict. This is particularly true in countries 
where the causes of armed conflict have not been 
fully resolved and the distinction between conflict-
related deaths and intentional homicides is par-
ticularly blurred. For example, recorded deaths due 
to intentional homicide may overlap with recorded 
civilian casualties attributed to the conflict, making 
it difficult to determine the types of policies and 
prevention efforts that need to be implemented 
from a criminal justice perspective.
There are several challenges to conducting research 
on crime and violence in post-conflict situations. 
For example, there is little to no pre-conflict base-
line data available for the countries discussed in 
this chapter, and there is a reduced capacity of law 
enforcement and justice institutions to fulfil their 
duties, such as the registration of criminal offences 
and their statistical reporting. The countries ana-
lysed in this chapter have been selected as the pres-
ence of United Nations peacekeeping operations 
or missions6 has resulted in the availability of offi-
cial statistics relating to their respective crime and 
violence situations. 
Furthermore, perceptions of security have different 
benchmarks in countries emerging from conflict, 
as people may perceive high levels of crime and 
violence to be relatively low in comparison to 
during the conflict period, thus do not report 
being victimized by crime as such. However, 
information from survey data, including on 
perceptions of safety and security, can provide 
complementary insights. Also, due to the gradual 
strengthening of security and justice institutions in 
the countries analysed here, it is likely that better 
reporting and data collection processes over the 
years is resulting in reported increases in some 
crimes, or increased reporting and/or recording 
only in certain areas with access to services. As 
such, comparisons across countries and over time 
should therefore be made with caution. In spite of 
such challenges, this chapter attempts to provide 
insight into patterns and trends in homicidal 
violence and violent crime in countries that have 
recently experienced conflict.
6 During the preparation of this study, several United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations were contacted for assistance with 
the collection of data. In particular, UNODC would like 
to gratefully acknowledge the support and data provided by 
MINUSTAH (Haiti), UNIPSIL (Sierra Leone), UNMIL 
(Liberia), UNMISS (South Sudan), UNAMA (Afghanistan) 
and UNAMI (Iraq).
Violence and development 
Despite the differing natures of conflict and 
crime, both are detrimental to security and 
development. A direct causal relationship is dif-
ficult to establish — in actuality, such a rela-
tionship runs both ways — but it has also been 
argued that violence is development in reversea 
in many post-conflict settings. According to a 
World Bank study, poverty reduction in coun-
tries affected by major violence is an average of 
almost one percentage point slower per year 
than in countries not affected by violence,b 
which, after a few years, can be significant. This 
“development deficit” is particularly concen-
trated in vulnerable and conflict-affected States 
as, due to weak institutions, they are less likely 
to be able to absorb development inputs than 
States not affected by conflict.c 
The effects of violence are enduring: some 
research literature has shown that for countries 
having experienced civil war since 1960, an 
average of 14 years of peace is required to return 
to the growth paths prior to the conflict.d There 
is something of a consensus among the aca-
demic and international communities that 
lethal violence is often rooted in contexts of 
poverty, deprivation, inequality and injustice, 
social marginalization and weak rule of law. 
This study’s predecessor, the Global Study on 
Homicide 2011, demonstrated that lower levels 
of violent crime are generally related to higher 
levels of development, as well as to lower levels 
of income inequality.e
Addressing the root causes of violence and 
crime, fostering development of the rule of law, 
supporting institutions of justice and mecha-
nisms for conflict resolution are ways to reduce 
violence and support development. In coun-
tries coping with the legacies of conflict and its 
related fragility, this is a critical step in prevent-
ing a return to armed conflict.
a Collier, P. (2004). 
b World Bank (2011). 
c UNDP (2010). 
d Hoeffler, A., Billerbeck S. and S.S. Ijaz (2010), World Bank. P. 4.
e For more, see UNODC (2011a), chapter 2; and UNODC 
(2007).
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The countries analysed in this chapter have had 
different experiences of conflict in the years fol-
lowing the “official” end of their respective con-
flicts, yet all struggle with crime and its enablers as 
elements of the post-conflict setting. In some, 
security challenges are not only related to the con-
flict but also to an increase in levels of crime; in 
others, there has been a positive trend towards a 
decrease in violence and an increase in security, as 
perceived by the population. 
Nevertheless, they do show some similar trends. 
For example, because of their weak institutions, all 
the countries analysed face challenges in asserting 
the rule of law. As elsewhere in the world, interper-
sonal violence (such as that driven by access to 
resources like land) accounts for a significant share 
of homicide cases, and this type of violence may be 
made more acute by weak rule of law and the 
population’s lack of trust in institutions. Also, as in 
non-conflict-affected countries, violence appears 
to be largely an urban phenomenon (see figure 
4.2), which may be due to the increased instability 
and inequality linked to the influx of people to the 
major cities, either in search of employment or 
services, or because they were forced out of their 
more rural communities during the conflict. But 
given the presence of international organizations 
(often in the capital city) and the challenges facing 
security and infrastructure outside the major urban 
centres, such patterns may also be due to better 
recording of data in cities. 
Experiences of violence in certain 
countries with high levels of conﬂict-
related violence: Afghanistan and Iraq
It is extremely difficult to differentiate types and 
contexts of deadly violence in countries with recent 
experiences of violence. However, available data on 
civilian casualties7 in Afghanistan and Iraq show 
that civilians bear the brunt of violence emanating 
from still-warring parties: the population may be 
caught in the crossfire of armed operations between 
7 As per the definition used in international humanitarian law 
(Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I (1977)), civilians 
are persons who are not members of military/paramilitary 
forces or members belonging to organized armed groups of a 
party to a conflict. Civilian casualties are the civilian victims 
of conflict, and they may be of two types: direct (resulting 
directly from armed conflict, including, for example, military 
operations, targeted killings, indiscriminate bombings, etc.) 
or indirect (casualties resulting from, for example, explosive 
remnants of war, deaths in cross-fire, etc.). For more, see the 
definition provided by UNAMA (2013).
Fig. 4.1: Homicide rates in selected  
countries emerging from  
conﬂict (2007-2013)
Source: Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan; WHO (2014); 
Ministry of Interior, South Sudan (2012a and 2012b); UND-
PKO-UNMISS, JMAC; UNDPKO-MINUSTAH; Sierra Leone 
Police; UNDPKO-UNMIL. 
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Fig. 4.2: Homicide rates in national capitals 
versus rest of country, selected 
countries emerging from conﬂict 
(2012 or latest year) 
Source: UNDPKO-MINUSTAH; Sierra Leone Police; UND-
PKO-UNMIL; Ministry of Interior, South Sudan (2012a and 
2012b); UNDPKO-UNMISS, JMAC; UNODC Homicide  
Statistics (2013).
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government and anti-government forces; or may 
be victimized by violence perpetrated by govern-
mental and non-governmental armed groups. But 
beyond deaths directly related to the conflict, there 
are also cases of intentional homicide that are con-
tributing to the violent deaths in both those coun-
tries. Although data is scarce and it is not always 
possible to determine whether counts of civilian 
casualties and intentional homicides overlap, there 
is more to the story of lethal violence than purely 
conflict-related deaths in Afghanistan an Iraq, with 
criminal violence playing a role in that story.
Afghanistan
According to United Nations sources, between 
2008 and 2013 the annual rate of civilian casualties 
in Afghanistan ranged between 8 and 10 per 
100,000 population, with a peak in 2011. Over 
the same period, the responsibility for those deaths 
gradually switched, with anti-government 
elements8 accounting for just over half of all 
civilian casualties in 2008, while they were 
responsible for nearly 80 per cent in 2012 and 
2013 (see figure 4.3).
Almost half of the civilian casualties in Afghanistan 
are the result of indiscriminate attacks, such as with 
8 “Anti-government elements” encompass all individuals and 
armed groups involved in armed conflict with or armed oppo-
sition against the Government of Afghanistan and/or interna-
tional military forces. See UNAMA (2013).
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), whereas 
around a quarter are the result of targeted killings 
of specific civilians on the basis of their employ-
ment or perceived support of the Government or 
international forces; a tactic aimed at asserting con-
trol over and terrorizing the population.9 In non-
conflict situations, targeted killings of that nature 
would be considered socio-political homicides.
Data from the Ministry of Interior Affairs of 
Afghanistan show a marked increase in the rate of 
intentional homicide since 2009, when data 
became available, from a rate of 4.0 to 6.5 per 
100,000 population in 2012. In settings such as 
the non-international armed conflict in Afghani-
stan, the boundary between crime and conflict-
related violence is particularly blurred. No 
information is available on the type of violent 
deaths included in the count of intentional homi-
cide, and there is a possibility that a share of the 
homicide count includes some deaths counted 
among the civilian victims recorded by the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA). The statistical count of wilful killings 
of civilians by parties to the conflict, an illegal 
action in any circumstance,10 is characterized by a 
number of operational and methodological chal-
lenges (see chapter 6). 
Given the challenges of determining the nature of 
conflict versus non-conflict deaths in Afghanistan, 
no information is available on existing homicide 
typologies. That said, it appears that the feeling of 
insecurity amongst Afghans has increased slightly 
over the last few years, according to different pop-
ulation-based surveys. A recent UNODC survey 
noted that the percentage of the adult population 
that considered insecurity to be one of the most 
pressing challenges in the country increased from 
just over 50 per cent in 2009 to just under 60 per 
cent in 2012.11
In another survey, Afghans reported that their 
daily security is more affected by conventional 
forms of crime (such as assault or livestock theft) 
than by attacks by anti-government or pro-govern-
ment forces.12 Available survey data suggest that 
the percentage of the population that has fallen 
victim to crime and violence has remained stable 
9 UNAMA (2013). P. 4. 
10 As per Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which 
prohibits the killing of civilians by Parties to the Conflict at 
anytime, anyplace, whatsoever. (See Geneva Conventions). 
11 UNODC (2013a).
12 Asia Foundation (2012). Chapter 3.
Fig. 4.3: Rate of civilian casualties, by type 
of perpetrator, Afghanistan  
(2008-2013)
Source: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) (2013).
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over the last few years, though at a high level. 
According to data on offences reported to the 
police, the prevalence of other forms of crime has 
also risen over the last few years (for example, 
reported thefts have increased by 80 per cent and 
incidents of assault have more than doubled),13 
indicating that other types of crime and violence 
are also affecting the safety and security of Afghans. 
Increased reporting could also demonstrate the 
increased capacity of the criminal justice system to 
record such offences, increased territorial coverage 
of recording, or growing trust in the criminal jus-
tice system’s ability to respond to crime.
Iraq
As in Afghanistan, it is extremely challenging to 
determine the nature of violent deaths in Iraq. 
With terrorism, insurgency, ethnic and sectarian 
violence all interwoven, the violence in Iraq is 
complex and has led to an increase in instability. 
According to the United Nations Assistance Mis-
sion in Iraq (UNAMI), rising inter-sectarian ten-
sion is posing a major threat to stability and 
security in the country, much of it driven by armed 
opposition and terrorist groups.14 In addition, the 
conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic has also con-
tributed to increased sectarian tensions, most nota-
bly in the border regions.15 Such tensions may 
contribute to violence and, in extreme cases, lethal 
violence.
Iraq has been experiencing a surge in violence and 
terror attacks since early 2013, with most of the 
resulting deaths being of civilians. This increase in 
civilian casualties is a reversal of the overall 
declining trend since 2007, and the level is now 
higher than at any point since 2008 (see figure 
4.4). Most of the killings are the result of 
coordinated bombings, which target civilian 
infrastructure such as markets and cafes, rather 
than government buildings.16 
Casualties caused by the activities of armed groups 
and terrorism do not, however, provide the com-
plete picture of violence experienced by the popu-
lation of Iraq. In 2012, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) estimated more than 2,600 
intentional homicides in the country (a rate of 8.0 
13 Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan (2013).  
14 United Nations Security Council (2013a). S/2013/408.
15 Kobler, M. (2013). Briefing of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Iraq Martin Kobler to the United Nations 
Security Council.
16 United Nations News Centre (2013). 
per 100,000 population).17 No information is 
available on the type of violent deaths included in 
the estimate of intentional homicides, and a share 
of the civilian victims of violent deaths may be 
included in both the estimate of intentional hom-
icides and in those of civilian casualties. Data on 
other types of violence and crime, such as extor-
tion, kidnapping, robbery and assault, are limited, 
although reporting has suggested that minorities 
continue to be targeted in such acts of violence.18
The violence in both Afghanistan and Iraq is 
arguably a symptom of transition as the two 
countries struggle to establish and solidify new 
national identities that bridge the many divides 
working to undermine them. Measuring civilian 
casualties and reported homicide cases is one way 
to quantify the levels of violence in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, but such measures are preliminary steps 
in addressing the public safety and security 
concerns of the population. 
17 WHO (2014).
18 United Nations Security Council. (2013a). S/2013/408. 
Para. 35
Fig. 4.4: Rate of civilian casualties, Iraq  
(2007-2013)
Note: Bars refer to data from UNAMI, with high and low estimates 
based on additional sources of information about civilian casualties in 
Iraq (Iraq Body Count and the Saban Centre for Middle East Policy).
*Note: 2013 data are based on statistics for January-August 2013.
Source: United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) 
(2013).
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A snapshot of violence in  
a situation of entrenched 
conflict: Somalia
Afflicted by armed conflict for over 20 years, 
Somalia has seen the nature of violence change 
over time. There is no official data on crime 
and violence in Somalia, but some surveysa 
conducted throughout the country in 2010 
provide valuable information on perceptions of 
public safety and security, as well as on the extent 
of killings, in a context of ongoing sectarian 
violence. The surveys were conducted during one 
of the final years of Somalia’s Transitional Federal 
Government, prior to the establishment of the 
new constitution in 2012.
In Mogadishu, most of the violence appeared to 
be related to the conflict, with firearms playing a 
key role in much of it. Some 4 per cent of survey 
respondents noted that a household member had 
been killed in the previous year; assaults were also 
common, with 1 in 10 respondents falling victim 
to at least one physical assault or attack in the 
previous year. Private dwellings did not provide 
shelter from violence, as most sexual violence was 
reported to have occurred in homes, with over half 
of reported cases being perpetrated by armed 
groups, a quarter by individual criminals and 10 
per cent by government agents. The level of fire-
arm-related assault in Mogadishu was also reported 
to be high: two-thirds of all assaults were commit-
ted with a firearm.
In other cities, the population experienced differ-
ent levels and patterns of violence. In Las Anod, 
for example, most respondents perceived that 
their district had become safer in the past year and 
that most of the violence was interpersonal in 
nature. The survey respondents described homi-
cides as being largely revenge killings and com-
pensation-related disputes, and land-related 
conflict was deemed the primary source of vio-
lence in the district. Similarly, in Burao, there was 
an overwhelming perception of safety, and much 
of the violence appeared to be of the interpersonal 
type, with little of it triggered by crime or involv-
ing organized armed groups.
Higher levels of violence were experienced in Gal-
kayo, a known investment and financing hub for 
piracy, where 6 per cent of respondents reported 
that a member of their households had been a 
victim of homicide in the previous year, rising to 
12 per cent among internally displaced persons. 
Most of those killings were attributed to tradi-
tional revenge killing, which is often not consid-
ered a crime, but rather a legitimate form of 
achieving justice. The prevalence of firearms con-
tributed to the intensity and lethality of the vio-
lence. 
The dynamics of violence in a country that has 
experienced entrenched conflict for decades are 
different across the surveyed districts, but a few 
commonalities are evident, such as the use of fire-
arms, the use of lethal violence for revenge and the 
elevated levels of interpersonal violence. Respond-
ents in all cities also indicated a very low level of 
trust in criminal justice and security organiza-
tions, and, consequently, very low shares of crimes 
were reported to authorities for proper investiga-
tion and sanctioning. The lack of faith in formal 
authorities bodes ill for the establishment of the 
rule of law. 
a The information presented in this box is based on crime and victimi-
zation surveys conducted by the Observatory of Conflict and Violence 
Prevention in Burao, Bossaso, Galkayo and Las Anod, as well as six 
districts in Mogadishu from 2009 to 2010. These regions include 
concentrations of population, and each face different security chal-
lenges, varying between conflict, post-conflict, and crime-related vic-
timization. For more, see OCVP (2010).
!
!
!
!
EĂƟŽŶĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂů
ƵƌĂŽ
ŽƐĂƐŽ
'ĂůŬĂǇŽ
>ĂƐŶŽĚ
Mogadishu
d,/KW/
Map 4.1: Cities surveyed, Somalia 
(2010)
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used 
on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations.
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Examples of countries with high and 
increasing levels of violence and  
instability not directly related to the 
conﬂict: South Sudan and Haiti
South Sudan 
South Sudan19 seceded from Sudan in July 2011 
and is still consolidating its transition to independ-
ence. Much of the violence in the country is linked 
to resources such as land and livestock, as well as 
to crime and ongoing clashes between various 
armed groups, and to inter-clan disputes. In addi-
tion, ongoing inter-communal violence and resid-
ual armed group activity from the conflict often 
result in large-scale displacement, increasing the 
vulnerability of the population.20 Other sources of 
insecurity include the proliferation of small arms, 
increasing urbanization and limited economic 
opportunities for the country’s very young and 
very poor population.21 
Reliable statistics for observing and analysing 
trends are not yet available, and the available data 
19 The data on which this analysis of South Sudan is based were 
finalized prior to the violence and civil unrest of December 
2013.
20 g7+ (2013a).
21 National Bureau of Statistics, South Sudan (2012). 
should be interpreted with caution in relation to 
its accuracy and coverage.22 Until recently, there 
was no mechanism for collecting data on crime in 
South Sudan and it is likely that most crime is 
under-reported. However, it is possible to identify 
“hot spots” of crime and violence. Based on data 
from the Ministry of Interior and the United 
Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the 
national homicide rate in 2012 was estimated to 
be 13.9 per 100,000 population, whereas the 2013 
rate is estimated to be 21.3 per 100,000 popula-
tion.23 The increase in 2013 has been driven by 
violence in Jonglei State and in the Wunlit Triangle 
(Lakes, Warrap and Unity States), where homicide 
rates more than doubled in the first half of 2013 
from those observed in 2012, from 25 to over 60 
per 100,000 population, ten times the global aver-
age homicide rate (See map 4.2).
22 The United Nations Police of the United Nations Mission in 
South Sudan (UNMISS) are cataloguing crime statistics, and 
have detailed monthly data available by State since December 
2012.
23 These data are based and projected on six months of data 
from both December 2011-May 2012 and January-June 
2013, as collected by the Ministry of Interior, South Sudan 
(2012a and 2012b) and the UNDPKO-UNMISS Joint Mis-
sion Analysis Centre (JMAC) (2013).
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Map 4.2: Homicide rate, by State, South Sudan (2013)
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 
Dashed lines represent undetermined boundaries. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been 
determined. The final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.
Note: 2013 data are based on statistics for January-May 2013. 
Source: UNDPKO-UNMISS.
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The majority of this increase is associated with the 
escalation of cattle rustling/raiding, a region-spe-
cific form of crime that bridges two homicide 
typologies: those linked to crime and to interper-
sonal conflicts. Much of South Sudan is rural and 
cattle are considered indicators of wealth and social 
standing. As such, rustling can be a means to 
obtain a wife through accumulating money to pay 
a “bride price”, and can also symbolize the mark of 
an adolescent’s transition to maturity. Additionally, 
during the dry season, pastoralists move their cattle 
towards water resources, which may bring com-
munities competing for scarce resources into closer 
contact with one another.24 Cattle rustling and its 
associated reprisals has been a long-standing source 
of communal violence in the region, but has only 
recently begun to be considered as constituting a 
type of crime,25 and one which often involves 
organized criminal groups as well as the increasing 
use of firearms. The country is awash in small arms 
following the years of conflict — an estimated 
327,000 small arms26 were in circulation in 2012 
— and cattle raiders can be better armed than law 
enforcement officers. Attacks related to cattle raids 
can claim hundreds of lives,27 destroy entire com-
munities and exacerbate inter-communal tensions, 
particularly in the Wunlit Triangle where this form 
of violence is most prevalent.28 Increasingly carried 
out also for commercial and political reasons, such 
raids may be facilitated by weak rule of law in this 
newly independent country.29
Outside the Wunlit Triangle, violence is driven by 
different factors. Jonglei State, where much of the 
violence linked to armed conflict is still occurring, 
also has a high rate of homicide, above 35 per 
100,000 population in 2012 and 2013. Most of 
the killings in Jonglei are linked to occasional con-
frontations between the army and rebel groups, 
24 UNEP (2009).
25 See the 2008 Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation 
Organization (EAPCOO) Protocol on the Prevention, Combat-
ing and Eradication of Cattle Rustling in Eastern Africa, which 
defines “cattle rustling” as the “stealing or planning, organiz-
ing, attempting, aiding or abetting the stealing of livestock by 
any person from one country or community to another, where 
the theft is accompanied by dangerous weapons and violence.”
26 Small Arms Survey (2012). 
27 For example, it is estimated that almost 70 per cent of homi-
cides in Warrap in April 2013 were linked to cattle raids; in 
Lakes State it was over 80 per cent, and in Unity it was almost 
90 per cent, according to data from UNDPKO-UNMISS. 
With such attacks, the annual rates of homicide in the Wunlit 
Triangle of South Sudan closely resembles homicide rates of 
countries with high levels of intentional killings. 
28 United Nations Security Council (2013b). S/2013/140.
29 Yual, D. (2012); and Mbugua, J.K. (2012).
but episodes of civil unrest and protest have also 
resulted in violence.30 In Juba, the capital of South 
Sudan, high levels of unemployment and increas-
ing urban migration have increased competition 
for scarce resources such as land, fuelling interper-
sonal and, at times, inter-communal rivalries.31 
Juba accounts for the vast majority of all violent 
crime occurring in Central Equatoria State, includ-
ing over 90 per cent of the reported rapes and 
robberies.32
Haiti
Haiti’s vulnerability to political instability has been 
noted for decades. The United Nations has been 
directly involved in the country since the first 
peacekeeping mission deployed in 1993, following 
a coup in 1991.33 Despite experiencing political 
volatility and a concomitant lack of stability, in 
addition to several natural disasters, all of which 
have weakened the country’s fragile institutions, 
Haiti routinely has one of the lowest reported 
homicide rates in the Caribbean (although it is still 
above the global average). All three homicide 
typologies occur to varying extents within the 
country, but concerns regarding gang-related hom-
icides are most prominent.
The most recent wave of conflict-related violence 
erupted in February 2004, following months of 
deteriorating security, when armed conflict spread 
across the country as a coalition of rebel groups 
seized control over the north. Spikes in homicide 
and other violent crimes occurred from mid-2004 
to late 2006 due to the actions of armed groups 
and gangs who frequently joined forces, notably in 
parts of the capital, Port-au-Prince.34 Homicide 
rates and kidnappings increased in early 2008, 
partially due to a deterioration in economic condi-
tions linked to the global economic crisis and 
political instability.35 Already vulnerable to civil 
unrest and renewed gang activity,36 Haitian insti-
tutions were further weakened by the devastating 
January 2010 earthquake, which hampered the 
country’s ability to combat lawlessness.
30 For example, see UN OCHA (2013). 
31 UNDPKO-UNMISS, Radio Miraya (2013).
32 Data provided by UNDPKO-UNMISS, JMAC (2013).
33 UNDPKO. MINUSTAH background. 
34 United Nations Security Council (2004). S/2004/300. 
35 United Nations Security Council (2008). S/2008/586. Coin-
ciding with the global economic crisis, Haiti saw rising prices 
for oil, food, and also experienced a decrease in remittances 
from Haitians living abroad. Haiti is the 20th most aid-
dependent country in the world (see OECD (2012)).
36 United Nations Security Council (2009). S/2009/129.
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Haiti’s homicide rate has doubled in recent years 
(from 5.1 per 100,000 in 2007 to 10.2 per 100,000 
in 2012), but it decreased slightly in the first half 
of 2013.37 The 2012 rate was half the homicide 
rate in the neighbouring Dominican Republic 
(22.1 per 100,000 in 2012) and only a quarter that 
in Jamaica (39.3 per 100,000 in 2012), but the 
increase remains notable. Other types of violent 
crime, such as reported rapes and kidnappings, 
increased in the aftermath of the earthquake, but 
the same decreasing pattern as for homicide can be 
seen as of 2013 (figure 4.5). The difference in 
homicide rates in comparison to other crimes may 
be due to better reporting and recording of lethal 
violence. 
Moreover, Haiti’s relatively low national homicide 
rate disguises nuances within the country, with 
most of the violence and gang activity concen-
trated in the country’s urban centres, particularly 
Port-au-Prince and its surrounding metropolitan 
communes (see figure 4.6). In 2012, 75 per cent 
of the murders in Haiti took place in Port-au-
Prince and firearms accounted for 87 per cent of 
them.38 A recurrence of clashes between gangs, 
whose involvement in criminal and political vio-
37 UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
38 UNDPKO-MINUSTAH (2013).
lence in Haiti is deeply rooted, may explain such 
patterns.39 Other than homicide, most other crime 
was also concentrated in Port au Prince. For exam-
ple, 76 per cent of all recorded kidnappings during 
2012 and the first half of 2013 took place in the 
capital.40
Examples of homicide and violence in 
post-conﬂict countries with incremen-
tal gains in security and institution-
building: Sierra Leone and Liberia
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone was embroiled in conflict from 1991-
2002, which resulted in an estimated 70,000 casu-
alties and 2.6 million people displaced, out of a 
population of just over 5 million.41 The war also 
affected the operations of the criminal justice insti-
tutions in the country, particularly through infra-
structure destruction and the killing of personnel.42
Sierra Leone is now demonstrating progress in 
fostering inclusive politics and conflict resolution,43 
39 United Nations Security Council (2013c). S/2013/139.
40 UNDPKO-MINUSTAH (2013).
41 UNDP (2006). 
42 For more on the criminal justice system in Sierra Leone, see 
African Human Security Initiative (2009).
43 For more, see g7+ (2013b). 
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but it is still experiencing violence, particularly in 
its capital city, Freetown. The recorded homicide 
rate in Freetown increased from 5.7 per 100,000 
in 2007 to 9.3 per 100,000 in 2011; the homicide 
rate also doubled in the north and increased in the 
east (see map 4.3), but official figures indicate that 
the average homicide rate is relatively low at the 
national level. The elevated rate in the capital may, 
of course, indicate more reporting and better 
recording practices, given the greater concentra-
tion of criminal justice services in the city than 
elsewhere. 
As in other developing countries, there is lack of 
data on social and economic conditions, but the 
Sierra Leone Police attribute much of the violence 
to unemployment and poverty, in addition to high 
population density, the number of single parent 
families, and high rates of drug use.44 Many of the 
reasons for violence in Sierra Leone are thus lega-
cies of the previous armed conflict, due to resettle-
ment and issues related to the high levels of 
conflict-related deaths, such as population demo-
graphics and unstable family situations. The vio-
lence today may not be directly linked to the 
conflict, but the interpersonal causes of homicide 
are often rooted in the experiences of conflict. 
The gradual improvement in the crime and secu-
rity situation in Sierra Leone is confirmed by 
country-wide victimization survey data.45 In 2008, 
property and livestock theft were the dominant 
crimes cited by respondents, whereas over 50 per 
cent of the population had experienced assault, 
armed robbery, housebreaking, property, crop or 
livestock theft in the previous year. Despite the 
44 Sierra Leone Police (2011).
45 Chikwanha, A.B. (2008), African Human Security Initiative. 
Fig. 4.7: Rates of selected violent crimes, 
Sierra Leone (2004-2012) 
Source: Sierra Leone Police (2011). 
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high level of survey respondents who had experi-
enced such crimes, the same survey reported that 
half of the respondents believed that the level of 
violent crime in their area had actually decreased 
in the last three years, and while the level of 
recorded homicide was relatively low, it was the 
most feared crime in the country. The challenges 
of policing the more rural areas resulted in some 
survey respondents turning to alternative forms of 
justice when they were victimized by crime.
Disarmament and demobilization of former com-
batants is an issue common to many post-conflict 
countries. For example, in Sierra Leone, a pro-
gramme was implemented from 2003 to 2008 in 
order to reduce firearm availability,46 which con-
tinued to be an enabling factor for violent crime. 
According to reported crime figures, there was a 
spate of armed robberies in the capital region in 
2009-2010, which eventually declined due to 
improved measures to tackle crime by the police.47 
Liberia
Linked to neighbouring Sierra Leone by both 
geography and its role in that country’s armed 
conflict, Liberia is emerging from civil wars that 
lasted from 1989-1996 and 1999-2003, and which 
included extreme acts of violence against civilians, 
including torture, rape, indiscriminate killings, 
beatings and abductions, as well as the use of child 
soldiers. The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission estimated that 250,000 people were 
killed and a million displaced during the con-
flicts.48 Liberia’s infrastructure and economy were 
devastated by the conflicts, and while the latter is 
now slowly recovering, the country remains one of 
the poorest and least developed in the world, rank-
ing 174th out of 186 on the 2013 Human Devel-
opment Index.49 
Due to the increased capacity of national authori-
ties, some data on violent crime have become avail-
able in Liberia, but they should still be interpreted 
46 The “Arms for Development” programme, implemented 
in Sierra Leone from 2003-2008, was a community-based 
DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) pro-
gramme that focused on youth-oriented policies, support for 
elections and access to education. One of its key aims was 
to control illicit arms trafficking and develop community-
based approaches to weapons collections. Communities were 
offered incentives if they were declared “weapon-free”. For 
more, see UNDP. Arms for Development programme, Sierra 
Leone.
47 Sierra Leone Police (2011).
48 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Liberia 
(2009).
49 UNDP. Human Development Indicators: Liberia.
with caution. These figures suggest that levels of 
reported crime in Liberia have been relatively con-
stant over the last few years and, though the hom-
icide rate has been routinely less than 5 per 100,000 
population, other reported offences such as aggra-
vated assault, rape and armed robbery have been at 
consistently higher levels (see figure 4.8). 
According to a population survey undertaken in 
2011,50 most people felt safe and reported improve-
ments in security during the previous year, with 
the majority stating that the Government was suc-
cessful in reducing crime. The survey also found 
that in more than a third of criminal cases, the 
perpetrator was known to the victim, suggesting 
higher levels of interpersonal violence than homi-
cide linked to other typologies. 
Following the civil wars, firearms were widely 
available in Liberia, yet homicide by firearm 
occurred in less than 20 per cent of reported cases 
(see figure 4.9). By contrast, over 25 per cent of all 
homicides were committed with sharp objects,51 
suggesting that the availability of sophisticated 
weaponry is not necessarily a characteristic of hom-
icide in Liberia. Limited information is available 
50 Vinck, P, Pham, P. and T. Kreutzer (2011). Pp. 40-43.
51 UNDPKO-UNMIL (2013).
Fig. 4.8: Rates of selected violent crimes, 
Liberia (2007-2012) 
Source: UNDPKO-UNMIL and UNODC Homicide Statistics 
(2013). 
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on the motives behind homicides in Liberia, but 
mob justice was identified as the motivation in 
approximately 15 per cent of homicides recorded 
in 2012,52 which implies a lack of trust in the insti-
tutions tasked with implementing the rule of law. 
Legacies of conﬂict can impact  
homicide and other violent crime
The data presented in this chapter show that in 
countries emerging from conflict, the path to 
peace is not necessarily a straight one,53 nor is there 
always a clear distinction between crime-related 
and conflict-related violence. In many countries 
with recent experiences of conflict, a great deal of 
people still fear for their safety as a result of ongo-
ing violence, in its many forms, and in some cases 
homicide levels are comparable to levels of civilian 
casualties. Instability and the legacies of conflict 
— the availability of weapons, broken social ties, 
displacement, trauma, large youth populations 
52 UNDPKO-UNMIL(2013).
53 For more, see World Bank (2011). 
Fig. 4.9: Homicide mechanisms, Liberia 
(2012)
Source: UNDPKO-UNMIL. 
Firearm
Sharp object
Poison
Other/Unknown
18%
26%
1%
55% 2012
The g7+ and the New Deal 
for engagement in fragile 
States
A recent initiative has focused on the links between 
security, justice and development, and the impor-
tance of measuring progress in these areas in the 
framework of conflict-affected countries. The New 
Deal for Engagement in Fragile States is an initiative 
of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and 
Statebuilding, which brings together a group of 
conflict-affected States (the “g7+”a), development 
partners and international organizations. At its 
core, the New Deal is built around five Peacebuild-
ing and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), which are: 
s  Legitimate Politics — Foster inclusive  
political settlements and conflict resolution 
s  Security — Establish and strengthen people’s 
security 
s  Justice — Address injustices and increase 
people’s access to justice 
s  Economic Foundations — Generate  
employment and improve livelihoods 
s  Revenues and Services — Manage revenue 
and build capacity for accountable and fair 
service delivery 
The New Deal identifies the priority areas to be 
addressed in post-conflict settings and it outlines 
an agenda for more effective aid to fragile States 
based on the five PSGs: stronger alignment, mutual 
accountability, more transparency and investments 
in country systems, and a shared approach to risk 
management. The combination of political, secu-
rity, justice and development dimensions in one 
framework and the emphasis on monitoring pro-
gress against these five PSGs is unique and criti-
cally important in the New Deal. 
As part of the monitoring and support system to 
assist countries in achieving the five PSGs, an 
interim list of indicators has been developed to 
measure progress. Some of the proposed indicators 
include, for example, “violent deaths per 100,000 
population (conflict-related deaths and intentional 
homicides)” as an indicator to measure security, 
and the “extent of pre-trial detention” to measure 
justice. The use of such indicators in the countries 
of the New Deal can provide an important input 
into the discussions at the United Nations on the 
post-2015 development agenda. Issues such as 
peace, security, rule of law, justice and governance 
are not only relevant in the g7+ members, but are 
universal and relevant for all Member States of the 
United Nations. 
a The g7+ has 18 members (Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, 
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste 
and Togo). Its main objective is to share experiences, learn from one 
another and advocate for reforms to the way the international commu-
nity engages in conflict-affected States. 
Note: UNODC gratefully acknowledges the contribution of the 
United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) in the drafting 
of this text. 
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and influxes into urban areas — are risk factors for 
crime in all the countries studied in this chapter, as 
well as for all types of homicide. Such risk factors 
and the violence they may facilitate can undermine 
efforts towards peace-building and establishing the 
rule of law, which is fundamental for preventing 
organized crime from taking root and perpetuating 
the sense of insecurity and cycle of violence engen-
dered by weak institutions.

5. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
RESPONSE TO HOMICIDE
91
Previous chapters in this study have focused on 
what is known about recorded homicide offences. 
This chapter focuses, however, on the response of 
criminal justice systems in terms of homicide cases 
solved by the police, persons arrested for and per-
sons convicted of homicide. 
Bringing the perpetrators of homicide to justice 
and preventing impunity for those responsible for 
lethal violence is a core responsibility of the State. 
Indeed, there is international recognition1 that the 
State is required to provide judicial protection with 
regard to fundamental rights, including the right 
to life. An effective criminal justice system that 
ensures rigorous investigation, timely prosecution 
and fair adjudication of suspected homicide 
offenders is a pre-requisite for upholding the rule 
of law, as well as for achieving justice for homicide 
victims. The widespread impunity of perpetrators, 
on the other hand, fosters the kind of lawlessness 
that can facilitate more violence, recidivism, organ-
ized criminal activities and even contribute to the 
perpetration of more homicides.
Measuring the criminal justice response to homi-
cide requires accurate and reliable data across the 
main law enforcement, judicial and correctional 
institutions involved (police, prosecution, courts 
and prisons). Data on individual offences and 
alleged offenders should be collected at each stage 
(a simplified overview of which is shown in figure 
5.1) so that every case is followed through the 
system and performance indicators can be calcu-
lated. In practice, very few countries have such a 
recording system and, at the global level, only 
aggregated data on police-recorded offences and 
1  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 3; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 6.1. 
suspected offenders, and court data on persons 
convicted, are available for a sufficient number of 
countries to allow at least a basic analysis. 
Furthermore, data of this type do not give infor-
mation about fundamental qualitative aspects of 
criminal justice administration, such as the quality 
of investigations, the right to legal aid, the fairness 
of procedures and the duration of trials, but they 
do provide an initial assessment of the capacity of 
countries’ legal systems to deal with homicidal 
violence. As only limited data are available for 
Africa and Oceania, they are not included in the 
regional analysis, which exclusively focuses on 
Asia, the Americas and Europe.
Homicide cases: from investigation  
to sentencing
Once homicide cases are recorded by the police, 
law enforcement authorities conduct investiga-
tions that can eventually lead to the identification 
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Fig. 5.1: Statistical indicators relating to four phases in the 
criminal justice process
Source: UNODC. 
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of crime suspects on the basis of the evidence gath-
ered. The first indication of the overall results of 
the police investigation of homicide cases can be 
drawn from the “homicide clearance rate”, which 
is the percentage of homicides “cleared” of all those 
homicides brought to the attention of the police. 
In most cases, this means that the police have iden-
tified and arrested one or several suspects for a 
particular homicide and that the case has been 
turned over to the prosecution service.2 
At the global level, the homicide clearance rate is 
slightly above 60 per cent,3 which means that the 
police are not able to identify a suspect in a large 
portion of homicides. At 80 and 85 per cent, 
respectively, clearance levels are higher in Asia and 
2 A case will normally be considered “cleared” when a suspect 
has been identified by name and charged. In addition, there 
are other circumstances that may qualify a case as “cleared”. 
For example, the police may “clear” a case because the suspect 
has died; the suspect is not criminally liable due to age or 
mental incapacity; evidence has been found that no crime was 
committed; or an identified suspect has made her- or himself 
untraceable.
3 This is based on data from 41 countries.
Europe than in the Americas (about 50 per cent) 
(see figure 5.2). Several underlying reasons may 
account for these regional differences, such as the 
possibility that the higher homicide rates recorded 
in the Americas than in Europe and Asia may 
stretch the capacity of law enforcement institu-
tions in the Americas to investigate each case thor-
oughly. Also influencing law enforcement’s ability 
to clear cases is the type or context of a particular 
homicide, as certain typologies, such as those per-
petrated by gangs or organized criminal groups, 
tend to be more challenging to investigate than 
others.4
In countries for which data are available, homicide 
clearance rates tend to be lower where homicide 
levels are higher: in countries with very low homi-
cide rates (less than 1 per 100,000 population), 
clearance rates average 92 per cent, while in coun-
tries with high homicide rates (above 10 per 
100,000 population), clearance rates are as low as 
52 per cent (see figure 5.3). It seems that a virtuous 
4 Van Dijk, J. (2008). Pp. 157-158.
Fig. 5.2: Homicide clearance rate, by  
region (2007-2008 and 2011-2012)
Note: Regional figures represent weighted averages; data on two countries 
in Africa and Oceania are included in the global total but not shown 
separately. The homicide clearance rate is the percentage of homicides 
cleared by the police, divided by all homicides recorded by the police in 
the same year. 
Source: UN-CTS.
Fig. 5.3: Homicide clearance rate and  
police per 100,000 population,  
by level of homicide rate (2012  
or latest year)
Note: Average figures represent un-weighted averages. 
Source: UN-CTS.
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circle exists in countries with low homicide levels, 
where higher clearance rates can in turn act as a 
deterrent and lower homicide levels further.
Despite the fact that countries with high homicide 
rates actually have a greater number of police per 
100,000 population, they have low homicide 
clearance rates. Therefore the size of the police 
force apparently has no direct impact on the clear-
ance of homicide cases, but the fact that, as men-
tioned above, police resources can be really 
stretched in those countries should be taken into 
account. The “police to homicide” ratio gives an 
indication of the number of police officers com-
pared to the number of homicides, which is greater 
than 500 in countries with low homicide rates, but 
is 25 times lower in countries with high homicide 
rates (20 police officers per homicide case).
Additional information on the outcome of the 
criminal justice process is provided by data relating 
to persons suspected5 and those convicted of hom-
icide: at the global level, for every 100 homicide 
victims, 97 persons are suspected/arrested on 
homicide charges,6 while 43 are convicted of 
homicide (see figure 5.5).
When looking at the criminal justice process at the 
regional level, for every 100 homicide victims 
there are 53 suspects in the Americas, 151 in Asia 
5 At the international level, there are different definitions and 
methodologies for counting persons suspected of a crime. 
For example, some countries count the number of persons 
arrested, while others also include persons suspected or cau-
tioned.
6 Through the successive stages of the criminal justice process, 
the counting unit is shifted from offences to persons enter-
ing into contact with law enforcement and criminal justice 
authorities. The number of suspects can be higher or lower 
than the number of homicides (higher when more than one 
person is suspected of a homicide, or lower when a suspect is 
charged with more than one homicide or the police cannot 
identify a suspect), but the number of convictions is likely to 
be substantially lower than the number of homicide suspects; 
for many suspects charged with homicide, there will be no 
conviction because of a lack of evidence.
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global total but not shown separately. 
Source: UN-CTS.
Fig. 5.5: Persons suspected and persons 
convicted per 100 homicides, by 
region (2011 or latest year) 
Note: Data on three countries in Africa and Oceania are included in the 
global total but not shown separately.
Source: UN-CTS.
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and 100 in Europe, while the number of persons 
convicted per 100 homicide victims is 24 in the 
Americas, 48 in Asia and 81 in Europe (see figure 
5.5). Thus, in the Americas, where, on average, the 
homicide rate is high, the police are able to iden-
tify a suspect for slightly more than half of all 
homicide victims, but less than 50 per cent of 
those suspected are convicted, meaning that less 
than a quarter of homicides lead to a conviction. 
In Asia, where homicide rates are lower in general, 
on average there are multiple suspects for every 
homicide, yet only half of homicides end in a con-
viction. In Europe, there are as many suspects as 
there are homicides, with eight out of ten leading 
to a conviction; a high conviction rate by com-
parison.7
With a conviction rate of 24 per cent, the level of 
impunity for homicide in the Americas is rather 
high. This may be partly due to the fact that, as 
mentioned previously, the high volume of homi-
cides are a drain on law enforcement and criminal 
justice resources. Furthermore, as discussed in 
chapter 2 of this study, homicides in the Americas 
are often connected to organized crime or gang 
activity and usually have lower clearance and con-
viction rates compared to other homicide typolo-
7 The conviction rate is the number of persons convicted of 
homicide divided by the number of homicides in the same 
year, per 100 homicides. Some limitations of this indica-
tor, dictated by data availability, are that it uses “persons” 
as counting units (instead of cases) and that it is built using 
aggregated annual data even though homicide and its related 
trial can take place in different calendar years.
gies such as intimate partner/family-related 
homicide or other types of interpersonal homicide. 
Other possible explanations include the corrup-
tion of officials by organized criminal groups and/
or the fear of reprisals. 
With 50 per cent more suspects than homicides, 
less than a third of whom are convicted, the situa-
tion in Asia is harder to explain. It could be related 
to reasons of recording and methodology, with the 
number of those questioned or interviewed regard-
ing a particular homicide being included in the 
number of suspected persons, or a large number of 
suspects arrested without serious grounds, result-
ing in large numbers of suspects who are not to be 
prosecuted. But if this is a real difference, it may 
point to inefficiencies in the performance of the 
police and prosecution services. This phenomenon 
may also be due to the prevalent types of homicide 
in Asia as there may be a large share of homicides 
linked to typologies that involve more than one 
perpetrator, such as various types of domestic vio-
lence in which more than one family member 
perpetrates the offence. In India, for example, an 
average of two or more suspects are arrested for 
each homicide case, suggesting the involvement of 
accomplices.8
8 National Crime Records Bureau, India (2012). P. 148.
Fig. 5.6: Percentage distribution of persons convicted of homicide, by sex and by region  
 (2012 or latest year) 
Note: Data on four countries in Africa and Oceania are included in the global total but not shown separately.
Source: UN-CTS.
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In Europe, the level of impunity is much lower 
and the vast majority of homicides lead to a con-
viction. This may be a reflection of the low homi-
cide rates and the adequacy of law enforcement 
and criminal justice resources, as well as the greater 
proportion of interpersonal homicides, in which 
victim and perpetrator are often known to each 
other, increasing the likelihood that an investiga-
tion will establish a clear link between the perpe-
trator and the crime. For example, in Finland, 90 
per cent of all homicide victims between 2003 and 
2011 were known to the offender.9 
The vast majority of homicide suspects in all 
regions are male. Available data indicate that this 
general pattern is also the case for homicide con-
victions, with men accounting for an average of 
95 per cent of all persons convicted of homicide 
in 53 countries for which data are available (see 
figure 5.6). 
Trends in the criminal justice response 
to homicide
A way to monitor the efficiency of criminal justice 
systems in relation to the management of homi-
cide cases is to consider trends in homicide as well 
as corresponding developments in the levels of 
people suspected and convicted of homicide. This 
analysis should not be considered indicative of the 
overall performance of the system — as stated 
earlier, qualitative aspects of criminal justice 
administration should also be accounted for  — 
but it can shed light on whether its resources are 
being used efficiently.
Over the last few years, the gap between the 
number of homicides and the number of convic-
tions has been widening in the Americas.10 The 
police seem to be able to identify suspects even 
though the number of homicides has increased, 
but the number of convictions does not follow the 
rising trend (see figure 5.7). In Asia,11 the criminal 
justice response to homicide did not change sig-
nificantly between 2003 and 2011; the gap 
between homicide cases and convictions increased 
slightly, with a suspect being convicted in less than 
half of all homicide cases. In Europe, both the 
9 Lehti, M. (2013), in Henkirikoskatsaus, Verkkokatsauksia 
29/2013 (Homicide Review, Web review 29/103).
10 Countries in the Americas for which consistent time series are 
available include Canada, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala and 
Mexico.
11 Countries in Asia for which consistent time series are available 
include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Hong Kong, 
China, India, Israel, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia.
Fig. 5.7: Homicides, persons suspected of 
homicide and persons convicted 
of homicide per 100,000 popula-
tion, by region (2003-2011) 
Source: UN-CTS. 
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homicide and suspect rate have declined by almost 
half since 2003, while the rate of persons convicted 
of homicide has declined by 30 per cent. This 
means that the gap between homicides committed 
and convictions has narrowed, with the majority of 
homicide investigations leading to a conviction. 
A direct way to monitor the efficiency of the crim-
inal justice system is to examine time trends in 
homicide conviction rates, which are very diverse 
at the regional level (see figure 5.8). A decreasing 
trend shows that the performance of the criminal 
justice system is deteriorating and that improved 
capacities, resources and procedures are needed. 
The increasing trend recorded in Europe indicates 
that the region’s criminal justice systems have been 
increasingly efficient in dealing with homicides. 
This is no doubt also connected to the low levels 
of homicides recorded in Europe. On the other 
hand, although Asia is also characterized by low 
homicide rates, the conviction rate has gradually 
declined in that region. In the Americas, the 
increasing trend recorded up until 2007 has since 
reversed, as rising homicide trends have not been 
paralleled by similar levels of convictions, meaning 
that impunity related to homicide has grown in 
the Americas in recent years. The specific reasons 
for such phenomena need further investigation, 
but they could be due to issues related to a lack, or 
inefficient use, of resources, insufficient capacities 
or inappropriate legislation. 
Prisoners sentenced for homicide
Among all the types of crime dealt with by the 
criminal justice system, homicides tend to make 
up only a marginal share of the total. In most 
countries, the share of persons convicted of homi-
cide is usually well below 1 per cent of all those 
convicted of crime. However, the combination of 
the relative levity of sentences for less serious 
crimes and the long duration of prison sentences 
for homicide offenders means that, at any given 
point in time, homicide offenders can make up a 
significant share of the total prison population. 
This share depends on a number of factors, such as 
the overall rate of persons convicted of homicide 
and other crimes, the severity with which the crim-
Fig. 5.8: Homicide conviction rate, by  
region (2003-2011)
Note: The conviction rate is the number of persons convicted of 
homicide divided by the number of homicides in the same year,  
per 100 homicides.
Source: UN-CTS.
Fig. 5.9: Total prison population per 
100,000 population, prisoners 
convicted of homicide per 100,000 
population, and prisoners convict-
ed of homicide as a percentage 
of all prisoners, selected regions 
(2012 or latest year)
Source: UN-CTS.
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inal justice system deals with offenders guilty of 
different types of offence, variations in sentencing 
policies and possibilities of parole. 
Available data on homicide offenders in prison 
indicate that in some countries with high homi-
cide rates, such as selected countries in South 
America, there can be a substantial number of 
homicide offenders in prison per 100,000 popula-
tion.12 Yet, irrespective of different levels of homi-
12 In the Americas, data are available for: Costa Rica; El Salva-
cide, the share of homicide offenders among the 
total prison population is not markedly different 
across regions. In Europe and the Americas, it is 
between 7 and 10 per cent, while it is lower in Asia 
(see figure 5.9). In terms of prison management, 
high shares of homicide offenders pose specific 
management challenges to prison administrations. 
dor; Panama; Paraguay; and the United States of America. 
In Asia, data on homicide offenders in prison are available 
for: Armenia; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; and the 
State of Palestine. 
Homicide in prison
Less visible but no less problematic are cases of violent deaths among prisoners. In line with States’ 
heightened duty to ensure and respect the right to life in custodial settings, international standards and 
United Nations human rights bodies call upon prison administrations to initiate and/or facilitate 
prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into all incidents of death in custody or shortly follow-
ing release, including with independent forensic or post mortem examinations, as appropriate.a In spite 
of this principle, relevant information is often scarce, but some indications emerge from available data 
on deaths in prison settings. In many countries there is a substantial death rate per 100,000 prison 
inmates (which includes both natural causes of death as well as those resulting from external causes), 
which is very high, especially considering the relatively young age structure of the prison population 
(see figure 5.10). Among external causes, rates of homicide appear to be a bigger problem in prisons in 
the Americas (57 per 100,000 prisoners), than in Europe (2 per 100,000 prisoners), where suicide 
appears to be the main non-natural cause of death of inmates.
Fig. 5.10:  Total deaths, homicides and suicides of prisoners per 100,000 prison  
 population, selected regions and sub-regions (2012)
Source: UN-CTS.
When comparing data for the seven countries in the Americas for which data on deaths, homicide and 
suicide of prisoners are available, the homicide rate per 100,000 prisoners is three times higher than the 
homicide rate in the general population.b In the other regions, there does not appear to be a major dif-
ference between the homicide rate in the prison setting and in the total population, although more 
information would be needed to come to definite conclusions in this regard.
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a  United Nations General Assembly (1988); ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights (1995) E.CN.4/1995/34, Para. 926g.
b  In the same seven countries, the  average homicide rate is 19.1 per 100,000 population.
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Gaps in data availability
Data presented in this report cover all United 
Nations Member States (193) and a number of 
territories/autonomous entities (26). In most 
cases, they are derived from national data 
repositories generated by either the criminal justice 
or the public health system. In the former, data are 
generated by law enforcement authorities in the 
process of recording and investigating a criminal 
case; in the latter, statistical information is 
produced by health authorities certifying the cause 
of death of individuals.1 For reasons related to the 
preservation of both public health and safety, 
national authorities typically devote all due 
attention to recording and investigating deaths 
due to violent and external causes. Consequently, 
either (or both) of these sources are the best 
possible options available to produce statistical 
information on homicide.2
In the case of the 70 countries where neither of 
these sources is available, homicide data included 
in this study are derived from estimates produced 
by the World Health Organization (WHO),3 
which are based on a standardised statistical model 
used to produce data on all causes of death, and 
which provide the only available and comparable 
figure on intentional homicides. While the use of 
a standardised model ensures a certain consistency, 
the underlying assumptions and inferences used to 
derive these estimates are often very weak com-
pared to the data based on completed administra-
1 See UNODC (2011). Pp. 83-85.
2 For more information about the differences between public 
health and criminal justice sources, see the Methodological 
Annex.
3 World Health Organization (2014).
tive records, thus affecting the overall quality of 
homicide statistics. The data quality of homicide 
reported for these countries will improve only 
when proper registration systems are put in place 
and/or national data repositories are made acces-
sible. In comparison to the data used in the Global 
Study on Homicide 2011, the availability of country 
data based on administrative records has improved 
incrementally in Africa, the Americas and Oceania, 
while it has slightly deteriorated in Asia. 
Fig. 6.1: Percentage of countries for which 
homicide data are produced by 
national registration systems, by 
region (comparing UNODC Global 
Study on Homicide 2011 and 2013)
Source: UNODC Global Study on Homicide 2011 and 2013. 
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The respective availability of data on homicides 
produced by the two types of sources (public 
health and criminal justice systems) can vary sig-
nificantly by region, but overall the number of 
countries able to produce criminal justice data is 
greater than those that produce public health 
homicide statistics. For instance, data produced by 
national registration systems on homicide from 
criminal justice sources are available for over 90 
per cent of countries in Europe, while public 
health data are available for just under 80 per cent 
of them (see figure 6.2). The two sources show 
bigger differences in availability in Asia, Africa and 
Oceania than elsewhere, as registry-based public 
health data are not readily available in those 
regions.
The lack of national homicide data (from either 
criminal justice or public health systems) and the 
need to use model-based data for the aforemen-
tioned 70 countries is the result of two challenges: 
a) limited capacity to establish or maintain a 
national registration system of crimes and/or 
deaths; and b) weak reporting channels transmit-
ting national data to international organizations. 
The UNODC annual collection of crime data (the 
United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and 
Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, UN-CTS) 
has significantly improved its coverage in recent 
years, but it still suffers from large data gaps in 
certain regions. The percentage of countries 
reporting data in 2012 was 50 per cent (covering 
75 per cent of the global population), with the 
lowest response rates in Africa and Oceania (see 
figure 6.3). In order to produce data series on 
homicide that cover the entire globe, UNODC 
complemented the information provided by 
Member States through the UN-CTS with data 
from other national official sources. 
In addition to the data gaps relating to total hom-
icide counts, there is still a considerable gap in the 
availability of disaggregated data. As the Global 
Study on Homicide 2013 demonstrates, further 
improvements in the availability and quality of 
data related to the victim, the perpetrator(s), the 
relationship between them, the context and the 
motivation behind the killing are needed to help 
gain a better understanding of what triggers vio-
lent crime, who is most at risk, and the elements 
Fig. 6.2: Percentage of countries with  
homicide data produced by  
national registration systems 
(criminal justice and public health) 
reported or available to UNODC, 
by region (2012)
Source: UNODC Global Study on Homicide 2011 and 2013. 
Fig. 6.3: Percentage of countries reporting 
to the UN-CTS, by region (UN-CTS 
2011 and 2012)
Source: UN-CTS. 
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that can facilitate homicide, so that preventative 
and reduction-oriented policies can be better tar-
geted. Since the publication of the Global Study on 
Homicide 2011, improvements in the availability 
of data produced by national registration systems 
on such disaggregations have been made across the 
board, with the exception of disaggregated data on 
killing mechanisms (see figure 6.4).4 
Data quality issues 
Two key elements of data quality are important 
from a statistical perspective: a) the accuracy of the 
data (i.e. how closely data represent the reality of 
the situation); and b) the international compara-
bility of the data. “Accuracy” relates to how close 
the homicide count is to the standard definition of 
intentional homicide. Discrepancies with the “true 
value” can be due to weaknesses in data collection 
4 The reduced availability of data on killing mechanisms is 
largely due to the more stringent criteria used in the selection 
process for data included in the UNODC Homicide Statistics 
(2013) dataset, particularly in relation to the timeliness of 
data. For more information, see Methodological annex. 
systems, such as incomplete coverage of the events 
and/or misrepresentation of the data. Assessing 
data accuracy is challenging in any statistical field, 
since the “true” value typically remains unknown 
but, as intentional homicide is often recorded by 
both criminal justice and public health sources, 
this independent registration of (largely) the same 
phenomenon can provide an indirect evaluation of 
the accuracy of the data by way of comparing these 
sources.5 In the Americas, Europe and Oceania, 
the two sources usually match when they are both 
available, suggesting a high degree of accuracy of 
homicide data in those regions (see figure 6.5). 
The situation is different in Africa, however, where 
large discrepancies between the two sources (in the 
three countries where data from both sources are 
available) point to doubtful data quality. These 
discrepancies are probably due to differences in 
recording practices or different coverage of the two 
systems. 
5 The assumption made is that accuracy is greater when inde-
pendent and separate sources produce similar data. 
Fig. 6.4: Number of countries for which 
disaggregated data on intentional 
homicide produced by national 
registration systems are available 
(2010 and 2012)
*Note: Time series data is available from 1995 to 2011/2012. For 9 
countries in Africa, time series data is available from 2004 to 2011/2012.
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013).
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criminal justice and public health 
sources for homicide data in 
countries where data from both 
sources are available, by region 
(2012)
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). 
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The second element, the international compara-
bility of homicide data, depends to a large extent 
on the definition used to record intentional homi-
cide offences. Intentional homicide is currently 
defined at the international level by UNODC as 
“unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person 
by another person”; a definition containing three 
elements characterizing an intentional homicide:
1. The killing of a person by another person 
(objective element);
2. The intent of the perpetrator to kill or seri-
ously injure the victim (subjective element);
3. The intentional killing is against the law, 
which means that the law considers the per-
petrator liable for the unlawful death (legal 
element). 
The specificities of intentional homicide can be 
understood better when placed in the broad con-
text of violent deaths (figure 6.6).6 The scheme 
shows that non-conflict violent deaths are distin-
guished from deaths that are a direct result of war 
6 Violence is defined by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) as the “intentional use of physical force or power, 
threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or 
against a group or community, that either results in or has 
a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychologi-
cal harm, mal-development, or deprivation.”(World Health 
Organization (2002)).
or conflict, or those that are self-inflicted (sui-
cides). At the next level, some types of wilful kill-
ings, such as killings in self-defence and those 
deriving from legal interventions,7 are distin-
guished from intentional homicide because they 
are considered justifiable due to mitigating cir-
cumstances, while non-intentional homicides are 
considered a separate offence due to the lack of 
intent to kill another person. Deaths occurring 
during situations of civil unrest are particularly 
challenging to categorize, and this challenge has 
yet to be addressed from a statistical perspective 
(see page 104/105).
As definitions used by countries to record data on 
intentional homicide are often quite close to the 
definition used by UNODC,8 national statistical 
data on homicide are highly comparable at the 
7 Such are killings by the police or other law enforcement agents 
in the course of arresting or attempting to arrest lawbreakers, 
while maintaining order, or during other legal actions where 
they are caused by use of force by law enforcement acting in 
accordance with the United Nations (1990) Basic principles 
on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials (A/
CONF.144/28/Rev.1). Killings resulting from the excessive 
use of force in law enforcement or through the excessive 
use of force in self-defence are either considered intentional 
homicides or non-negligent non-intentional homicide and 
should therefore be counted as such. For more, see section on 
Unlawful killings by law enforcement authorities in chapter 
2.3 of this study.
8 According to UN-CTS (2012), 69 countries report that their 
definition for statistical purposes correspond to the standard 
indicated by UNODC in 2011, while 17 report that their 
definition is not fully compliant with this standard definition.
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Fig. 6.6: Classiﬁcation of violent deaths 
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international level. Some notable discrepancies 
exist, however, in the way some specific categories 
of intentional killings are treated or classified. 
Inclusions and exclusions from the recording of 
what constitutes an “intentional homicide” may 
differ across countries. For example, some coun-
tries in the Americas record deaths due to legal 
interventions and homicides committed in self-
defence as “intentional homicide”; other countries 
may include deaths which are not part of the stand-
ard definition, such as those related to armed con-
flict and non-intentional homicides (i.e. accidental 
or non-voluntary homicides, or “collateral” deaths). 
Reviewing such practices can help to improve 
international comparability of homicide data. 
Addressing challenges in the quality 
and availability of homicide data
Different regions face different challenges and there 
are several key elements to consider en route to 
better quality, comparable data, including the need 
to develop and implement a standard definition for 
intentional homicide, as well as improve national 
and international systems of data collection.
The development of a standard  
deﬁnition for more comparable data
The standard definition used by UNODC to col-
lect homicide data provides a good reference for 
standardizing data across countries. However, some 
nuances can make a significant difference in the 
homicide count and its interpretation in some 
countries, several of which have not yet been clearly 
addressed in a more detailed statistical definition of 
intentional homicide. The development of an 
internationally agreed definition of intentional 
homicide for statistical purposes is one of the objec-
tives of the International Classification of Crime 
for Statistical Purposes (ICCS), a statistical stand-
ard requested by the United Nations Statistical 
Commission and the United Nations Commission 
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.9 Once 
finalized, the ICCS will create a comprehensive 
definitional framework that will improve the stand-
ardization and comparability of data on crime.10 
9 ECOSOC CCPCJ (2013). E/RES/2013/37; ECOSOC, Sta-
tistical Commission (2012). E/2012/24. P. 7(d).
10 The ICCS is currently under development and it builds 
on the “Principles and framework for an international 
classification of crimes for statistical purposes” produced 
by UNODC-UNECE and endorsed by the Conference of 
European Statisticians in 2012. The ICCS is scheduled to be 
presented to the United Nations Statistical Commission and 
the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice, for approval in 2015.
The ICCS will be an event-based classification 
system, in which crimes will be described in terms 
of actions rather than legal provisions. A factual 
description of each item will be provided, with an 
explanation of what actions (which may relate to 
different crime offences in different countries) are 
included/excluded from such a categorization. The 
classification is then built in a hierarchical struc-
ture, with a number of successive levels.
With respect to intentional homicide, the ICCS 
will provide international guidance on three main 
aspects: 
a) The definition of intentional homicide and iden-
tification of types of killings to be considered under 
this definition
While all national legislations include the offence 
of intentional homicide, they can define it in dif-
ferent ways. Additionally, penal codes in some 
countries may consider some of the unlawful 
deaths purposefully inflicted on a person by 
another person under different headings and, con-
sequently, statistical data organized according to 
those legislations may provide separate counts for 
different types of homicide. Examples of specific 
homicide-related offences may include infanti-
cides, “honour killings”, dowry deaths, femicides, 
serious assaults leading to death or thefts followed 
by the killing of the victim. Another example is 
violent death due to terrorism: from a conceptual 
perspective, the notion of “intentional homicide” 
is broad enough to encompass deaths caused by 
terrorist acts, and whilst perpetrators may face 
Categories for Level 1
1 Acts leading to death or intending to cause death
2 Acts causing harm or intending to cause harm to the person
3 Injurious acts of a sexual nature
4 Acts against property involving violence against a person
5 Acts against property only
6 Acts involving controlled psychoactive substances or other drugs
7 Acts involving fraud, deception or corruption
8 Acts against public order or authority
9 Acts against public safety and state security
10 Acts against the natural environment
11 Other criminal acts not elsewhere classified
Table 6.1: First level categories of the ICCS (Rev.2.1) 
Source: UNODC.
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additional charges, such as acts of terrorism, acts 
against the State, or even crimes against humanity, 
the core act still concerns the intentional killing of 
other persons. From a statistical point of view, all 
such cases should be included in the count of 
intentional homicide, since they conform to its 
standard definition. The ICCS will clarify the 
types of killings that should be included or 
excluded from the total count of intentional hom-
icide. 
b) The development of comprehensive and policy-rel-
evant data disaggregations of intentional homicide 
related to victims and perpetrators, as well as the 
context in which the homicide occurs
Total counts and rates of homicide can provide a 
better insight into the nature of violent crime if 
they are disaggregated by a number of characteris-
tics, and the ICCS will offer a framework which 
countries can follow to break-down the data in a 
standardized manner. The three typologies of 
homicide presented in this study (homicide related 
to other criminal activities, interpersonal homicide 
and socio-political homicide) will provide a basis 
for discussion and further development in the 
ICCS, with the purpose of advocating for the pro-
duction of policy-relevant homicide indicators.
c) A clarification of the statistical treatment of violent 
deaths that occur in the context of war and civil 
unrest
Two of the most challenging categories of violent 
deaths to identify as “intentional homicide” are 
those that occur during operations of war or in 
situations of civil unrest. Consistently with the 
definition of intentional homicide, killings directly 
associated with operations of war are not consid-
ered to be intentional homicides, which poses two 
methodological challenges to ensuring that a sepa-
rate and accurate count is made for, respectively, 
direct conflict deaths and intentional homicides:
s  To establish clear criteria to identify what 
constitutes an armed conflict for the purpose 
of producing statistics
s  To establish clear criteria to determine which 
violent deaths are directly associated with 
armed conflicts and are not intentional 
homicides.
In the case of the first challenge, this distinction 
has been made in international humanitarian law, 
which distinguishes between two types of armed 
conflict: (1) international armed conflicts, which 
exist wherever there is a resort to armed force 
between States; and (2) non-international armed 
conflicts, which occur whenever there is protracted 
armed violence between governmental authorities 
and organized armed groups or between such 
groups within a State.11 While international armed 
conflicts are, in principle, more easily determined, 
in many situations of protracted disorder within 
countries it can be difficult to establish clear bor-
ders between non-international armed conflicts 
and “civil unrest”. Two elements that may deter-
mine the difference are: a) the threshold of inten-
sity of hostilities (i.e. when hostilities are of a 
collective character, or when the government uses 
military force rather than police force against 
insurgents); and b) the degree to which the armed 
groups are organized (i.e. non-governmental 
groups involved in the conflict must be considered 
“parties to the conflict” in that they possess organ-
ized armed forces under a certain command struc-
ture and have the capacity to sustain military 
operations).12 
In the case of the second challenge, a distinction 
needs to be made between deaths directly related 
to the conflict (i.e. directly attributable to actions 
constituting part of the armed conflict) and other 
violent acts leading to death that occur during a 
period of armed conflict but are not part of that 
conflict and should thus be classified according to 
the criteria used for any other killing. For example, 
killings committed by a party not involved in the 
conflict should not be considered as directly related 
to the conflict, and they should be analysed as any 
other killing, irrespective of the conflict situation, 
and classified into existing typologies of violent 
death (intentional homicide, non-intentional 
homicide, etc.) according to standard definitions. 
The most difficult issue to disentangle concerns 
cases when a third party (a person not party to the 
conflict) is purposefully killed by a party to the 
conflict. Such cases are common in conflict situa-
tions today, where civilians are explicitly targeted 
by warring parties, as part of inherent conflict 
strategy. From a statistical point of view, the char-
acterization of such violent deaths — whether to 
ascribe them to the conflict or consider them as 
intentional homicides — has not yet been resolved, 
and there are different recording practices across 
national and international agencies. 
Violent deaths in the context of civil unrest, i.e. 
during a situation of confrontation between two or 
11 This definition was used by the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (1995), and Common 
articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 
12 International Committee of the Red Cross (2008). 
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more parties that does not amount to an internal 
conflict, also pose specific statistical challenges, as 
no international statistical standard is currently 
addressing this issue. From a theoretical perspec-
tive, one approach would be to consider each vio-
lent death during civil unrest according to the 
general definition of intentional homicide. This 
would imply that deaths caused by law enforce-
ment forces that can be validly described as “legal 
interventions” should not be considered inten-
tional homicides. On the other hand, if such 
deaths are caused by law enforcement officials 
acting with excessive force, they should be consid-
ered intentional or non-intentional homicides, 
according to the circumstances. An alternative 
approach would be to consider all violent deaths 
during civil unrest (irrespective of perpetrator, 
victim, modality of the killing, etc.) as a stand-
alone category (similar to conflict deaths).
The purpose of the ICCS is to define any form of 
crime, including homicide. As such, it is expected 
that pending issues related to the statistical treat-
ment of some violent deaths in situations of con-
The road map to improve 
crime statistics 
In 2013, the United Nations Statistical Commis-
sion and the United Nations Commission on 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice agreeda on 
a road map to improve the quality and availability 
of crime statistics, and the improvement of data 
related to intentional homicide can be seen in this 
larger context.b The road map identifies three 
main ways to improve the availability and quality 
of data on crime:
1) Development of new standards
One of the limiting factors in the measurement 
and comparability of crime statistics across coun-
tries is the lack of methodological standards. 
Building the ICCS is a major element identified 
in the road map to work towards a global frame-
work for treating statistical data on crime, but 
other methodological tools also need further 
development, such as those for measuring com-
plex crimes like transnational organized crime, 
corruption, cybercrime, etc. There is also a need 
to mainstream gender into crime statistics better, 
as there are significant differences in how crime 
affects men and women, as well as disparities in 
gender with regard to how crime is committed 
and how offenders are prosecuted and convicted. 
2) Improvement of national capacity 
and coordination
In many countries, the production of statistical 
data on crime is at an early stage of development, 
often due to a lack of coordination amongst 
responsible agencies, a lack of implementation of 
statistical standards and a lack of capacity to 
develop and implement various data collection 
tools such as surveys. There is a need to harmonize 
concepts and procedures and to establish national 
mechanisms for coordinating the collection and 
dissemination of crime data. National statistical 
offices have a key role to play in such coordina-
tion, and capacity building programmes at the 
regional and international level can do much to 
help provide a uniform approach and promote 
standardization for data collection tools and statis-
tical classification approaches. 
3) Better international data collection 
and analyses
In addition to coordination within countries, 
there is a need for improvement in international 
data collection and analysis. The appointment of 
national focal points may prove useful in generat-
ing higher response rates to the UN-CTS, while 
other collaborations and joint collections with 
regional organizations would further enhance data 
availability and analysis. International data reposi-
tories reporting on crime, such as the UNODC 
Homicide Statistics dataset, are increasingly neces-
sary to expand global knowledge about crime. 
Additional forms of crime, such as violence against 
women, would also benefit from a global reposi-
tory. Better analysis of data available in such 
repositories, as well as better dissemination of 
resulting analysis may trigger processes at the 
national and international levels to enhance the 
quality and coverage of such data. 
The road map to improve crime statistics lays a 
foundation for future endeavours to improve the 
quality and availability of crime statistics at both 
the national and international level. However, the 
implementation of its objectives and proposed 
actions require dedicated efforts in capacity build-
ing, coordination and collaboration amongst 
national agencies and subsequently within regional 
organisations, to enhance the information availa-
ble to develop more targeted crime reduction and 
prevention policies.
a See ECOSOC Statistical Commission (2013).  
E/CN.3/2013/11; and ECOSOC CCPCJ (2013).  
E/RES/2013/37.
b See ECOSOC (2012). E/RES/2012/18.
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flict and civil unrest will be resolved, so that clear 
guidance can be given for producing comprehen-
sive and comparable statistics on intentional hom-
icides and other violent deaths in such situations. 
The improvement of national systems 
of data collection
Law enforcement authorities may collect and store 
detailed information on crime events, victims and 
perpetrators, but this wealth of information is 
much less frequently translated into statistical data 
through the use of harmonized concepts and sta-
tistical processes.
In the case of intentional homicide, a good practice 
is to establish ad hoc data collections in order to 
complement and standardize information derived 
from police reports and to ensure complete cover-
age. For example, Australia has a national homicide 
monitoring programme, and detailed data collec-
tions on homicide also exist in Finland, the Neth-
erlands and Sweden.13 Ad hoc data collections on 
homicide, such as that in Finland, generate infor-
mation that can be used not only for operational 
and strategic planning in the guidance of police 
work, but also to inform criminal investigations 
and support policies to prevent homicides. Such 
data collections can generate very specific data on 
victims and perpetrators that can help identify 
those most at risk of homicide and which influenc-
ing or enabling factors contribute to the crime. 
Given the multi-faceted institutional response 
required to deal with homicide, more than one 
organization will often manage data on homicide. 
Coordination of homicide data among responsible 
agencies and national stakeholders can greatly 
improve the quality and consistency of national 
data. Basic steps that can facilitate this coordina-
tion include the exchange of information, harmo-
nization of methodologies, and the sharing of 
aggregated data amongst national agencies. 
National-level coordination can also generate inte-
grated systems to collect and harmonize informa-
tion on individual homicide cases, and result in 
more comprehensive and consistent information 
available from a country. Standardized systems, 
based on standardized definitions and classifica-
tion schemes, allow for the collection and sharing 
of information amongst national agencies with 
regards to individual incidents, perpetrators and 
victims, but they require proper IT systems which 
13 See: Homicide in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden: A first 
study on the European Homicide Monitor data (2011).
can facilitate the reporting and sharing of data 
both within and outside countries. While the con-
crete forms and mechanisms to improve coordina-
tion at the national level depend on national 
circumstances, national statistical offices can play 
a key role in coordinating and promoting statisti-
cal standards.
The establishment of national observatories on 
crime and/or violence has proven to be an effective 
tool to improve the coverage and standardization 
of crime data. Such observatories are typically 
established by, or in close collaboration with, local, 
national or regional governments, and sometimes 
in public-private partnerships with support from 
various donors. Designed to monitor trends and 
patterns based on crime or violence data from 
either public health or criminal justice sources, 
they often incorporate survey data and NGO 
reporting into their analysis.14 There are several 
national and local violence observatories in Latin 
America, which monitor citizen security, gender-
based violence and other forms of violence, such as 
youth or political violence. For example, the 
National Autonomous University of Honduras has 
established a violence observatory that collects 
data from all States of Honduras and publishes a 
biannual homicide report with coordinated inputs 
from the national police, the Ministry of Public 
Safety and the medical forensics agency (For more, 
see http://iudpas.org/). While such observatories 
are not yet as well established in Africa, several 
have begun collecting and analysing data to com-
plement official statistics.
The improvement of international  
data collection
While UNODC is the focal point for statistics 
related to crime and criminal justice within the 
United Nations system,15 the UN-CTS is the cur-
rent reference for standardized definitions. As men-
tioned previously, the response rate to the UN-CTS 
is close to 50 per cent of countries. Data collection 
on crime is a complex process that involves several 
agencies and institutions (police, prosecution, 
courts, prisons) within United Nations Member 
States. In order to improve not only the response 
rate but also the consistency of data recorded in the 
UN-CTS, the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) requested United Nations Member 
14 For a comprehensive review of various types and modus 
operandi of crime/violence observatories, see Gilgen, E. and 
L. Tracey (2011), Geneva Declaration Secretariat.
15 ECOSOC SC (2012). E/2012/24. P. 7(d).
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States to appoint a national focal point to act as the 
coordinator of the different institutions providing 
data to the UN-CTS, to ensure their quality and 
completeness. While 110 countries have thus far 
appointed focal points, gaps remain in the provi-
sion of complete and consistent data in the 
UN-CTS. 
In order to give countries further support and 
assistance with the coordination of crime-related 
statistical information, both within States and 
within regions, several global and regional initia-
tives have been implemented. For example, 
UNODC has partnered with the Organization of 
American States (OAS) to facilitate data reporting 
from the Americas, and with Eurostat to coordi-
nate data collection in Europe. Moreover, 
UNODC and the WHO are strengthening coor-
dination efforts between them in order to improve 
the integration of the two main international 
sources for data (criminal justice and public health) 
on intentional homicide.
The establishment of regional  
partnerships to support countries  
in improving crime statistics
Several regional partnerships are supporting 
countries to improve their capacity to improve 
crime statistics. Many of these recent initiatives are 
providing technical assistance and building 
capacity within regions particularly affected by 
crime and violence, and are developing best 
practices with regard to statistics, particularly 
crime-related statistics. 
The Center of Excellence in Statistical Informa-
tion on Governance, Crime, Victimization and 
Justice, based in Mexico City, is a joint initiative of 
the National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
of Mexico (INEGI) and UNODC (for more 
information, see http://www.cdeunodc.inegi.org.
mx/UNODC_English.html). Based on interna-
tional best practices, the Center serves as a focal 
point for knowledge and contributes to capacity 
building on statistical information in the region, 
Harmonization of homicide data: the case of Chile
In many countries, there are multiple criminal justice and public health institutions recording data on 
homicide, using a variety of different indicators and definitions specific to their individual purposes. 
This is also the case in Chile, where several sources of data on homicide are available in independent 
systems of data collection. The diversity and variability between these sources is but one national-level 
example of the challenges extant in determining the overall “national” count of intentional homicides. 
For the purposes of international comparison, based on standardized definitions, Chile was able to 
effectively coordinate between its various agencies through exchanges of information and discussion to 
produce internationally comparable data, based on timeliness and coverage of the data. As a result, data 
from the Subsecretarías de Prevención del Delito was selected as the best source of data matching the 
standardized definition of intentional homicide.
Table 6.2: Homicide counts in Chile, by counting unit and national recording institute 
(2005-2011)
Source: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (2013).
Institute Counting unit 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Carabineros Cases 562 564 555 534 555 473 492 483
Policía de  
Investigaciones Cases 755 504 502 671 705 714 810 n/a
Ministerio Público Offences n/a 1314 1310 1472 1585 1359 1463 1320
Subsecretarías de  
Prevención del Delito Cases 568 587 574 557 594 487 543 483
Subsecretarías de  
Prevención del Delito Victims 576 590 616 588 630 541 636 550
Servicio Nacional de  
la Mujer
Cases of 
femicide n/a n/a 54 57 53 49 40 34
Departamento  
de Estadísticas e  
Información de Salud
Victims 946 924 786 756 903 779 785 n/a
Servicio Médico Legal Victims 911 836 819 802 903 743 n/a n/a
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by working with countries to improve the quality 
and availability of data and analysis of statistical 
information. The Center focuses its efforts on 
promoting systems for crime statistics, developing 
and implementing victimization surveys (both 
population and business), and on serving as a 
bridge between regional and global statistical pro-
cesses on crime and justice. 
The Regional System of Standardised Indicators in 
Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security (RIC), 
established in 2008, is a project funded by the 
Inter-American Development Bank, which func-
tions as a coordinating system for the sharing of 
information and good practices on statistical indi-
cators relating to crime and security issues between 
over 200 public institutions in 19 countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Through the 
RIC process, countries benefit from technical 
assistance and training to improve data and infor-
mation systems, and receive assistance with stand-
ardizing definitions, mechanisms and technologies 
to produce and share information. It also provides 
a forum for sharing good practices and developing 
public policies on common security challenges 
(For more, see http://seguridadyregion.com/).
The Strategy for Harmonisation of Statistics in 
Africa (SHaSA) is a collaborative effort between 
the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa, the African Union Commission and the 
African Development Bank, funded by the United 
Nations Development Programme, to support the 
African integration agenda and enhance coordina-
tion and collaboration between national statistical 
offices, regional statistical organizations and devel-
opment partners. Not limited to crime statistics, 
the SHaSA indeed covers all aspects of political, 
economic, social and cultural integration for 
Africa. The initiative focuses on the production of 
quality statistics, coordination of statistical pro-
duction, development of sustainable institutional 
capacity for statistics and the facilitation of quality 
decision-making (For more, see http://ea.au.int/fr/
sites/default/files/SHaSA%20-EN.pdf ). 
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Data sources
The Global Study on Homicide 2013 makes exten-
sive use of the UNODC Homicide Statistics 
(2013) dataset,1 which has been compiled in order 
to provide users with comprehensive data covering 
all aspects of homicide discussed in this study. In 
all, the UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) data-
set presents data for 219 countries and territories.
As explained below, a variety of national and inter-
national sources of homicide data have been con-
sidered and, in order to present accurate and 
comparable statistics, data have been selected 
which conform as much as possible to the defini-
tion of intentional homicide used by UNODC for 
statistical purposes: “unlawful death purposefully 
inflicted on a person by another person”. 
Data included in the UNODC Homicide Statis-
tics (2013) dataset are sourced from either crimi-
nal justice or public health systems. In the former, 
data are generated by law enforcement or criminal 
justice authorities in the process of recording and 
investigating a crime event, whereas in the latter, 
data are produced by health authorities certifying 
the cause of death of an individual.2 There is gen-
erally good agreement between the sources, but 
there are also occasional differences (see chapter 6: 
Data challenges). While acknowledging such dif-
ferences, all efforts have been made to ensure the 
greatest possible consistency in the use of data 
from the two types of source,3 which are detailed 
below.4
1 The UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset is available 
at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homi-
cide.html.
2 For a thorough discussion on the two sources, see: UNODC, 
Global Study on Homicide 2011.
Criminal justice data
Data regularly collected by UNODC through the 
United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and 
Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-
CTS) comprise national statistics on a number of 
conventional crimes, which are collected by police, 
prosecution, court and prison authorities. Police-
recorded data on intentional homicides from the 
UN-CTS are used in this study, which include, 
where available, complementary data on homicide 
victims by sex and age, by killing mechanism (fire-
arms, sharp objects and others) and by perpetra-
tor/context of the crime (family/intimate partner, 
organized crime, gang, robbery, other, or unknown 
context). Data also include homicides in the most 
populous city of each country. In 2011, data col-
lected through the UN-CTS included homicide 
cases cleared by the police for the first time. 
Data collected through publicly available sources 
and produced by national government sources 
(police, National Statistical Office, Ministry of 
Interior, Ministry of Justice, etc.) have been used 
to complete data series for those countries for 
which UN-CTS data were not available, and for 
those variables not included in the UN-CTS col-
lection, such as sub-national data. 
Data collected and compiled by other interna-
tional and regional agencies have also been 
3 For example, while it can be appropriate to compare time 
trends from the two different sources (criminal justice and 
public health) under the assumption that they both ade-
quately capture changes in homicide levels, it is not recom-
mended to form a time series for a given country by joining 
separate criminal justice and public health data from different 
years.
4 Detailed information on sources used at country level is pro-
vided in the Statistical annex.
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reviewed and used, where appropriate, including 
data from Eurostat, the Organization of American 
States, the Inter-American Development Bank 
(through the Regional System of Standardised 
Indicators in Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen 
Security (RIC) project) and various other United 
Nations agencies, such as the United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
and the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe (UNECE).
Public health data
At the country level, all deaths should be recorded 
and their cause explored and certified by public 
health authorities. National definitions and classi-
fications used for this purpose are usually in line 
with the World Health Organization (WHO) 
“International Classification of Diseases (ICD)”, 
the international standard diagnostic classification 
for epidemiological and clinical use. The current 
version (ICD-10) offers a detailed framework for 
the classification of causes of death, covering all 
known diseases and external factors, including 
violence. Deaths recorded with ICD codes X85-
Y09 (injuries inflicted by another person with 
intent to injure or kill) generally correspond to the 
definition of intentional homicide discussed above.
At the international level, data on homicides from 
public health sources are derived from databases 
on deaths by cause managed by the WHO, includ-
ing through some of its regional offices.5 Data 
presented in the Global Health Estimates pro-
duced by the WHO6 include estimates for coun-
tries without available vital registration data. Such 
estimates are based on a statistical model devel-
oped by the Institute for Health Metrics and Eval-
uation (IHME), which estimates deaths by cause 
at the country level on the basis of a number of 
covariates, while taking into account available sta-
tistical data. IHME estimates have been used by 
the WHO for various causes of death (including 
interpersonal violence) with reference to 2012 
death data.7 In the forthcoming WHO Global 
5 World Health Organization (2014); WHO Mortality Data-
base (last accessed in June 2013) which compiles mortality 
data by age, sex, and cause of death, as reported by WHO 
Member States from their civil registration systems; the 
Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO) Regional Core 
Health Data Initiative dataset (last accessed in June 2013); 
and WHO-Europe’s European Health for All Database (last 
accessed in June 2013). It should be noted that 2008 data 
from WHO is not comparable to the 2012 Causes of Death 
dataset due to changes in estimation procedures. 
6 World Health Organization (2014). 
7 For WHO Mortality by Cause of Death methodology, see 
Health Estimates (2014) dataset, estimates made 
through statistical modelling have been produced 
for around 70 per cent of all countries, most of 
which are located in Africa and Asia. These WHO 
data have been used for several countries in this 
study in relation to total numbers of homicide and 
homicides by sex.
Furthermore, for a number of countries, data on 
distribution of homicide by age and sex, as well as 
by killing mechanism, have been sourced from the 
Global Health Data Exchange (GDHx) provided 
by IHME.8 These breakdowns of cause of death 
categories by age, sex and killing mechanism at the 
country level have also been produced through 
statistical modelling.
Data validation process
The following considerations have been taken into 
account when deciding what data to include in the 
UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset:
s  The primary source of data is an official 
institution/organization.9
s  The definitions used to produce data are in 
line with the homicide definition used in the 
UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) data-
set. For example, where detailed data were 
available, counts of violent deaths from man-
slaughter have been excluded from the count 
of intentional homicides, as have attempted 
homicides.
s  In cases where multiple data series were 
available for the same country, follow-up 
with the country and/or an analysis of  
official reports and research literature has 
been carried out to determine the selection 
of the data series. 
Data review by Member States 
In order to ensure the quality of data used in the 
UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset, a 
process of technical consultation with Member 
States was undertaken before the finalization of 
the dataset. All country data on homicide were 
made available to United Nations Member States 
for a review of their quality and accuracy. Com-
Department of Health Statistics and Informatics, WHO 
(2011).
8 See IHME (2012).
9 Due to the unavailability of data from official sources, for 
three countries NGO-based sources were used for certain 
years.
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ments were received from a number of Member 
States and were addressed before the finalization of 
the Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset. 
Selection of reference data for the 
analyses presented in this study
As a result of the data collection and validation 
process, typically two or more time series (i.e. 
criminal justice and public health) became availa-
ble for the total intentional homicide count in 
each country. It has therefore been necessary to 
select the most appropriate reference counts of 
homicide levels for 2011-2012 and for trend data 
to be used in the analyses shown in this study. The 
following criteria have been used to select the ref-
erence series of homicide counts for each country: 
s  Adherence to the standard definition of homi-
cide: The degree of adherence to the standard 
definition of homicide and resulting inter-
national comparability are considered most 
important, thus preference has been given to 
data produced by the criminal justice system.
s  Coverage: In cases where criminal justice 
data were not available, or where the cover-
age was poor (as determined, for example, by 
comparison with neighbouring countries or 
other official sources of information), prefer-
ence has been given to public health data.10 
s  Timeliness: The timeliness of the available 
data has also been considered. The year 2010 
was considered the cut-off point for “the 
most recent” year. For example, if a coun-
try had a time series that included data only 
up to 2009, this time series has not been 
selected as the reference data upon which 
analysis has been conducted. In cases where 
data more recent than/equal to 2010 were 
not available, data from a previous year have 
been used. This was the case for 14 countries 
/territories for which the WHO (2014) esti-
mates were not available.
Contents of the Homicide  
Statistics Database
The following data series have been included in 
the Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset, for the 
countries/territories where data were available:
s  Intentional homicide counts (1995-2012)
s  Intentional homicide rates (1995-2012)
10 This was the case especially for many countries in Western, 
Eastern and Middle Africa, where criminal justice data are less 
available and present issues of under-coverage.
s  Percentage of male and female homicides 
(2000-2012)
s  Percentage of homicides by mechanism 
(2000-2012)
s  Intentional homicide counts and rates in 
the most populous city of each country 
(2000-2012)
s  Intentional homicide by context (intimate 
partner/family-related, organized crime/
gang-related) by sex (2000-2012)
s  Intentional homicide related to robberies by 
sex (latest years).
Procedures for calculating rates, re-
gional aggregates and disaggregations 
by speciﬁc variables 
Data used for homicide rates at the 
country level
On the basis of the selection criteria discussed 
above, available data sources have been considered 
and a reference series has been selected for each 
country in relation to 2012 or the latest available 
year. Homicide rates have been calculated based 
on population estimates from the United Nations 
Population Division.11
Subject to data availability, a long and continuous 
time series of homicide counts and rates has been 
compiled, making use of the same data source for 
each country.
Global, regional and sub-regional 
homicide counts, rates and range 
estimates
The global, regional and sub-regional counts for 
total homicides have been calculated as the sum of 
country-level homicide counts provided by the 
reference series selected at the national level. 
Global, regional and aggregated rates have been 
calculated as population-weighted averages. 
These “point estimates” (single year) are accompa-
nied, when relevant, by an indication of their 
uncertainty, which considers the variability 
between criminal justice and public health data for 
each country. Taking into account that two homi-
cide counts are generally available for each country 
(one criminal justice and one public health; 
although only one source is available in some 
countries), two additional estimates are built for 
each region. The lower estimate in the range is 
determined by the sum of the lower homicide 
11 United Nations Population Division (2012). 
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Map 7.1: Countries/territories, by type of source for homicide counts and time series (2012 or latest year) 
 
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undeter-
mined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has 
not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the 
Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). 
Map 7.2: Countries/territories, by latest year available for homicide count 
 
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dashed lines represent undeter-
mined boundaries. The dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has 
not yet been agreed upon by the parties. The final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. A dispute exists between the 
Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). 
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counts for each country (from either criminal jus-
tice or public health sources). Similarly, the upper 
estimate is calculated as the sum of the higher 
homicide counts for each country (from either 
criminal justice or public health sources). Bigger 
discrepancies between criminal justice and public 
health data produce larger range estimates at the 
regional and sub-regional levels, indicating the 
level of uncertainty associated with total homicide 
counts at the sub-regional, regional, and thus 
global, levels. 
Data used to calculate homicide counts 
and rates at the sub-national level
Data at the sub-national level are available for 
most countries in the Americas and Europe, as 
well as a small number of countries in Africa, parts 
of Asia and Oceania. For Europe, data has been 
sourced from Eurostat and disaggregated accord-
ing to the NUTS (Nomenclature of territorial 
units for statistics) regional classification. Sub-
national homicide rates for countries in the Amer-
icas (excluding the Caribbean) have been compiled 
from a number of sources, predominantly reflect-
ing criminal justice data. For other regions, data 
on sub-national homicide rates were provided by 
national sources.
Data used to calculate city homicide 
rates
Data on homicide in a country’s most populous 
city is provided to UNODC through the annual 
UNODC Survey on Crime Trends and Opera-
tions of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS). City 
populations are often provided in the UN-CTS as 
well, but if not, national census data from the 
latest year, or population data sourced from the 
United Nations Population Division, have been 
used to calculate the city homicide rate.
Data used to calculate homicide by age 
and sex
Data on victims of homicide by age and sex have 
been compiled from various sources, using similar 
criteria adopted for the selection of the reference 
data. The selected percentage distribution by age 
and sex available from those sources was then 
applied to the homicide count of the country ref-
erence series in order to ensure consistency between 
total homicides and number of homicides by age 
and sex.
Data used for types of homicides
Data on organized crime/gang-related homicides, 
intimate partner/family-related homicides and 
homicides linked to other criminal activities are 
sourced from criminal justice data produced by 
national authorities. Data have been compiled 
according to national practices and definitions, 
which are generally linked to national legislations. 
Comparisons between countries should therefore 
be conducted with caution.
Data used for the estimation of global 
ﬁgures on intimate partner/family-
related homicides
Data on intimate partner/family-related homi-
cides, disaggregated by sex, are sourced from 52 
national and international criminal justice sources 
along with data on total homicide by sex. The fol-
lowing procedure computes regional and global 
counts and rates for victims of intimate partner/
family-related homicide, by sex: 
s  Country level data on male homicide, female 
homicide, male intimate partner/family-re-
lated homicide and female intimate partner/
family-related homicide victims are aggre-
gated at the regional level for countries where 
all such data are available.
s  From these absolute numbers, for each in-
dicator per region, percentage shares of inti-
mate partner/family-related homicide victims 
are calculated by sex.
s  The percentage share is applied to the total 
number of homicide victims by sex in each 
region.
s  These regional totals are summed to produce 
a global estimate of intimate partner/family-
related homicide victims, both total and by 
sex. 
The regional and global intimate partner/family-
related homicide rates are calculated by using 
counts of these intimate partner/family-related 
homicide victims and population estimates from 
the United Nations Population Division.
Data used for killing mechanism 
Data on victims of homicide by different 
mechanisms, predominantly firearms and sharp 
objects, are compiled from a variety of sources, 
using similar criteria adopted for the selection of 
the reference series. The latest percentage 
distribution of homicide victims by mechanism 
available from those sources has been applied to 
the homicide count of the reference series for each 
country in order to ensure consistency between 
total homicides and number of homicides by 
killing mechanism. 
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Data used for post-conﬂict countries
The countries selected for analysis in chapter 4 
were chosen based on data availability, predomi-
nantly as a result of the presence of a United 
Nations peacekeeping or stability mission, or 
United Nations country office, that has data col-
lection and monitoring in place. In several of those 
countries, there was no reporting available for any 
crime-related statistics prior to the establishment 
of an international presence and monitoring 
capacity. In addition to the well-known limitations 
of data on reported crime,12 such limitations are all 
the more relevant in post-conflict settings. Com-
parisons, both across time and especially cross-
country, should always be made with caution. 
Afghanistan and Iraq data
Data for civilian casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq 
have been provided by the human rights reporting 
section of the United Nations Assistance Mission 
in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI). Each Mis-
sion has a set of definitions used for “civilian casu-
alty”, as well as different recording methods for 
incidents, perpetrators and victims.
South Sudan data
The collection and analysis of crime data in South 
Sudan is nascent, and the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme, working with the South 
Sudan National Police Force, has begun to collect 
nation-wide crime statistics, collate them and pro-
vide some analysis. Data is available for December 
2011-May 2012, the six-month timeframe used as 
the basis for estimating the 2012 homicide rate at 
the national and sub-national level for South 
Sudan. 
The United Nations Mission in South Sudan 
(UNMISS), through its Joint Mission Analysis 
Centre (JMAC), has also taken the initiative to 
collect data specifically on violent crime. These 
data are collected and collated by the JMAC on a 
monthly basis and made available to UNODC for 
categorization and analysis for the months of Jan-
uary-June 2013. These data form the basis for 
calculating the 2013 homicide rate for South 
Sudan on a national and sub-national basis. Sub-
national population data for the States of South 
Sudan have been taken from the 2008 Sudan 
census in order to calculate sub-national homicide 
rates. 
12 See, for example: ECOSOC (2012). E/RES/2012/18.
The collection of data and analysis for South 
Sudan were completed prior to the violent clashes 
of December 2013, and the estimated 2013 hom-
icide rate does not include the victims of those 
events.
Data for Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone 
For Haiti, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the UNODC 
Homicide Statistics (2013) dataset contains data 
provided directly by the United Nations Stabiliza-
tion Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the Sierra 
Leone Police through the United Nations Project 
Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) and the United 
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which have 
been used as received. In Sierra Leone, the most 
recent sub-national population estimates available 
are from the 2004 national census and they have 
been used to calculate sub-national homicide rates 
for 2007 and 2011. 
Availability of homicide data  
produced by national registration  
systems
The following table presents countries and territo-
ries for which recent data (since 2005) on homi-
cide produced by national registration systems are 
available at the international level.13 The table 
shows the latest available year, the number of years 
for which criminal justice (CJ) and public health 
(PH) data are available, as well as available disag-
gregations by sex, age, firearms and intimate part-
ner/family-related homicide. Availability refers to 
data collected by UNODC, either directly from 
countries or through other international/regional 
organizations.
13 National registration systems refer to criminal justice or 
public health institutions publishing data on homicide.
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Table 7.1: Data on homicide produced by national registration systems since 2005, as available to UNODC 
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Africa Eastern Africa Burundi 2011 4
Africa Eastern Africa Kenya 2012 8
Africa Eastern Africa Malawi 2012 8 YES
Africa Eastern Africa Mauritius 2012 4 6 YES YES YES YES
Africa Eastern Africa Mayotte 2009 4
Africa Eastern Africa Mozambique 2009 5
Africa Eastern Africa Réunion 2009 5 3 YES
Africa Eastern Africa Rwanda 2008 4
Africa Eastern Africa Seychelles 2006 1 5 YES
Africa Eastern Africa South Sudan 2012 1 YES YES
Africa Eastern Africa Uganda 2011 7 YES YES
Africa Eastern Africa Zambia 2010 6
Africa Eastern Africa Zimbabwe 2008 4
Africa Middle Africa Cameroon 2007 2
Africa Middle Africa
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo
2010 6
Africa Middle Africa Sao Tome and Principe 2011 6 YES YES
Africa Northern Africa Algeria 2011 7 YES
Africa Northern Africa Egypt 2011 7 7 YES YES YES YES
Africa Northern Africa Morocco 2012 8 1 YES
Africa Northern Africa Sudan 2008 2
Africa Southern Africa Botswana 2009 3
Africa Southern Africa Lesotho 2010 4
Africa Southern Africa Namibia 2012 5 YES
Africa Southern Africa South Africa 2012 8 5 YES YES YES
Africa Western Africa Burkina Faso 2008 4 YES
Africa Western Africa Cabo Verde 2012 5 3
Africa Western Africa Côte d’Ivoire 2008 2
Africa Western Africa Ghana 2009 3
Africa Western Africa Guinea 2007 1
Africa Western Africa Liberia 2012 6
Africa Western Africa Nigeria 2008 4
Africa Western Africa Senegal 2010 2
Africa Western Africa Sierra Leone 2012 8 YES
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Americas Caribbean Anguilla 2008 4 4 YES
Americas Caribbean Antigua and Barbuda 2012 7 5
Americas Caribbean Aruba 2010 6 YES
Americas Caribbean Bahamas 2012 8 4 YES YES YES YES
Americas Caribbean Barbados 2012 8 4 YES
Americas Caribbean British Virgin Islands 2006 1 YES
Americas Caribbean Cayman Islands 2009 4 YES
Americas Caribbean Cuba 2010 6 YES
Americas Caribbean Dominica 2010 6 6 YES
Americas Caribbean Dominican Republic 2012 8 2 YES YES YES YES
Americas Caribbean Grenada 2012 8 4 YES YES YES YES
Americas Caribbean Guadeloupe 2009 5 5 YES
Americas Caribbean Haiti 2012 6
Americas Caribbean Jamaica 2012 8 1 YES YES YES YES
Americas Caribbean Martinique 2009 5 4 YES
Americas Caribbean Montserrat 2008 3 YES
Americas Caribbean Puerto Rico 2012 7 6 YES
Americas Caribbean Saint Kitts and Nevis 2012 8 6 YES YES
Americas Caribbean Saint Lucia 2012 7 3
Americas Caribbean
Saint Vincent 
and the  
Grenadines
2012 8 6 YES YES YES
Americas Caribbean Trinidad and Tobago 2012 8 4 YES YES YES YES
Americas Caribbean Turks and Caicos Islands 2009 3 YES
Americas Caribbean United States Virgin Islands 2010 6 YES
Americas Central America Belize 2012 8 5 YES YES
Americas Central America Costa Rica 2012 8 7 YES YES YES YES
Americas Central America El Salvador 2012 8 5 YES YES YES YES
Americas Central America Guatemala 2012 8 5 YES YES
Americas Central America Honduras 2012 8 YES YES YES
Americas Central America Mexico 2012 7 8 YES YES
Americas Central America Nicaragua 2012 8 7 YES YES YES YES
Americas Central America Panama 2012 8 5 YES YES YES YES
Americas Northern America Bermuda 2012 8 3 YES YES
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Americas Northern America Canada 2012 8 5 YES YES YES YES
Americas Northern America Greenland 2009 5
Americas Northern America Saint Pierre and Miquelon 2009 4 3 YES
Americas Northern America United States of America 2012 8 6 YES YES YES YES
Americas South America Argentina 2010 6 6 YES YES
Americas South America Bolivia (Plurina-tional State of) 2012 8 YES
Americas South America Brazil 2012 6 6 YES
Americas South America Chile 2012 8 5 YES YES YES YES
Americas South America Colombia 2012 8 8 YES YES YES YES
Americas South America Ecuador 2012 8 6 YES
Americas South America French Guiana 2009 5 4 YES
Americas South America Guyana 2012 8 5 YES YES YES YES
Americas South America Paraguay 2012 8 6 YES YES
Americas South America Peru 2012 8 6 YES
Americas South America Suriname 2009 5 5
Americas South America Uruguay 2012 8 3 YES YES YES YES
Americas South America
Venezuela  
(Bolivarian 
Republic of)
2012 8 5
Asia Central Asia Kazakhstan 2012 8 6 YES
Asia Central Asia Kyrgyzstan 2011 7 6 YES YES
Asia Central Asia Tajikistan 2011 7 1 YES YES
Asia Central Asia Turkmenistan 2006 2
Asia Central Asia Uzbekistan 2008 4 1
Asia Eastern Asia China 2010 6
Asia Eastern Asia China, Hong Kong SAR 2012 8 5 YES YES YES YES
Asia Eastern Asia China, Macao SAR 2010 6 YES
Asia Eastern Asia Japan 2011 7 5 YES
Asia Eastern Asia Mongolia 2011 7 YES YES YES YES
Asia Eastern Asia Republic of Korea 2011 7 5 YES YES
Asia Eastern Asia Taiwan Prov-ince of China 2011 7
Asia South-Eastern Asia
Brunei  
Darussalam 2009 5
Asia South-Eastern Asia Cambodia 2009 5
Asia South-Eastern Asia Indonesia 2012 4
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Asia South-Eastern Asia
Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic
2010 1
Asia South-Eastern Asia Malaysia 2010 4 2
Asia South-Eastern Asia Myanmar 2007 3
Asia South-Eastern Asia Philippines 2012 8 1 YES
Asia South-Eastern Asia Singapore 2012 8 7 YES YES YES YES
Asia South-Eastern Asia Thailand 2011 7 2
Asia South-Eastern Asia Timor-Leste 2010 6
Asia South-Eastern Asia Viet Nam 2006 2
Asia Southern Asia Afghanistan 2012 4
Asia Southern Asia Bangladesh 2012 7
Asia Southern Asia Bhutan 2010 6
Asia Southern Asia India 2012 8 YES YES YES
Asia Southern Asia Iran (Islamic Republic of) 2009 1
Asia Southern Asia Maldives 2008 2 3 YES
Asia Southern Asia Nepal 2012 7
Asia Southern Asia Pakistan 2012 8
Asia Southern Asia Sri Lanka 2011 7 1
Asia Western Asia Armenia 2012 8 5 YES YES YES
Asia Western Asia Azerbaijan 2010 6 YES YES YES
Asia Western Asia Bahrain 2011 7 5 YES
Asia Western Asia Cyprus 2012 8 7 YES YES YES YES
Asia Western Asia Georgia 2010 6 4 YES YES YES
Asia Western Asia Israel 2012 8 5 YES
Asia Western Asia Jordan 2011 7 1 YES
Asia Western Asia Kuwait 2012 5 5 YES
Asia Western Asia Lebanon 2010 6
Asia Western Asia Oman 2011 3 1
Asia Western Asia Qatar 2008 4 5
Asia Western Asia Saudi Arabia 2007 3
Asia Western Asia State of  Palestine 2012 1 2
Asia Western Asia Syrian Arab Republic 2010 6
Asia Western Asia Turkey 2011 7 4 YES
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Asia Western Asia United Arab Emirates 2006 2
Asia Western Asia Yemen 2010 6
Europe Eastern Europe Belarus 2010 6 3 YES
Europe Eastern Europe Bulgaria 2012 8 7 YES YES YES
Europe Eastern Europe Czech Republic 2012 8 8 YES YES YES YES
Europe Eastern Europe Hungary 2012 8 5 YES YES YES YES
Europe Eastern Europe Poland 2011 7 6 YES
Europe Eastern Europe Republic of Moldova 2012 8 7 YES YES
Europe Eastern Europe Romania 2012 8 6 YES YES YES
Europe Eastern Europe Russian  Federation 2012 5 6
Europe Eastern Europe Slovakia 2012 8 4 YES
Europe Eastern Europe Ukraine 2010 6 6 YES YES
Europe Northern Europe Denmark 2012 7 2 YES YES YES
Europe Northern Europe Estonia 2011 7 6 YES
Europe Northern Europe Finland 2012 8 6 YES YES YES YES
Europe Northern Europe Iceland 2012 8 5 YES YES YES YES
Europe Northern Europe Ireland 2012 8 6 YES
Europe Northern Europe Latvia 2012 8 6 YES YES YES YES
Europe Northern Europe Lithuania 2012 8 6 YES YES YES
Europe Northern Europe Norway 2011 7 6 YES YES YES
Europe Northern Europe Sweden 2012 8 8 YES YES YES
Europe Northern Europe
United King-
dom of Great 
Britain and 
Northern  
Ireland 
2011 7 6 YES YES YES
Europe Southern Europe Albania 2012 8 YES YES YES YES
Europe Southern Europe Andorra 2010 4 YES YES
Europe Southern Europe Bosnia and  Herzegovina 2011 7 YES YES YES YES
Europe Southern Europe Croatia 2012 8 6 YES YES YES YES
Europe Southern Europe Greece 2011 7 6 YES
Europe Southern Europe Italy 2012 8 5 YES YES YES YES
Europe Southern Europe
Kosovo (in 
compliance 
with UN Secu-
rity Council 
Resolution 
1244/99)
2010 3
Europe Southern Europe Malta 2012 8 6 YES YES YES YES
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Europe Southern Europe Montenegro 2012 8 4 YES YES YES YES
Europe Southern Europe Portugal 2012 8 4 YES
Europe Southern Europe Serbia 2012 8 7 YES YES YES
Europe Southern Europe Slovenia 2012 8 6 YES YES YES YES
Europe Southern Europe Spain 2012 8 6 YES YES YES YES
Europe Southern Europe
The former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia
2011 7 6 YES YES YES YES
Europe Western Europe Austria 2012 8 6 YES YES YES YES
Europe Western Europe Belgium 2012 8 2
Europe Western Europe France 2012 8 5
Europe Western Europe Germany 2011 7 6 YES YES YES
Europe Western Europe Liechtenstein 2011 8 YES YES
Europe Western Europe Luxembourg 2011 7 5 YES YES YES YES
Europe Western Europe Monaco 2008 4 YES
Europe Western Europe Netherlands 2011 8 YES YES
Europe Western Europe Switzerland 2011 7 6 YES YES YES
Oceania Australia and New Zealand Australia 2012 8 1 YES YES YES YES
Oceania Australia and New Zealand New Zealand 2012 8 4 YES YES YES YES
Oceania Melanesia Fiji 2008 4 1
Oceania Melanesia New Caledonia 2009 4
Oceania Melanesia Papua New Guinea 2010 6
Oceania Melanesia Solomon Islands 2008 4
Oceania Micronesia Guam 2011 7
Oceania Polynesia French  Polynesia 2009 4
Oceania Polynesia Tonga 2012 8 YES YES YES
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Abbreviations
Source type:
CJ Criminal Justice
PH Public Health
Data sources:
CTS
Data are provided to UNODC annually by national police, national statistical offices or other 
competent national authorities through the United Nations Surveys on Crime Trends and the 
Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS). Detailed information can be found on 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/United-Nations-Surveys-on-Crime-Trends-
and-the-Operations-of-Criminal-Justice-Systems.html.
Eurostat The statistical office of the European Union. Offences recorded by the police.
Interpol International Criminal Police Organization. 
NGO (a-c)
Non-governmental organization: (a) Mayra Brea de Cabral and Edylberto Cabral (2009), “Vio-
lence in the Dominican Republic: nature, recent developments and prospects for control”. 
Authors calculations based on data from the national police and the Attorney General of the 
Dominican Republic (b) Annita Montoute and David Anyanwu (2009), “Situational Analysis 
of Gun Related Crime in the Caribbean: The Case of Trinidad & Tobago; Antigua & Barbuda; 
St Vincent & the Grenadines and St. Lucia”. Prepared for the Coalition for Development and 
the Reduction of Armed Violence (c) The Venezuelan Program of Action and Education in 
Human Rights (PROVEA).
NSO National Statistical Office. 
OAS Organization of American States — Observatory on Citizen Security. Number of offences of intentional homicide recorded by the police. 
OCAVI Observatorio Centroamericano sobre Violencia - The Central American Observatory on Vio-lence. Sourced from national  police data.
PAHO Pan American Health Organization’s Core Health Data System. 
SES Regional System of Standardized Citizen Security and Coexistence Indicators.
Transmonee UNICEF Transmonee Database. Innocenti Research Centre, Florence.  
UN-PKO Peacekeeping Operation.      
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 
WHO World Health Organization Global Health Estimates 2014: draft homicide estimates for  year 2012.
WHO-MDB World Health Organization Mortality Database.
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Table 8.2: Percentage of male and female intentional homicide victims, by country/territory  
(latest available year)   
selameFselaMraeYyrotirret/yrtnuoC
%6.92%4.070102EMHIHPidnuruB
%4.92%6.070102EMHIHPsoromoC
%7.72%3.270102EMHIHPituobijD
%6.52%4.470102EMHIHPaertirE
%8.22%2.770102EMHIHPaipoihtE
%4.32%6.670102EMHIHPayneK
%4.82%6.170102EMHIHPracsagadaM
%5.21%5.782102ecilop lanoitaNJCiwalaM
%5.32%5.671102STCJCsuitiruaM
%2.42%8.570102EMHIHPeuqibmazoM
%0.52%0.578002BDM-OHWHPnoinuéR
%1.92%9.070102EMHIHPadnawR
%7.02%3.970102EMHIHPsellehcyeS
%1.62%9.370102EMHIHPailamoS
%5.71%5.282102ecilop lanoitaNJCnaduS htuoS
%8.31%2.688002STCJCadnagU
%0.72%0.370102EMHIHP ainaznaT fo cilbupeR detinU
%2.22%8.770102ecilop lanoitaNJCaibmaZ
%2.82%8.170102EMHIHPewbabmiZ
%8.81%2.180102EMHIHPalognA
%5.42%5.570102EMHIHPnooremaC
%4.41%6.580102EMHIHPcilbupeR nacirfA lartneC
%8.82%2.170102EMHIHPdahC
%1.61%9.380102EMHIHPognoC
%2.91%8.080102EMHIHPognoC eht fo cilbupeR citarcomeD
%5.71%5.280102EMHIHPaeniuG lairotauqE
%1.61%9.380102EMHIHPnobaG
%4.52%6.470102EMHIHPepicnirP dna emoT oaS
%0.61%0.480102EMHIHPaireglA
%2.21%8.781102STCJCtpygE
%2.32%8.670102EMHIHPaybiL
%2.21%8.789002STCJCoccoroM
%7.41%3.580102EMHIHPnaduS
%0.32%0.770102EMHIHPaisinuT
Source
AFRICA
Eastern Africa
AFRICA
Middle Africa
AFRICA
Northern Africa
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selameFselaMraeYyrotirret/yrtnuoC Source
%0.42%0.670102EMHIHPanawstoB
%0.62%0.470102EMHIHPohtoseL
%7.32%3.670102EMHIHPaibimaN
%4.51%6.481102ecilop lanoitaNJCacirfA htuoS
%1.22%9.770102EMHIHPdnalizawS
%9.82%1.170102EMHIHPnineB
%8.23%2.760102EMHIHPosaF anikruB
%5.52%5.470102EMHIHPedreV obaC
%0.42%0.670102EMHIHPeriovI'd etôC
%1.13%9.860102EMHIHPaibmaG
%2.63%8.360102EMHIHPanahG
%6.03%4.960102EMHIHPaeniuG
%4.92%6.070102EMHIHPuassiB-aeniuG
%9.92%1.070102EMHIHPairebiL
%0.53%0.560102EMHIHPilaM
%1.13%9.860102EMHIHPainatiruaM
%9.33%1.660102EMHIHPregiN
%8.13%2.860102EMHIHPairegiN
%2.52%8.470102EMHIHPlageneS
%2.32%8.670102EMHIHPenoeL arreiS
%5.82%5.170102EMHIHPogoT
OHAPHPalliugnA 2009 100.0% 0.0%
%1.23%9.760102EMHIHPadubraB dna augitnA
%0.0%0.0010102OHAPHPaburA
%6.21%4.781102STCJCsamahaB
%3.23%7.760102ecilop lanoitaNJCsodabraB
%0.05%0.056002OHAPHPsdnalsI nigriV hsitirB
%5.21%5.789002OHAPHPsdnalsI namyaC
%0.52%0.570102OHAPHPabuC
%5.21%5.780102OHAPHPacinimoD
%9.8%1.192102STCJCcilbupeR nacinimoD
%7.53%3.462102STCJCadanerG
%8.51%2.489002OHAPHPepuoledauG
%6.12%4.870102EMHIHP itiaH
%5.01%5.981102STCJCaciamaJ
%3.72%7.279002OHAPHPeuqinitraM
%0.0%0.0018002OHAPHPtarrestnoM
%9.5%1.490102OHAPHPociR otreuP
%5.9%5.090102STCJCsiveN dna sttiK tniaS
Southern Africa
AFRICA
Western Africa
AMERICAS
Caribbean
AFRICA
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selameFselaMraeYyrotirret/yrtnuoC Source
%3.02%7.970102EMHIHPaicuL tniaS
%0.21%0.880102STCJCsenidanerG eht dna tnecniV tniaS
%3.8%7.191102STCJCogaboT dna dadinirT
%0.0%0.0019002OHAPHPsdnalsI sociaC dna skruT
%5.21%5.780102OHAPHPsdnalsI nigriV setatS detinU
%7.9%3.091102STCJCezileB
%3.21%7.782102STCJCaciR atsoC
%0.11%0.982102STCJCrodavlaS lE
%1.11%9.889002STCJCalametauG
%8.6%2.391102STCJCsarudnoH
%7.01%3.982102OSNHPocixeM
%4.7%6.291102OHAPHPaugaraciN
%4.5%6.492102STCJCamanaP
%0.0%0.07002BDM-OHWHP*adumreB
%2.03%8.961102STCJCadanaC
Saint Pierre and Miquelon* PH WHO-MDB 2008 0.0% 0.0%
United States of America  CJ Naonal police 2012 77.8% 22.2%
%4.61%6.380102OHAPHPanitnegrA
%7.22%3.770102EMHIHP)fo etatS lanoitanirulP( aiviloB
%2.01%8.980102EMHIHPlizarB
%1.81%9.181102STCJCelihC
%4.8%6.191102STCJCaibmoloC
%2.8%8.190102OHAPHProdaucE
%2.81%8.189002OHAPHPanaiuG hcnerF
%0.04%0.061102STCJCanayuG
%2.11%8.882102STCCJyaugaraP
%9.12%1.870102EMHIHPureP
%7.42%3.570102EMHIHPemaniruS
%6.02%4.971102STCCJ yaugurU
%1.8%9.190102EMHIHP)fo cilbupeR nairaviloB( aleuzeneV
%9.71%1.280102EMHIHPnatshkazaK
%3.13%7.869002STCJCnatszygryK
%5.31%5.681102STCJCnatsikijaT
%2.61%8.380102EMHIHPnatsinemkruT
%6.71%4.280102EMHIHPnatsikebzU
AMERICAS
Northern America
AMERICAS
South America
Central Asia
ASIA
Central America
AMERICAS
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selameFselaMraeYyrotirret/yrtnuoC Source
%9.12%1.870102EMHIHPanihC
%9.54%1.450102EMHIHPmalassuraD ienurB
%7.42%3.570102EMHIHPaidobmaC
%7.91%3.080102EMHIHPaisenodnI
%6.02%4.970102EMHIHPcilbupeR citarcomeD s'elpoeP oaL
%4.72%6.270102EMHIHPaisyalaM
%5.83%5.160102EMHIHPramnayM
STCJCsenippilihP 2011 88.0% 12.0%
%5.73%5.261102STCJCeropagniS
%3.21%7.780102EMHIHPdnaliahT
%9.62%1.370102EMHIHPetseL-romiT
%5.82%5.170102EMHIHPmaN teiV
%0.31%0.780102EMHIHPnatsinahgfA
%8.63%2.360102EMHIHPhsedalgnaB
%8.83%2.160102EMHIHPnatuhB
%8.04%2.952102ecilop lanoitaNJCaidnI
%1.81%9.180102EMHIHP)fo cilbupeR cimalsI( narI
%7.63%3.360102EMHIHPsevidlaM
%7.22%3.770102EMHIHPlapeN
%3.32%7.670102EMHIHPnatsikaP
%2.51%8.480102EMHIHPaknaL irS
%2.53%8.462102STCJCainemrA
%1.03%9.960102STCJCnajiabrezA
%4.41%6.580102EMHIHPniarhaB
%7.22%3.772102STCJCsurpyC
%3.42%7.571102ECENUJCaigroeG
%7.31%3.862102PHqarI
%2.72%8.270102EMHIHPlearsI
%4.32%6.678002BDM-OHWHPnadroJ
%4.61%6.380102Naonal PoliceCJtiawuK
ASIA
Eastern Asia
ASIA
South-Eastern Asia
ASIA
Southern Asia
ASIA
Western Asia
EMHI
%5.25%5.741102STCJCaeroK fo cilbupeR
%6.22%4.771102STCJCailognoM
%0.04%0.064991BDM-OHWHPo SARacaMChina,
%9.25%1.741102STCJCnapaJ
%9.22%1.770102EMHIHPaeroK fo cilbupeR s'elpoeP citarcomeD
%9.25%1.741102STCJCChina,  g SARnoK gnoH
%4.31%6.680102EMHIHPanihC fo ecnivorP nawiaT
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selameFselaMraeYyrotirret/yrtnuoC Source
%5.02%5.970102EMHIHPnonabeL
%7.62%3.370102EMHIHPnamO
%1.81%9.180102EMHIHPrataQ
%3.33%7.660102EMHIHPaibarA iduaS
%4.21%6.780102EMHIHPenitselaP fo etatS
%0.61%0.480102EMHIHPcilbupeR barA nairyS
%5.02%5.971102ECENUJCyekruT
%2.31%8.680102EMHIHPsetarimE barA detinU
%5.02%5.970102EMHIHPnemeY
%3.23%7.760102EMHIHPsuraleB
%7.71%3.282102STCJCairagluB
%7.54%3.452102ecilop lanoitaNJCcilbupeR hcezC
%7.14%3.852102STCJCyragnuH
%8.62%2.370102EMHIHPdnaloP
%5.72%5.272102STCJCavodloM fo cilbupeR
%5.73%5.260102ECENUJCainamoR
%5.42%5.570102EMHIHPnoitaredeF naissuR
%0.23%0.860102EMHIHPaikavolS
%4.13%6.860102ECENUJCeniarkU
%0.43%0.662102STCJCkramneD
%4.32%6.670102ECENUJCainotsE
%1.64%9.352102STCJCdnalniF
%0.001%0.02102STCJCdnalecI
%3.31%7.682102OSNJCdnalerI
%0.15%0.942102STCJCaivtaL
%2.62%8.372102STCJCainauhtiL
%8.64%2.351102STCJCyawroN
%9.13%1.860102ECENUJCnedewS
United Kingdom (England and Wales) CJ Naonal police/CTS 2011 70.3% 29.7%
%4.71%6.281102STCJC)dnalerI nrehtroN( modgniK detinU
%6.91%4.081102STCJC)dnaltocS( modgniK detinU
%6.61%4.382102STCJCainablA
%0.0%0.02102STCJCarrodnA
%4.13%6.861102STCJCanivogezreH dna ainsoB
%3.53%7.462102STCJCaitaorC
%6.6%4.399002STCJCeceerG
%1.03%9.961102STCJCylatI
%0.52%0.572102STCJCatlaM
%6.71%4.282102STCJCorgenetnoM
Southern Europe
EUROPE
Eastern Europe
EUROPE
Northern Europe
EUROPE
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selameFselaMraeYyrotirret/yrtnuoC Source
%8.92%2.070102EMHIHPlagutroP
%0.0%0.05002BDM-OHWHP*oniraM naS
%1.53%9.462102STCJCaibreS
%9.24%1.752102STCJCainevolS
%3.43%7.562102STCJCniapS
%3.31%7.681102STCJCainodecaM fo cilbupeR valsoguY remrof ehT
%2.04%8.952102STCJCairtsuA
%4.34%6.650102EMHIHPmuigleB
%9.73%1.260102EMHIHPecnarF
%3.74%7.251102STCJCynamreG
%0.0%0.0010102STCJCnietsnethceiL
%0.0%0.0011102STCJCgruobmexuL
%0.53%0.561102OSNHPsdnalrehteN
%0.05%0.051102STCJCdnalreztiwS
%7.23%3.762102STCJCailartsuA
%2.15%8.842102STCJCdnalaeZ weN
%7.83%3.160102EMHIHPijiF
%3.62%7.370102EMHIHPaeniuG weN aupaP
%2.52%8.470102EMHIHPsdnalsI nomoloS
%0.82%0.270102EMHIHPutaunaV
%6.03%4.960102EMHIHPitabiriK
%7.81%3.180102EMHIHPsdnalsI llahsraM
%8.52%2.470102EMHIHP)fo setatS detaredeF( aisenorciM
%8.81%2.180102EMHIHPaomaS
%0.001%0.02102ecilop lanoitaNJCagnoT
Polynesia
Western Europe
OCEANIA
Australia and New Zealand
OCEANIA
Melanesia
EUROPE
OCEANIA
Micronesia
OCEANIA
* No homicide was recorded in the respecve year.
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Table 8.3: Percentage distribution of intentional homicides, by mechanism and by country/territory   
(2000-2012)   
21021102010290028002700260025002msinahceMecruoSyrotirret/yrtnuoC
%0%3%0%0%0%2%0% mraeriFSTCsuitiruaM
% mraeriFecilop lanoitaNnaduS htuoS 14%
Sharp object % 1%
Other % 85%
%91%11%31%9%41%31% mraeriFSTCadnagU
%001%001%001%001%001%001% mraeriFSTCepicnirP dna emoT oaS
%6%5% mraeriFSTCaireglA
%86%32%34%94%34%93% mraeriFSTCtpygE
%91%12%73%53%63%53 
%31%65%02%61%02%62% rehtO
%51%31%41%81%91% mraeriFecilop lanoitaNaibimaN
%33% mraeriFSMMINacirfA htuoS
%73 
%03% rehtO
%07% mraeriFSTCenoeL arreiS
%47%37%06%36%55%45%96% mraeriFSTCsamahaB
  21% 21% 26% 30% 26% 19% 17%
Other % 10% 25% 19% 7% 14% 7% 9%
%46%36%56%56%07%45%46% mraeriFSTCcilbupeR nacinimoD
%52%52%42%42%02
%11%21%01%11%01% rehtO
%0%0%0%0%6%81%8%9% mraeriFSTCadanerG
55% 50% 55% 88% 86% 90% 75% 71%
Other % 36% 42% 27% 6% 14% 10% 25% 29%
%07%67%77%77%97%57% mraeriFSTCaciamaJ
%91%71%71%71%61%91 
%11%7%6%6%5%6% rehtO
%88%18%58% mraeriFSTCsiveN dna sttiK tniaS
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines CTS Firearm % 22% 31% 58% 30% 36%
43% 46% 31% 15% 44%
Other % 35% 23% 11% 55% 20%
%17%57%27%97%77%37% mraeriFSTCogaboT dna dadinirT
%61%31%61%21%31%51 
%31%21%21%9%01%21% rehtO
AFRICA
Southern Africa
AFRICA
Western Africa
AMERICAS
Caribbean
AFRICA
Eastern Africa
AFRICA
Middle Africa
AFRICA
Northern Africa
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Year
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%76%26%84%04%15% mraeriFSTCezileB
33%
Other % 0%
%46%36%66%46%86%16%26% mraeriFSTC/SESaciR atsoC
%91%91%81%22%02%42%42
%61%81%61%41%21%41%41% rehtO
%26%07%37%67%76%08%87%77% mraeriFSTCrodavlaS lE
%12%81%51%51%31%21
%71%21%21%01%12%8% rehtO
%38%38%38%87%97% mraeriFSTCalametauG
%48%38%18%97% mraeriFSESsarudnoH
%01%11%41%51
%6%5%5%6% rehtO
%75%55%55%93%93%13%92% mraeriFSTCocixeM
%25% mraeriFSTCaugaraciN
%84
%0% rehtO
%47%67%77%28%97%56%86%95% mraeriFecilop lanoitaN/STCamanaP
26% 16% 21% 13% 11% 15% 16% 17%
Other % 15% 16% 14% 7% 7% 8% 8% 10%
%92%43%23%53%53%33%63% mraeriFSTCadanaC
32% 35% 34% 35% 37% 31% 36%
Other % 32% 31% 32% 29% 31% 35% 34%
%06%95%06%06%85%95%95%16% mraeriFSTCaciremA fo setatS detinU
11% 11% 11% 11% 12% 12% 12% 11%
Other % 28% 30% 30% 31% 28% 28% 30% 30%
%84%64%34%44% mraeriFSTCanitnegrA
%7%1%2% mraeriFSTC)fo etatS lanoitanirulP( aiviloB
%72%32%52%9%7%21%93% mraeriFSTCelihC
%23%14
%14%63% rehtO
%77%87%87%17%17%27%07% mraeriFNaonal Instute of 
Forensic Medicine
aibmoloC
10% 11% 11% 13% 13% 14% 14%
Other % 20% 17% 17% 16% 9% 8% 9%
%96%18% mraeriFSTCrodaucE
%52%12%01% mraeriFSTCanayuG
Sharp object % 45%
Other % 30%
%46%16%26%75%26%16%36%06% mraeriFSTCyaugaraP
%81%61%02%71%02% mraeriFSTCureP
% mraeriFSTCyaugurU 49%
Sharp object % 34%
Other % 18%
AMERICAS
Central America
AMERICAS
Northern America
AMERICAS
South America
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
21021102010290028002700260025002msinahceMecruoSyrotirret/yrtnuoC
Year
142
 GLOBAL STUDY on Homicide
%7%7%7%7%5%5%4%5% mraeriFSTCnatshkazaK
%1%3%4%3%2%1%1% mraeriFSTCnatszygryK
%01%01%61%9%41%72%31% mraeriFSTCnatsikijaT
%0%0%0%0%3%3% mraeriFSTCRAS gnoK gnoH ,anihC
38% 43% 17% 19% 36% 26%
Other % 59% 54% 83% 81% 64% 74%
%2%2%5%6%5%2%4% mraeriFSTCailognoM
%53%23%93%03%04
%46%66%75%56%55% rehtO
% mraeriFSTCaeroK fo cilbupeR 2%
%0%0% mraeriFSTCmalassuraD ienurB
%0%0%0%0%0%6%0% mraeriFSTCeropagniS
%7%7%01%21%31%41% mraeriFSTCaidnI
%001%76% mraeriFSTCsevidlaM
%31%21% mraeriFSTClapeN
%11%9%32%11%22%92%02%21% mraeriFSTCainemrA
34% 27% 29% 30% 33% 32% 26%
Other % 53% 53% 43% 48% 57% 45% 65%
%31%7%31%9%9% mraeriFSTCnajiabrezA
%71
%07% rehtO
%0%52% mraeriFSTCniarhaB
%25%33%31%62%33%32%33%05% mraeriFSTCsurpyC
33% 26%
Other % 33% 22%
%31%61%71%41%52%32% mraeriFSTCaigroeG
%93% mraeriFSTCnadroJ
%63%5% mraeriFSTCnonabeL
%27% mraeriFSTCenitselaP fo etatS
%71%51% mraeriFSTCyekruT
%2%3%3%1%1% mraeriFSTCsuraleB
%81%23%22%92%03%13%42%22% mraeriFSTCairagluB
5% 25% 20% 17% 15% 18% 24% 35%
Other % 73% 52% 49% 53% 56% 61% 44% 48%
%01%01%6%51%51%41%21%41% mraeriFSTC/ecilop lanoitaNcilbupeR hcezC
%74%54%14%84%14
%24%94%44%73%44% rehtO
%7%8%11%5%8%8%6%41% mraeriFSTCyragnuH
37% 40% 38% 37% 40% 35% 46% 36%
Other % 49% 54% 54% 55% 55% 54% 46% 57%
ASIA
Southern Asia
ASIA
Western Asia
EUROPE
Eastern Europe
ASIA
Central Asia
ASIA
Eastern Asia
ASIA
South-Eastern Asia
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
21021102010290028002700260025002msinahceMecruoSyrotirret/yrtnuoC
Year
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%4%7%7%7%01%01%01% mraeriFSTCdnaloP
%5%4%2%3%3%3%5%5% mraeriFSTCavodloM fo cilbupeR
%2%3%1%1%1%2%2%2% mraeriFSTCainamoR
%91%41%91%71%91%02%81%11% mraeriFSTCaikavolS
%5%3%3%3%3% mraeriFSTCeniarkU
%43%62%62%11%81%82%12% mraeriFSTCkramneD
%91%41%21%02%32%81%01%52% mraeriFSTCdnalniF
47% 39% 35% 34% 43% 45% 43% 35%
Other % 28% 51% 46% 44% 38% 43% 43% 46%
%0%0%0%0%0%05%0%0% mraeriFSTCdnalecI
%001%33%05
%0%76%05% rehtO
%6%5%8%4%3%01% mraeriFSTCaivtaL
%1%1%3%1%3%3%3% mraeriFSTCainauhtiL
%61% mraeriFSTCnedewS
43%
41%
%7%01%7%6%7%8% mraeriFSTC)selaW dna dnalgnE( modgniK detinU
%93%73%53%04%73%83
%45%45%85%45%65%45% rehtO
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) CTS Firearm % 23% 0% 14% 4% 17% 13% 22%
%53%62%42%33
%34%16%95%36% rehtO
%85%45%35%25%74%34%73STC)dnaltocS( modgniK detinU
Other % 63% 57% 53% 48% 47% 46% 42%
%16%96%76%06%36%65%75% mraeriFSTCainablA
%91%61%61%21%21%41
%02%51%61%82%52%13% rehtO
%0%0%001%0% mraeriFSTCarrodnA
%001%0%0%0
%0%001%0%0% rehtO
%41%64%94%21%55%52%62% mraeriFSTCanivogezreH dna ainsoB
%8%32
%87%03% rehtO
%13%72%54%53%83%74%05%74% mraeriFSTCaitaorC
%73%53%62
%13%93%92% rehtO
%14% mraeriFecilop lanoitaNylatI
%72
%23% rehtO
%24%0%05%0%38%05%0%52% mraeriFSTCatlaM
50% 0% 0% 0% 50% 25% 33% 25%
Other % 25% 0% 50% 17% 50% 25% 67% 33%
%67%74%25%33%76% mraeriFSTCorgenetnoM
Sharp object % 14%
Other % 10%
EUROPE
Northern Europe
Southern Europe
EUROPE
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
% rehtO
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
21021102010290028002700260025002msinahceMecruoSyrotirret/yrtnuoC
Year
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%73%02%53%43%44%92%25%15% mraeriFSTClagutroP
%21%02%82%13%53%52%92%52% mraeriFSTCaibreS
28% 17% 15% 14% 19% 26% 18% 17%
Other % 47% 53% 61% 51% 50% 46% 62% 71%
%92%36%04%51%02%83%52%55% mraeriFSTCainevolS
20% 42% 33% 50% 54% 13% 6% 43%
Other % 25% 33% 29% 30% 31% 47% 31% 29%
%41%41%81%32%61%41%31%21% mraeriFSTCniapS
%93%63%04
%74%05%24% rehtO
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia CTS Firearm % 55% 54% 62% 49% 37% 65% 63%
%7%61%13%32%21%62
%03%91%13%92%62%02% rehtO
%01%9%9%7%11%11%8% mraeriFSTCairtsuA
30% 26% 33% 31% 34% 36% 38%
Other % 62% 63% 57% 62% 56% 55% 53%
%42%42% mraeriFSTCynamreG
%0%0%0%001%0%0%0% mraeriFSTCnietsnethceiL
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Other % 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
%0%0%04%31%92%11% mraeriFSTCgruobmexuL
%05%07%02%31%41
%05%03%04%57%75% rehtO
%0%0% mraeriFSTCocanoM
%43%32%72%52%82%42%13% mraeriFOSNsdnalrehteN
%84%52%74% mraeriFSTCdnalreztiwS
%82%83%42
%42%73%92% rehtO
%71%71%71%31%11%31%51%31% mraeriFOSN/STCailartsuA
36% 38% 43% 43% 41%
Other % 51% 47% 44% 46% 46%
%7%8%61%61%41%31%81%51% mraeriFSTCdnalaeZ weN
%43%14%04%52%72%33
%95%15%44%85%95%45% rehtO
%0%0%0%0% mraeriFSTCsdnalsI nomoloS
%0%0%0%0%52%0%0%0% mraeriFecilop lanoitaNagnoT
OCEANIA
Australia and New Zealand
OCEANIA
Melanesia
OCEANIA
Polynesia
EUROPE
Western Europe
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
Sharp object %
21021102010290028002700260025002msinahceMecruoSyrotirret/yrtnuoC
Year
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Table 8.4: Intentional homicide count and rate per 100,000 population in most populous city,  
by country/territory (2005-2012)   
Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
902191041331711121771691tnuoCSTCiboriaNayneK
Rate 7.0 6.1 4.1 3.9 4.4 4.5 6.1 6.1
troPsuitiruaM  Louis CTS Count 8 5 8 14 11 12 8
Rate 5.4 3.4 5.4 9.4 7.4 8.1 5.4
93352957401tnuoCSTCotupaMeuqibmazoM
Rate 9.7 6.9 8.4 4.8 3.5
South NUabuJnaduS - 231tnuoCOKP
0.21etaR
063954104tnuoCSTCalapmaKadnagU
0.213.514.31etaR
United Republic of Tanzania Dar es Salaam NGO Count 362
Rate 12.8
lanoitaNakasuLaibmaZ  police Count 121 129 162 46 142 121
Rate 8.9 9.0 10.8 2.9 8.6 7.0
Democrac Republic of the Congo Kinshasa UN- 361tnuoCOKP
6.1etaR
Sao Tome and Principe Sao Tome CTS Count 2 2 2 3
Rate 3.6 3.6 3.6 5.3
04135374832212tnuoCSTCsreiglAaireglA
Rate 0.8 0.8 1.4 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.4
1720024739264412tnuoCSTCoriaCtpygE
Rate 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.8 2.4
2563140344tnuoCSTCacnalbasaCoccoroM
Rate 1.2 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.4
362tnuoCSTCmuotrahKnaduS
0.5etaR
63tnuoCSTCenorobaGanawstoB
1.61etaR
141631641tnuoCSTCuresaMohtoseL
Rate 64.1 59.7 61.9
South epaCacirfA  Town Naonal police Count 1,797 2,016 2,018
Rate 55.4 61.0 59.9
lanoitaNarccAanahG  8464tnuoCecilop
3.13.1etaR
NUaivornoMairebiL -PKO Count 46 68 58 50
Rate 4.8 7.0 5.9 4.9
Sierra 2725tnuoCSTCnwoteerFenoeL
Rate 5.8 8.0
011871775068433tnuoCSTCuassaNsamahaB
Rate 13.3 19.3 24.1 22.9 28.5 31.3 44.2
Dominican Republic Santo Domingo CTS Count       
Rate
troPitiaH  au Prince UN-PKO Count 294 162 297 495
Rate 23.8 13.1 24.1 40.1
Northern Africa
AFRICA
Southern Africa
AFRICA
Western Africa
AMERICAS
Caribbean
 Source
Middle Africa
AFRICA
Indicator
AFRICA
Eastern Africa
AFRICA
ytiCy/territoryrtnuoC
661
29.1
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823144236146727565133tnuoCSTCnotsgniKaciamaJ
Rate 50.8 86.7 111.5 98.3 97.0 67.7 50.3
Saint Kis and Nevis Basseterre Naonal police/CTS Count 5 4 8 8 12 6 17
Rate 32.5 25.6 50.6 50.0 73.2 35.5 131.6
Trinidad and Tobago Port of Spain CTS Count 117 99 86 164 127 93 94
Rate 21.4 18.1 15.7 30.0 23.2 17.0 17.2
ezileBezileB  City CTS Count 44 42 41 47 54 70 74
Rate 74.2 68.7 65.1 72.5 81.0 102.1 105.1
Costa naSaciR  José CTS Count 46 65 93 80 68 61 55
Rate 13.6 19.1 27.1 23.1 19.5 21.2 17.7
El naSrodavlaS  Salvador CTS Count                                                                    277 157
Rate                         89.9 52.5
alametauGalametauG  City CTS/Naonal police Count 1,098 1,161 1,239 1,172 1,272 1,253
Rate 111.4 115.7 121.3 112.8 120.3 116.6
571,1640,1508476tnuoCSESaplagicugeTsarudnoH
2.2019.290.375.26etaR
ocixeMocixeM  City CTS Count 698 649 714 713 747 811 779
Rate 7.9 7.3 8.0 8.0 8.4 9.2 8.8
632871261tnuoCSTCauganaMaugaraciN
Rate 11.7 14.1 18.7
amanaPamanaP  City CTS Count 257 247 305 465 610 549 530 492
Rate 15.9 14.9 18.1 27.0 34.6 30.6 60.2 53.1
8797481013016999tnuoCSTCotnoroTadanaC
Rate 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3
United States of America New York City CTS Count 539 596 496 523 471 536 515 419
Rate 6.5 7.1 5.9 6.3 5.6 6.4 6.3 5.1
soneuBanitnegrA  Aires CTS Count 130 116 119 139 150
Rate 4.3 3.8 3.9 4.6 4.9
Bolivia (Plurinaonal State of) La Paz CTS Count 46 44
Rate 5.5 5.2
oaSlizarB  Paolo Secretaria de Count 2,684 1,770 1,648 1,322 1,301 1,263 1,069 1,621
Seguranca Publica Rate 24.7 16.2 15.0 11.9 11.6 11.2 9.4 14.2
ogaitnaSelihC  de Chile CTS Count 253 221 278 224 250 205 239
Rate 4.5 3.9 4.8 3.8 4.2 3.4 3.9
lanoitaNátogoBaibmoloC  Instute Count 1,689 1,336 1,401 1,466 1,649 1,743 1,654 1,281
of Forensic Medicine Rate 24.0 18.6 19.3 19.9 22.1 23.0 21.6 16.5
032092322932772922tnuoCSES/STCotiuQrodaucE
Rate 11.4 13.8 11.9 11.1 14.4 11.4
8475501965586tnuoCSTCnoicnusAyaugaraP
Rate 13.1 10.6 13.3 20.2 11.0 9.2
794365217484005tnuoCSTCamiLureP
Rate 6.2 5.9 8.4 6.5 5.7
yrtsiniM/STCoedivetnoMyaugurU  of Interior Count 90 86 107 112 107 112
Rate 6.8 6.5 8.0 8.4 8.0 8.4
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Caracas NGO Count 1,926 2,218 2,710 2,653 2,550
Rate 88.0 107.0 130.5 127.0 122.0
721041521431071031461371tnuoCSTCytamlAnatshkazaK
Rate 13.6 12.6 9.8 12.6 9.7 8.9 9.7 8.6
1888089839401031tnuoCSTCkekhsiBnatszygryK
Rate 16.5 12.9 11.2 10.5 9.2 9.9 9.0
32429191629283tnuoCSTCebnahsuDnatsikijaT
Rate 6.0 4.5 4.0 2.9 2.9 3.7 3.6
3333tnuoCSTCdabahkhsAnatsinemkruT
Rate 3.6 3.5
Central America
AMERICAS
ASIA
Central Asia
South America
Northern America
AMERICAS
AMERICAS
Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 Source IndicatorytiCy/territoryrtnuoC
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gnoHa, Hong Kong SARnihC  Kong CTS Count 34 35 18 36 47 35 17 27
Rate 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.4
23934538555574tnuoCSTCoykoTnapaJ
Rate 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2
nalUailognoM  Bator CTS Count 157 152 143 111 98 119 140
Rate 16.8 15.6 14.1 10.5 8.9 10.5 11.9
Republic of 38492052122912991tnuoCSTCluoeSaeroK
Rate 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.4 2.8 0.8
Brunei radnaBmalassuraD  Seri CTS Count 0 1
7.00.0etaRnawageB
47685776tnuoCSTCatrakaJaisenodnI
8.09.08.07.0etaR
alauKaisyalaM  Lampur CTS Count 47 70
Rate 3.0 4.4
411tnuoCOSNnognaYramnayM
Rate 2.9
nozeuQsenippilihP  City CTS Count 239 188 151 119 123
Rate 10.3 8.1 6.5 5.1 5.3
1161910272817112tnuoCSTCeropagniSeropagniS
Rate 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2
912522252382723113tnuoCSTCkokgnaBdnaliahT
Rate 4.3 4.4 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.7
Timor- NUiliDetseL - 71tnuoCOKP
3.11etaR
443132tnuoCSTCakahDhsedalgnaB
Rate 3.6 5.3
822712012032932212tnuoCSTCiabmuMaidnI
Rate 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2
68tnuoCSTCelaMsevidlaM
Rate 6.7 5.0
661271tnuoCSTCudnamhtaKlapeN
Rate 19.2 18.5
Sri lanoitaNobmoloCaknaL  police Count 66 55 55 31
Rate 2.6 2.2 2.2 1.2
910271tnuoCSTCnavereYainemrA
7.18.15.1etaR
0776760707tnuoCSTCukaBnajiabrezA
Rate 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.3
tnuoCSTCaisociNsurpyC 3 8 3 3 3 4 2 5
Rate 1.0 2.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.6 2.0
9375650968141tnuoCSTCisilibTaigroeG
Rate 13.1 7.8 8.2 4.9 5.0 3.4
leTlearsI  Aviv CTS Count 24 15 17 18
Rate 6.1 3.8 4.3 4.6
0432tnuoCSTCnammAnadroJ
Rate 1.5 1.8
tiawuKtiawuK  City CTS Count 8 9 12 11 11
Rate 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2
44tnuoCSTCtacsuMnamO
Rate 0.6 0.6
45tnuoCSTCahoDrataQ
Rate 1.3 1.1
State of 71tnuoCSTCnorbeHenitselaP
Rate 3.2
Eastern Asia
ASIA
South-Eastern Asia
ASIA
Southern Asia
ASIA
ASIA
Western Asia
Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 Source IndicatorytiCy/territoryrtnuoC
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Syrian Arab Republic Aleppo CTS Count 155 131
Rate 2.9 2.5
695656248329tnuoCSTClubnatsIyekruT
Rate 7.3 6.7 5.2 4.7
United Arab Emirates Dubai CTS Count 25 20
Rate 1.9 1.5
38183920169tnuoCSTCaanaSnemeY
Rate 5.5 5.5 4.7 3.9 3.8
8465947858tnuoCSTCksniMsuraleB
Rate 4.8 4.9 2.7 3.1 2.6
4202026272427283tnuoCSTCaifoSairagluB
Rate 3.1 2.2 1.9 2.2 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.8
Czech 0161185112tnuoCSTCeugarPcilbupeR
Rate 1.7 1.2 1.5 1.3 0.8
8223236362710313tnuoCSTCtsepaduByragnuH
Rate 1.8 1.8 1.0 1.5 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6
63725352736373tnuoCSTCwasraWdnaloP
Rate 2.2 2.1 2.2 1.5 2.0 1.6 2.1
Republic of Moldova Chishinau CTS Count 57 56 51 36 43 42 35 41
Rate 7.3 7.2 6.5 4.6 5.5 5.3 4.4 5.2
1271220271225272tnuoCSTCtserahcuBainamoR
Rate 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.1
Russian 934384184626926767667tnuoCSTCwocsoMnoitaredeF
Rate 7.1 7.0 5.7 5.6 4.2 4.2 3.8
21418901615111tnuoCSTCavalsitarBaikavolS
Rate 2.6 3.5 3.8 2.3 2.1 1.9 3.2 2.9
1981120199921921tnuoCSTCveiKeniarkU
Rate 4.8 4.8 3.6 3.7 4.2 3.2
416143187931tnuoCtatsoruE/STCnegahnepoCkramneD
Rate 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.7 1.1 0.3 1.3 1.1
2292531204tnuoCtatsoruE/STCnnillaTainotsE
Rate 10.1 5.3 8.8 7.3 5.5
214121761014131tnuoCSTCiknisleHdnalniF
Rate 2.3 2.5 1.8 2.8 1.2 2.0 2.4 2.0
tnuoCSTCkivajkyeRdnalecI 2 0 2 0 1 1 3 1
Rate 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 1.5 0.5
039262133392tnuoCtatsoruEnilbuDdnalerI
Rate 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.0
6281327303926453tnuoCSTCagiRaivtaL
Rate 4.8 6.3 4.0 4.2 5.2 3.3 2.7 4.0
22620385142334tnuoCSTCsuinliVainauhtiL
Rate 7.8 5.8 7.4 10.4 5.4 4.7 4.1
915721899tnuoCSTColsOyawroN
Rate 1.6 1.6 1.4 2.1 1.2 0.9 3.2
United Kingdom (England and Wales) London CTS Count 177 160 161 155 118 133 100
Rate 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.8 1.3
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) Belfast CTS Count 13 11 6 4 7 9 3
Rate 4.9 4.1 2.2 1.5 2.6 3.3 1.1
United Kingdom (Scotland) Glasgow CTS Count 31 32 31 23 20 30 12
Rate 5.4 5.5 5.3 3.9 3.4 5.1 2.0
82335281129142tnuoCSTCanariTainablA
Rate
arrodnAarrodnA  la Vella CTS Count 0 0 1 1 1
Rate 0.0 0.0 2.7 2.5 2.7
Bosnia and Herzegovina Sarajevo CTS Count 9 10 10 10
Rate 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0
Southern Europe
EUROPE
EUROPE
Northern Europe
EUROPE
Eastern Europe
Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 Source IndicatorytiCy/territoryrtnuoC
5.7 4.5 5.0 4.3 6.0 7.9 6.7
19
3.5
15
1.2
21
1.7
18
1.4
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01110155161161tnuoCSTCbergaZaitaorC
Rate 2.1 1.4 0.8 1.9 0.6 1.3 1.4 1.3
68280796863494tnuoCSTCsnehtAeceerG
Rate 1.4 1.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.4
427299282926243tnuoCSTCemoRylatI
Rate 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.3 1.0 0.9
tnuoCSTCattellaVatlaM 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Rate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.9 0.0 0.0
1121tnuoCSTCacirogdoPorgenetnoM 7 7 8 7 7 7
Rate 6.5 5.9 3.7 3.6 4.1 3.5 3.5 3.5
217151tnuoCSTCnobsiLlagutroP 9 4 6 5 13
Rate 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.6
2273324204050584tnuoCSTCedargleBaibreS
Rate 3.0 3.1 3.1 2.5 1.5 1.4 2.2 1.3
tnuoCSTCanajlbujLainevolS 4 1 3 0 1 3 4 2
Rate 1.5 0.4 1.1 0.0 0.4 1.1 1.4 0.7
8212822393437363tnuoCSTCdirdaMniapS
Rate 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.9
The former Yugoslav Republic of                      Skopje CTS Count 15 19 21 13 12 14 11
Rate 2.9 3.6 4.0 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.1
4252719151028122tnuoCSTCanneiVairtsuA
Rate 1.3 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.4
0342133344027323tnuoCSTCslessurBmuigleB
Rate 3.1 3.6 1.9 4.1 3.0 2.8 2.1 2.6
1404145253339243tnuoCSTCsiraPecnarF
Rate 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.1 1.8 1.8 1.8
53731624240506tnuoCSTCnilreBynamreG
Rate 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.1 1.0
tnuoCSTCzudaVnietsnethceiL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
tnuoCSTC/tatsoruEgruobmexuLgruobmexuL 1 4 3 3 5 0 3
Rate 1.1 4.2 3.2 3.2 5.3 0.0 3.2
etnoMocanoM  Carlo CTS Count 1 1 0 0
Rate 2.8 2.8 0.0 0.0
21014211727142tnuoCtatsoruEmadretsmAsdnalrehteN
Rate 3.2 2.3 3.6 1.5 3.2 1.3 1.5
1114tnuoCSTChcirüZdnalreztiwS
3.00.31.1etaR
942615tnuoCOSNyendySailartsuA
Rate 1.2 1.4 1.1
New 0141715102113291tnuoCSTCdnalkcuAdnalaeZ
Rate 1.4 1.7 0.8 1.4 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.7
Solomon arainoHsdnalsI  City CTS Count 3 12 19 11
Rate 5.2 20.8 33.0 19.1
lanoitaNafola'ukuNTonga  police Count 4 8 1 3 4 1 2 1
Rate 17.0 33.8 4.2 12.5 16.5 4.1 8.1 4.0
Melanesia
OCEANIA
Polynesia
EUROPE
Western Europe
OCEANIA
Australia and New Zealand
OCEANIA
Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 Source IndicatorytiCy/territoryrtnuoC
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Fig. 8.1: Homicide rates: Most populous city rate versus national rate, Africa (2012 or latest year) 
Fig. 8.2: Homicide rates: Most populous city rate versus national rate, Americas (2012 or latest year)
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Fig. 8.3: Homicide rates: Most populous city rate versus national rate, Asia (2012 or latest year) 
Fig. 8.4: Homicide rates: Most populous city rate versus national rate, Europe (2012 or latest year)

9. REFERENCES
153
Executive summary
Alvazzi del Frate, A. (2012). Small Arms Survey. 
Moving Targets, Chapter 3: A matter of survival – 
Non-lethal firearms violence. Cambridge University 
Press.
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 
(IHME) (2010). Global Health Data Exchange 
(GDHx). Available: http://www.healthmetricsand-
evaluation.org. 
Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan (2013). 
Crime statistics by type. (Last accessed: 23 Decem-
ber 2013) Available: http://cso.gov.af/content/
files/education%20syb.pdf.
Ministry of Interior, South Sudan (2012). Quar-
terly Crime Statistics Report for December 2011-Feb-
ruary 2012, and Quarterly Crime Statistics Report 
for March-May 2012.
Sierra Leone Police (2011). Annual Crime Statistics 
Report 2011. Freetown.
UNDPKO-MINUSTAH (2013). Haiti’s Crime 
Situation. 9 July 2013.
UNDPKO-UNMIL (2013). UNPOL Crime Ser-
vices Department, Crime Analysis and Records 
Team. Annual Major Crime Statistics. 
UNDPKO-UNMISS (2013). (Data request by 
UNODC).
United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and 
Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-
CTS). (Last accessed: 23 December 2013). Avail-
ab l e :  h t tp : / /www.unodc .org /unodc/en/
data-and-analysis/statistics/crime.html.
UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). Available: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analy-
sis/homicide.html.
World Health Organization, Mortality Database. 
(Last accessed 22 January 2014) Available: www.
who.int/healthinfo/mortality_data/en.
Chapter 1: The big picture
Dai, M. (2013). “Homicide in Asia”, in Liu, J. et 
al. (eds). Handbook of Asian Criminology. Springer 
Science+ Business Media: New York. 
Government of El Salvador (2013). Presentation by 
Minister of Justice and Public Security David Mun-
guia Payes. OAS Regular Meeting of the Perma-
nent Council. 10 April 2013.
High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-
2015 Development Agenda (2013). A new global 
partnership: Eradicate poverty and transform econo-
mies through sustainable development.
Johnson, D.T. 2006. “The Vanishing Killer: 
Japan’s post-war homicide decline”. Social Science 
Japan Journal 9:73-90.
Kaylen, M.T. (2012). “Rural homicide in Europe: 
A review of the literature”, in Liem, M.C. and 
W.A. Pridemore (eds). Handbook of European 
Homicide Research: Patterns, Explanations and 
Country Studies. Springer: London.
Ministry of Justice, Brazil (2012). Anuário 
Brasileiro de Segurança Pública. 
Ministry of Justice, Research and Training Insti-
tute, Japan (2011). White Paper on Crime 2010.
Muggah, R. and G. Milante (2013). “More vio-
lence, less development”. Global Observatory, 22 
April 2013. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013)
Available: http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/
analysis/484-less-violence-more-development.
html.
Mutebi, A.M. (2004). “Thailand in 2003: Riding 
high again”. Asian Survey 44(1): 78-86.
Nowak, M. (2012). Small Arms Survey, Research 
Note 23. Urban armed violence.
154
 GLOBAL STUDY on Homicide
Park, W.K. (2006). Trends in crime rates in postwar 
Japan: a structural perspective.
Saferworld (2013). Addressing conflict and violence 
from 2015: A vision of goals, targets and indicators. 
February 2013. (Last accessed 22 January 2014) 
Available: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/down-
loads/Post-2015-4th-goals,targets-and-indicators-
FINAL.pdf. 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) (2013). Afghanistan Annual Report: 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Kabul, 
February 2014. (Last accessed 5 March 2014) 
Available: http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/
UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC-
report_2013-Full-report-ENG.pdf. 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq 
(UNAMI) (2013). Human Rights Division (2013) 
(Last accessed 25 November 2013) Available: 
http://unami.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid= 
5397&language=en-US. 
United Nations General Assembly (2012). Resolu-
tion A/RES/66/288, The Future We Want. (Rio 20+ 
Declaration).
United Nations General Assembly (2013). The 
rule of law, crime prevention and criminal justice in 
the United Nations development agenda beyond 
2015. E/RES/68/188.
UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). Available: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analy-
sis/homicide.html.
UNODC (2011). Global Study on Homicide.
UNODC (2013a). Accounting for security and jus-
tice in the post-2015 development agenda.
UNODC (2013b). World Drug Report. 
World Bank (2011). World Development Report.
World Health Organization (WHO) Mortality 
Database. (Last accessed 22 January 2014) Availa-
ble: www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality_data/en. 
Chapter 2: The many faces of homicide
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (2013). 
Análisis de los homicidios en seis países de América 
Latina. (Last accessed : 23 December 2013) Avail-
able: http://brik.iadb.org/handle/iadb/81538. 
European Homicide Monitor (2003-2006). (Last 
accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: http://
law.leiden.edu/organisation/criminology/research/
homicide/europeanhomicidemonitor.html.
Jamaica Constabulary Force (2008-2011). (Data 
request by UNODC).
National Crime Records Bureau, India (2001-
2012). Crime in India. 
Sección de Estadística, Departamento de Planifi-
cación, Costa Rica (2013). Homicidios 2006-2012.
United Nations (2000). Convention against Trans-
national Organized Crime. 
2.1: Homicide related to other criminal 
activities
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (2013). 
Análisis de Los homicidios en seis países de América 
Latina. (Last accessed : 23 December 2013) Avail-
able: http://brik.iadb.org/handle/iadb/81538.
Getulio Vargas Foundation. “UPP! I want one 
too!” UPP Reporter, 23 February 2010, in United 
Nations Human Rights Council. 2010. Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston: Follow-up to 
country recommendations – Brazil. A/HRC/14/24/
Add.4.
Government of El Salvador (2013). Presentation by 
Minister of Justice and Public Security David Mun-
guia Payes. OAS Regular Meeting of the Perma-
nent Council. 10 April 2013.
Government of Italy (1930). Italian Criminal 
Code, Article 416: Association to commit crimes.
Instituto de Seguranca Publica, Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil (2013). (Last accessed 23 December 2013) 
Available: http://www.isp.rj.gov.br/#.
Instituto Universitario de Democracia, Paz y 
Seguridad (2013). Observatorio de la Violencia. 
Mortalidad y otros. Boletin Enero-Junio 2013. 
(Last accessed 23 December 2013) Available: http: 
//iudpas.org/pdf/Boletines/Nacional/NEd30Ene-
Jun2013.pdf.
Instituto Universitario de Opinion Publica (2013). 
Universdidad Centroamericana Jose Simeon 
Canas. Boletin de prensa Ano XXVII, No. 1. Tabla 
29. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: 
http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/iudop/archivos/
boletin1_2013.pdf.
ISTAT, Italy (2012). Dataset: Crimes reported by 
the police forces to the judicial authority.
Massari, M. (2013). Small Arms Survey. Everyday 
Dangers, Chapter 4: Guns in the Family – Mafia 
violence in Italy. Cambridge University Press.
Ministry of Interior, Transcrime, Italy (2013). 
Project NOP Security 2007-2013: Mafias Invest-
ments. Report line 1.
National Police of El Salvador (2013). (Data 
request by UNODC).
United Nations (2000). Convention against Trans-
national Organized Crime. 
United Nations Human Rights Council (2010). 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
155
REFERENCES
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston: 
Follow-up to country recommendations – Brazil. A/
HRC/14/24/Add.4.
United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Oper-
ations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-CTS). 
(Last accessed: 23 December 2013). Available: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analy-
sis/statistics/crime.html.
UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). Available: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analy-
sis/homicide.html.
UNODC (2011). Global Study on Homicide.
2.2: Interpersonal homicide
Abrahams, N. et al. (2012). Every eight hours: Inti-
mate femicide in South Africa 10 years later! South 
African Medical Research Council Research Brief, 
August 2012.
Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States (2013). 
(UNODC data request, based on Federal Bureau 
of Investigation Supplementary Homicide Reports, 
2001-2010).
Cabinet Office, Japan (2004). FY2003 Annual 
Report on the State of Formation of a Gender-Equal 
Society and Policies to be Implemented in Fy2004 to 
Promote the Formation of a Gender-Equal Society. 
(Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: 
http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/about_
danjo/whitepaper/pdf/ewp2004.pdf.
Cabinet Office, Japan (2009). White Paper on 
Gender Equality 2009. (Last accessed: 23 Decem-
ber 2013) Available: http://www.gender.go.jp/eng-
lish_contents/about_danjo/whitepaper/pdf/
ewp2009.pdf.
Campbell, J.C. et al. (2003). “Risk factors for 
femicide in abusive relationships: Results from a 
multisite case control study”. American Journal of 
Public Health 93(7): 1089-1097.
Campbell, J.C. (2007). “Intimate partner homi-
cide review and implications of research and 
policy”. Trauma, Violence and Abuse 8(3): 246-
269. 
Crown Prosecution Service (2007). Forced mar-
riage and honour crimes pilot study in the UK. 
United Kingdom: London Metropolitan Police.
Crown Prosecution Service (2007). “Honour-
based violence action plan and MPS strategy”, in 
Gill, A. Honour killings and the quest for justice in 
black and minority ethnic communities in the UK. 
12 June 2009. United Nations Division for the 
Advancement of Women. EGM/GPLHP/2009/
EP.03. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Availa-
ble: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/
vaw_legislation_2009/Expert%20Paper%20
EGMGPLHP%20_Aisha%20Gill%20revised_.
pdf.
Duwe, G. (2004). “The patterns and prevalence of 
mass murder in twentieth-century America”. Jus-
tice Quarterly 21: 729-762.
Eisner, M. and L. Ghuneim (2013). “Honour kill-
ing attitudes amongst adolescents in Amman, 
Jordan”. Aggressive Behaviour 39(5): 405-417.
European Homicide Monitor. (Last accessed: 23 
December 2013) Available: http://law.leiden.edu/
organisation/criminology/research/homicide/
europeanhomicidemonitor.html.
Fulu, E. et al. (2013). Why do some men use violence 
against women and how can we prevent it? Quanti-
tative findings from the United Nations multi-coun-
try study on men and violence in Asia and the Pacific. 
Bangkok, Thailand: UNDP, UNFPA, UN Women 
and UNV.
Government of Mexico (2007). General Law on 
Women’s Access to a Life Free of Violence. (Last 
accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: http://
www.summit-americas.org/brief/docs/Law_on_
access_to_a_life_free_violence.pdf.
Government of the United Kingdom (2012). 
Home Office Homicide Index.
Hanson, B. (2013). Preventing and reducing domes-
tic violence homicides. United States Department of 
Justice, Office on Violence against Women. (Last 
accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: http://
blogs.justice.gov/ovw/archives/2326.
Jansen, H.A.F.M. (2012). Prevalence surveys on 
violence against women: Challenges around indica-
tors, data collection and use. UNWOMEN. Bang-
kok, Thailand: ESCAP, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, 
WHO. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Avail-
able: http://www.unwomen.org/~/media/Head-
quarters/Attachments/Sections/CSW/57/EGM/
EGM-paper-Henriette-Jansen%20pdf.pdf.
Jeanne Geiger Crisis Center. Domestic violence high 
risk team network. (Last accessed: 23 December 
2013) Available: http://www.safestudio.org/
dvhrtn_model.html.
Kivivuori, J. and M. Lehti (2012). “Social corre-
lates of intimate partner homicide in Finland: dis-
tinct or shared with other homicide types?” 
Homicide Studies 16:60.
Maryland Network Against Domestic Violence. 
Lethality Assessment Program – Maryland Model. 
(Last accessed 23 December 2013) Available: 
http://mnadv.org/lethality/what-is-lap/.
National Crime Records Bureau, India. (2012). 
Crime in India. 
National Research Institute of Legal Policy, Finn-
ish Homicide Monitoring System (2011). Homi-
156
 GLOBAL STUDY on Homicide
cide in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden: A first 
study on the European Homicide Monitor Data. 
Oberwittler, D. and Kasselt, J. (2011). Honour 
Killings in Germany: A study based on prosecution 
files. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: 
http://hbv-awareness.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2011/11/HonourKillingsGermany_ExecSum-
mary.pdf.
United Nations (1996). The Beijing Declaration 
and the Platform for Action, Fourth World Confer-
ence on Women. Beijing, China, 4-15 September 
1995. New York. 
UNDP and UNFPA (2007). The dynamics of 
honor killings in Turkey: Prospects for Action. (Last 
accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: http://
www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/docu-
ments/publications/2007/honourkillings.pdf.
UNECE Statistical Division Database. (Last 
accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: http://
w3.unece.org/pxweb/.
United Nations General Assembly (1994). Decla-
ration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. 
A/RES/48/104.
United Nations General Assembly (2002). Report 
of the Secretary-General: Working towards the elimi-
nation of crimes against women committed in the 
name of honour. A/57/169.
United Nations General Assembly (2012). Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, 
Its Causes and Consequences, Rashida Manjoo. A/
HRC/20/16.
UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). Available: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analy-
sis/homicide.html.
UN OHCHR (2010). High Commissioner speaks 
out against domestic violence and “honour killing” on 
occasion of International Women’s Day. 8 March 
2010. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Avail-
able: http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=9869&LangID=E.
UNWOMEN (2011). Violence against women 
prevalence data: surveys by country. March 2011. 
(Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: 
http://www.endvawnow.org/uploads/browser/
files/vaw_prevalence_matrix_15april_2011.pdf.
Weizman-Henelius, G. (2012). “Gender-specific 
risk factors for intimate partner homicide: A 
nationwide register-based study”. Journal of Inter-
personal Violence 27(8): 1519-1539.
2.3: Socio-political homicide
Aid Worker Security Database. See: https://aid-
workersecurity.org.
Bleich, E. (2007). “Hate crime policy in Western 
Europe: Responding to racist violence in Britain, 
Germany and France”. American Behavioural Sci-
entist 51: 149-165.
Committee to Protect Journalists. See: www.cpj.
org.
European Court of Human Rights (2013). 
Factsheet - Right to life. 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
(2012). Making hate crime visible in the European 
Union: Acknowledging victims’ rights. (Last accessed: 
23 December 2013) Available: http://fra.europa.
eu/sites/default/files/fra-2012_hate-crime.pdf.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of 
Gonzalez et al. (“Cotton Field” v. Mexico, Judge-
ment of 16 November 2009.) (Last accessed: 23 
December 2013) Available: http://www.corteidh.
or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_205_ing.pdf.
Interpol (1999). Code of Conduct for Law Enforce-
ment Officials.
Mouzos, J. and S. Thompson (2000). “Gay-hate 
related homicides: An overview of major findings 
in New South Wales”. Australian Institute of 
Criminology: Trends and Issues in crime and crim-
inal justice. No. 155. (Last accessed: 23 December 
2013) Available:  http://www.aic.gov.au/
documents/4/D/3/%7B4D3405AD-0BD1-4140-
A1DD-2544B9050875%7Dti155.pdf.
Ovey, C. and R. White (2002). European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, Third Edition. London: 
Biddles Ltd.
Ugandan Police Force (2011). Annual Crime 
Report of 2011. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) 
Available: http://www.upf.go.ug/attachments/arti-
cle/5/Annual_Crime_Report_2011a.pdf.
UNDP (2006). Doing justice: how informal justice 
systems can contribute. 
UNESCO. UN Plan of action on the safety of jour-
nalists and the issue of impunity. International Pro-
gramme for the Development of Communication. 
CI-12/CONF.202/6. 
UNESCO. Facts and Figures of Killed Journalists 
from 2006-2012.
UNESCO (2012). Director General Report on the 
Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity.
UNESCO (2013). UNESCO condemns the killing 
of journalists. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) 
See: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communica-
tion-and-information/freedom-of-expression/
press-freedom/unesco-condemns-killing-of-jour-
nalists/.
United Nations (1990). Basic principles on the use 
157
REFERENCES
of force and firearms by law enforcement officials. 8th 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1.
United Nations (2009). Report of the Secretary-
General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict. S/2012/376. 29 May 2009.
United Nations (2012). Second Inter-Agency Meet-
ing on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impu-
nity. 22-23 November 2012, United Nations 
Office in Vienna.
United Nations General Assembly (1979). Code 
of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. E/
RES/34/169. 17 December 1979.
United Nations General Assembly (2012). Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, 
Its Causes and Consequences, Rashida Manjoo. A/
HRC/20/16.
United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights 
Council. Reports of the Special Rapporteur on extra-
judicial, summary or arbitrary executions. A/
HRC/21/49; A/HRC/22/67; A/HRC/23/51.
United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights 
Council (2009). Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. 
A/64/187.
United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights 
Council (2010). Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
Philip Alston: Study on police oversight mechanisms. 
A/HRC/14/24/Add.8.
United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights 
Council (2011). Resolution 17/5: Mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions. A/HRC/RES/17/5.
United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights 
Council (2012). Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
Christof Heyns. A/HRC/20/22. 
United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights 
Council (2013). Report of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: The 
safety of journalists. A/HRC/24/23. 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) (2011). To stay 
and deliver: Good practices for humanitarians in 
complex security environments.
United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and 
Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-
CTS) (2011). (Last accessed: 23 December 2013). 
Available: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-
and-analysis/statistics/crime.html.
UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). Available: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analy-
sis/homicide.html.
Wesley, T. (2012). “Classifying ‘Corrective’ Rape 
as Hate Crime: A call for justice”. BUWA! A Jour-
nal on African Women’s Experiences. (Last accessed: 
23 December 2013) Available: http://www.osisa.
org/sites/default/files/75-81.pdf.
Chapter 3: Homicide mechanisms and 
enablers
Alvazzi del Frate, A. (2012). Small Arms Survey. 
Moving Targets, Chapter 3: A matter of survival – 
Non-lethal firearms violence. Cambridge University 
Press.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012a). “Weapon 
use in homicide 1995-2011”. (Last accessed: 23 
December 2013) Available: http://www.aic.gov.
au/dataTools/facts/weaponUseTrend.html.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012b). “Recorded 
crime: Victims”.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013). “Victims, 
Selected offences by weapon used in commission 
of offence”. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) 
Available: http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.
nsf/Lookup/4736EB6458EAD0F6CA257B8800
1297F0?opendocument.
Australian Institute of Criminology (2009). “The 
carriage and use of knives by young people”. Crime 
Reduction Matters no. 75. Canberra. (Last 
accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: http://
www.aic.gov.au/publications/current_series/
crm/61-80/crm075.aspx.
Australian Institute of Criminology (2013). Homi-
cide in Australia 2008-10. National Homicide 
Monitoring Program annual report.
Bannister, J. et al. (2010). “Troublesome youth 
groups, gangs and knife carrying in Scotland”. 
Edinburgh: Scottish Government Social Research. 
(Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/resource/doc/3241 
91/0104329.pdf.
Bartels, L. (2011a). “Knife crime: recent data on 
carriage and use”. Trends and Issues in Crime and 
Criminal Justice, Australian Institute of Crimino-
logy.
Bartels, L. (2011b). “Knife crime: incidence, aeti-
ology and responses”. Technical and background 
paper no. 45. Canberra: Australian Institute of 
Criminology.
Biderman, C., J.M.P. de Mello and A.A. Schneider 
(2006). “Dry law and homicides: evidence from 
the Sao Paulo Metropolitan area”. The Economic 
Journal 120(543): 157-182.
Brown, J. and J. Sutton (2007). “Protection or 
attack? Young people carrying knifes and danger-
ous implements”. Australian Journal of Guidance 
and Counselling 17: 49-59.
158
 GLOBAL STUDY on Homicide
Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States of Amer-
ica (2013). National Crime Victimisation Survey 
(NCVS) 1993-2012.
Bye, E. K. (2008). “Alcohol and Homicide in East-
ern Europe: A time series analysis of six countries”. 
Homicide Studies 12(1): 7-27.
Bye, E.K. (2012). “Alcohol and Homicide in 
Europe”, in Liem, M. C.A. and W. A. Pridemore, 
(eds). Handbook of European Homicide Research: 
Patterns, explanations and country studies. Springer: 
London.
Castillo, J.C., Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013). 
“Illegal drug markets and violence in Mexico: The 
causes beyond Calderon”. Universidad de los 
Andes.
Center for the Study of Violence and Reconcilia-
tion (CSVR), South Africa (2010). “Streets of 
pain, streets of sorrow: The circumstances of the 
occurrence of murder in six areas with high rates 
of murder”, in Tackling Armed Violence: Key find-
ings and recommendations of the study on the violent 
nature of crime in South Africa. (Last accessed: 23 
December 2013) Available: http://www.csvr.org.
za/docs/study/6.TAV_final_report_13_03_10.
pdf.
Concha-Eastman, A. et al. (2002). “La epidemio-
logia de los homicidios en Cali, 1993-1998: seis 
años de un modelo poblacional”. Pan American 
Journal of Public Health 12: 230-239.
Duailibi, S. et al. (2007). “The effect of restricting 
opening hours on alcohol-related violence”. Amer-
ican Journal of Public Health 97(12).
European Crime and Safety Survey (EU ICS). 
(Last accessed : 23 January 2014) Available: http://
www.europeansafetyobservatory.eu/.
European Homicide Monitor. (Last accessed: 23 
December 2013) Available: http://law.leiden.edu/
organisation/criminology/research/homicide/
europeanhomicidemonitor.html.
Fryer, R.G. et al. (2013). “Measuring crack cocaine 
and its impact”. Economic Inquiry 51: 1651-1681.
Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2011). Global 
Burden of Armed Violence – Chapter 4. 
Goldstein, P.J. (1985). “The drugs/violence nexus: 
A tripartite conceptual framework”. Journal of 
Drug Issues 39: 143-174.
Government of the United Kingdom (2006). Vio-
lent Crime Reduction Act. (Last accessed: 23 
December 2013) Available: http://www.legisla-
tion.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/38/part/2/crossheading/
knives-etc.
Government of the United Kingdom (2012). 
Home Office Statistical Bulletin 02/12. (Last 
accessed: 23 January 2014) Available: www.parlia-
ment.uk/briefing-papers/sn04304.pdf.
Scottish Government (2011). Thematic report on 
knife crime. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) 
Available: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publica-
tions/2011/07/05130225/3.
Scottish Government (2013). Statistical Bulletin: 
Crime and Justice Series – Homicide in Scotland 
2012-13. 1 October 2013. (Last accessed: 23 
December 2013) Available: http://www.scotland.
gov.uk/Resource/0043/00435280.pdf.
Hemenway, D., T. Shinoda-Tagawa, and M. Miller 
(2002). “Firearm availability and female homicide 
victimization rates among 25 populous high-
income countries”. Journal of the American Medical 
Women’s Association 57: 100-104.
Home Office, Office for National Statistics, 
United Kingdom (2013). “Focus on: Violent 
crime and sexual offences, 2011-12”.
Homicide in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden: 
A first study on the European Homicide Monitor 
data (2011). (Last accessed : 23 December 2013) 
Available: http://www.bra.se/download/18.656e3
8431321e8524d80007748/1330943480501/201
1_15_homicide_finland_netherlands_sweden.
pdf.
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation. 
(IHME) (2010). Global Health Data Exchange 
(GDHx). Available: http://www.healthmetricsand-
evaluation.org.
International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS). 
Available: http://www.unicri.it/services/library_
documentation/publications/icvs/data/.
Killias, M., J. van Kesteren, and M. Rindlisbacher 
(2001). “Guns, violent crime and suicide in 21 
countries”. Canadian Journal of Criminology 43: 
429-448.
Kivivuori, J. and M. Lehti (2012). “Social corre-
lates of intimate partner homicide in Finland: 
Distinct or shared with other homicide types?” 
Homicide Studies 16(1): 60-70.
Lauritsen J.L. and M.L. Rezey (2013). Measuring 
the Prevalence of Crime with the National Crime 
Victimisation Survey. United States Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics. September 2013.
Lehti, M. and J. Kivivuori, J. (2005). “Alcohol-
related violence as an explanation for the differ-
ence between homicide rates in Finland and the 
other Nordic countries”. Nordisk alcohol- and 
narko-tikatidskrift, 22.
McVie, S. (2010). “Gang membership and knife 
carrying: Findings from the Edinburgh study of 
youth transitions and crime”. Edinburgh: Scottish 
159
REFERENCES
Government Social Research. (Last accessed: 23 
December 2013) Available: http://www.scotland.
gov/uk/resource/doc/324153/0104312.pdf.
Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013a). “Do illegal 
drug markets breed violence? Evidence for Colom-
bia”. MIMEO, Universidad de los Andes.
Mejia, D. and P. Restrepo (2013b). “Bushes and 
bullets: Illegal cocaine markets and violence in 
Colombia”. Universidad de los Andes. 
Mohanty, S. et al. (2013). “Homicide in southern 
India: A five-year retrospective study”. Forensic 
Medicine and Anatomy Research 1(2): 18-24.
Office of National Drug Control Policy, United 
States (2013). Improving the measurement of drug-
related crime. Washington, DC: Executive Office 
of the President. (Last accessed: 23 December 
2013) Available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/drug_
crime_report_final.pdf.
Organization of American States (2013). The drug 
problem in the Americas. 
Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation. 
(2004). Prevention of murders in Diadema, Brazil: 
the influence of new alcohol policies.
Phillips, A. and V. Chamberlain (2006). “MORI 
Five-Year Report: An analysis of youth survey 
data”. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Availa-
ble: http://www.yjb.gov.uk/publications/scripts/
prodview.asp?idproduct=288&eP=.
Planty M. and J. Truman (2013). Firearm Violence, 
1993–2011. United States Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics. May 2013.
Rehm, J., et al. (2004). “Alcohol,” in M. Ezzati 
et al. (eds.), Comparative quantification of health 
risks: Global and regional burden of disease attribut-
able to selected major risk factors. World Health 
Organization.
Rossow, I. (2000). Alcohol and homicide: a cross-
cultural comparison of the relationship in 14 Euro-
pean countries. National Institute for Alcohol and 
Drug Research, Oslo, Norway.
Rossow, I. and T. Norstrom (2011). “The impact 
of small changes in bar closing hours on violence-
The Norwegian experience from 18 cities”. Addic-
tion 107: 530-537.
Sanchez, A. I. et al. (2011). “Policies for alcohol 
restriction and their association with interpersonal 
violence: a time-series analysis of homicides in 
Cali, Colombia”. International Journal of Epidemi-
ology 2011: 1-10.
Shaw, M. (2013). Small Arms Survey. Everyday 
Dangers, Chapter 2: Too close to home- guns and 
intimate partner violence. Cambridge University 
Press.
Truman J., Langton L. and M. Planty. (2013). 
Criminal Victimisation 2012. United States Bureau 
of Justice Statistics. October 2013. 
United Nations General Assembly (2001). Resolu-
tion 55/255, Annex (Protocol against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their 
Parts and Components and Ammunition, supple-
menting the UN Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime), 31 May 2001. (Last accessed: 
15 January 2014) Available: http://www.unodc.
org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/
TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf.
United Nations General Assembly (2013). Final 
United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty. 
A/CONF.217/2013/L.3.
UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). Available: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analy-
sis/homicide.html.
UNODC (2011). Global Study on Homicide.
UNODC (2013). World Drug Report. 
Ward, L, Nicholas S. and M. Willoughby (2011). 
“An assessment of the Tackling Knives and Serious 
Youth Violence Action Programme (TKAP) – 
Phase II”. United Kingdom Home Office. (Last 
accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/116544/horr53-
report.pdf.
World Health Organization (WHO). Interna-
tional Statistical Classification of Disease and Related 
Health Problems, 10th Revision (ICD-10) - Chapter 
XX: External causes of morbidity and mortality 
(V01-Y98 – Assault (X85-Y09).
World Health Organization (WHO) (2006). 
Interpersonal violence and alcohol. (Last accessed: 
23 December 2013) Available: http://www.who.
int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_
report/factsheets/pb_violencealcohol.pdf.
World Health Organization (WHO) (2009). 
Interpersonal violence and illicit drug use. (Last 
accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: http://
www.who.int/violenceprevention/interpersonal_
violence_and_illicit_drug_use.pdf.
Chapter 4: Homicide, violence and 
conﬂict
African Human Security Initiative (2009). Sierra 
Leone: A country review of crime and criminal jus-
tice, 2008. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) 
Available: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/M160 
FULL.PDF.
Asia Foundation (2012). Afghanistan in 2012: A 
survey of the Afghan People - Chapter 3. (Last 
accessed: 23 January 2014) Available: http://asia-
160
 GLOBAL STUDY on Homicide
foundation.org/country/afghanistan/2012-poll.
php. 
Chikwanha, A.B. (2008). A survey of crime victims 
in Sierra Leone, May to June 2008. African Human 
Security Initiative. (Last accessed: 23 December 
2013) Available: http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/
jspui/bitstream/123456789/31078/1/SIERRALE-
ONECRIMESURVEYMAY08.pdf?1.
Collier, P. (2004). Development and Conflict. 
Centre for the Study of African Economics, 
Oxford University. (Last accessed: 23 December 
2013) Available: http://www.un.org/esa/docu-
ments/Development.and.Conflict2.pdf.
Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organi-
zation (EAPCOO) (2008). Protocol on the Preven-
tion, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling 
in Eastern Africa.
g7+. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013). Availa-
ble: http://www.g7plus.org. 
g7+ (2013a). South Sudan Fragility Assessment. 
(Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: 
http://www.g7plus.org/storage/South%20
Sudan%20Fragility%20Assessment%20Report.
pdf.
g7+ (2013b). Republic of Sierra Leone: Fragility 
Assessment. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) 
Available: http://www.g7plus.org/storage/Fragility-
Assessment-SierraLeone-bleed-print-180313.pdf.
Geneva Conventions. Available: http://www.icrc.
org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-0173.
pdf. 
Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2011). Global 
Burden of Armed Violence, Lethal Encounters. Chap-
ter 1: A unified approach to armed violence.
Hoeffler, A., Billerbeck S. and S.S. Ijaz (2010). 
“Post-conflict Recovery and Peace building”. 
Background paper for World Development Report 
2011, World Bank. (Last accessed: 23 December 
2013 (Available: http://documents.worldbank.
org/curated/en/2010/10/14288472/post-conflict-
recovery-peace-building.
Iraq Body Count. (Last accessed: 15 November 
2013). Available: http://www.iraqbodycount.org.
Kobler, M. (2013). Briefing of the Special Represen-
tative of the Secretary-General for Iraq Martin Kobler 
to UN Security Council. 16 July 2013. (Last 
accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: http://
unami.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket= 
s-pv-l_IaW8%3D&tabid=2792&mid=5079&lan
guage=en-US.
Mbugua, J.K. (2012). Security and organized crime: 
dynamics and challenges in South Sudan. Interna-
tional Peace Support Training Centre.
Ministry of Interior Affairs, Afghanistan (2013). 
Crime statistics by type. (Last accessed: 23 Decem-
ber 2013) Available: http://cso.gov.af/content/
files/education%20syb.pdf.
Ministry of Interior, South Sudan (2012a). Quar-
terly Crime Statistics Report for December 2011-Feb-
ruary 2012.
Ministry of Interior, South Sudan (2012b). Quar-
terly Crime Statistics Report for March-May 2012.
National Bureau of Statistics, South Sudan (2012). 
National Baseline Household Survey 2009 Report. 
(Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: 
http://ssnbs.org/storage/NBHS%20Final%20
website.pdf.
Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention, 
Somalia (2010). (Last accessed: 23 December 
2013) Available: http://www.ocvp.org. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (2012). Fragile States 
2013: Resource Flows and trends in a shifting world. 
(Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/FragileStates2013.
pdf.
Saban Centre for Middle East Policy at the Brook-
ings Institution. (Last accessed: 20 December 
2013) See Iraq Index: http://www.brookings.edu/ 
~/media/centers/saban/iraq%20index/index 
20130726.pdf.
Sierra Leone Police (2011). Annual Crime Statistics 
Report 2011. Freetown. 
Small Arms Survey (2012). Reaching for the gun: 
Arms flows and holdings in South Sudan. Human 
Security Baseline Assessment.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic 
of Liberia (2009). Volume 1: Preliminary Findings 
and Recommendations.
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) (2013). Afghanistan Annual Report: 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Kabul, 
February 2014. (Last accessed 5 March 2014) 
Available: http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/
UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC-
report_2013-Full-report-ENG.pdf.
United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq 
(UNAMI) (2013). Human Rights Division. (Last 
accessed: 15 November 2013). Available: http://
unami.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=5397 
&language=en-US.
UNDP. Arms for Development programme, Sierra 
Leone. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Avail-
able: http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/
thematic/conflict/SierraLeone.pdf.
UNDP. Human Development Indicators: Liberia. 
161
REFERENCES
(Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/
LBR.html.
UNDP (2005). Programming for justice – access for 
all: a practitioner’s guide to a human-rights based 
approach to access to justice. Bangkok, Thailand.
UNDP (2006). Case Study: Sierra Leone, Evalua-
tion of UNDP assistance to conflict-affected countries.
UNDP (2010). Capacity development in post-con-
flict countries. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) 
Available: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/
aplaws/publication/en/publications/capacity-
development/capacity-development-in-post-con-
flict-countries/CD%20in%20post%20conflict 
%20countries.pdf.
UNDPKO. MINUSTAH background. (Last 
accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: http://
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/
background.shtml.
UNDPKO-MINUSTAH (2013). Haiti’s Crime 
Situation. 9 July 2013.
UNDPKO-UNMIL (2013). Annual Major Crime 
Statistics. UNPOL Crime Services Department, 
Crime Analysis and Records Team. 
UNDPKO-UNMISS, Joint Mission Analysis 
Centre (JMAC) (2013). (Data request by 
UNODC).
UNDPKO-UNMISS, Radio Miraya (2013). 
Grappling with unemployment in South Sudan. 
(Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: 
http://www.radiomiraya.org/reports2/7062-grap-
pling-with-unemployment-in-south-sudan.
html#gsc.tab=0.
United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) (2012). Report of the National Institute 
of Statistics and Geography of Mexico and the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime on a road map 
to improve the quality and availability of crime sta-
tistics at the national and international levels. E/
RES/2012/18.
UNEP (2009). Conflict and the Environment: 
Sudan. Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment. 
Geneva.
UN News Centre (2013). Iraq: UN envoy voices 
outrage as car bombings claim dozens of lives during 
Eid ul-Fitr. 11 August 2013. (Last accessed: 20 
December 2013) Available: https://www.un.org/
apps/news//story.asp?NewsID=45603&Cr=Iraq 
&Cr1=.
UN OCHA (2013). South Sudan: Weekly Bulletins. 
(Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: 
http://www.unocha.org/south-sudan/reports-
media/humanitarian-bulletins?page=6.
UNODC (2007). Crime and Development in Cen-
tral America.
UNODC (2009). Transnational Trafficking and the 
Rule of Law in West Africa: A threat assessment.
UNODC (2011a). Global Study on Homicide.
UNODC (2011b). Organized Crime and Instabil-
ity in Central Africa: A threat assessment.
UNODC (2013a). Corruption in Afghanistan: 
Recent patterns and trends. Figure 1.
UNODC (2013b). Transnational Organized Crime 
in West Africa: A threat assessment.
UNODC (2013c). Accounting for Security and 
Justice in the post-2015 Development Agenda.
UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). Available: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analy-
sis/homicide.html.
United Nations Security Council (2004). Report of 
the Secretary-General on Haiti. S/2004/300. 16 
April 2004.
United Nations Security Council (2008). Report of 
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabili-
zation Mission in Haiti. S/2008/586. 27 August 
2008.
United Nations Security Council (2009). Report of 
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabili-
zation Mission in Haiti. S/2009/129. March 2009.
United Nations Security Council (2013a). Third 
report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 
6 of resolution 2061 (2012). S/2013/408.
United Nations Security Council (2013b). Report 
of the Secretary-General on South Sudan . 
S/2013/140. 
United Nations Security Council (2013c). Report 
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Sta-
bilization Mission in Haiti. S/2013/139. March 
2013.
Vinck, P, Pham, P. and T. Kreutzer (2011). Talking 
Peace: A population-based survey on attitudes about 
security, dispute resolution, and post-conflict recon-
struction in Liberia. Human Rights Center, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley – School of Law. 
World Bank (2011). World Development Report: 
Conflict, Security and Development: Chapter 1.
World Health Organization (WHO) (2014). 
Global Health Estimates Summary Tables: Deaths by 
Cause, Age and Sex, 2000-2012. Geneva: World 
Health Organization.
Yual, D. (2012). The complex causes of cattle raiding 
in South Sudan. Institute for Security Studies. 9 
May 2012. (Last accessed: 23 January 2014) Avail-
able: http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-com-
plex-causes-of-cattle-raiding-in-south-sudan.
162
 GLOBAL STUDY on Homicide
Chapter 5: The criminal justice  
response to homicide
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966). (Last accessed: 5 March 2014) 
Available: http://www.ohchr.org/en/professional-
interest/pages/ccpr.aspx.
Lehti, M. (2013). Henkirikoskatsaus, Verkkokat-
sauksia 29/2013 (Homicide Review, Web review 
29/103). National Research Institute of Legal 
Policy, Finland.
National Crime Records Bureau, India (2012). 
Crime in India 2012. 
United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) Commission on Human Rights 
(1995). Report of the special rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. 
Rodley, submitted pursuant to Commission on 
Human Rights resolution 1992/32. E/CN.4/1995/ 
34.
United Nations General Assembly (1988). Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 34. 
A/RES/43/173.
UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). Available: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analy-
sis/homicide.html.
United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and 
Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-
CTS). (Last accessed: 23 December 2013). Avail-
ab l e :  h t tp : / /www.unodc .org /unodc/en/
data-and-analysis/statistics/crime.html.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
(Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Available: 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr.
Van Dijk, J. (2008). The World of Crime: Breaking 
the silence on problems of security, justice, and devel-
opment across the world. California: Sage Publica-
tions. 
Chapter 6: Data challenges
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (2013). 
Análisis de los homicidios en seis países de América 
Latina. (Last accessed : 23 December 2013) Avail-
able: http://brik.iadb.org/handle/iadb/81538 
Geneva Conventions. (Last accessed: 23 Decem-
ber 2013) Available: http://www.icrc.org/eng/
assets/files/publications/icrc-002-0173.pdf. 
Gilgen, E. and L. Tracey (2011). Contributing 
evidence to programming: armed violence monitoring 
systems. Geneva Declaration Secretariat.
Homicide in Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden: 
A first study on the European Homicide Monitor 
Data (2011). (Last accessed : 23 December 2013) 
Available: http://www.bra.se/download/18.656e3
8431321e8524d80007748/1330943480501/201
1_15_homicide_finland_netherlands_sweden.
pdf.
International Committee of the Red Cross (2008). 
“How is the term ‘armed conflict’ defined in inter-
national humanitarian law?”
International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) (1995). The Prosecutor v. Dusko 
Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocu-
tory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A. 2 October 
1995.
Regional System of Standardized Indicators in 
Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen Security (RIC). 
(Last accessed: 23 December 2013). Available: 
http://seguridadyregion.com/.
Strategy for the Harmonization of Statistics in 
Africa (SHaSA). (Last accessed: 23 December 
2013). Available: http://ea.au.int/fr/sites/default/
files/SHaSA%20-EN.pdf.
United Nations (1990). Basic principles on the use 
of force and firearms by law enforcement officials. 8th 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1.
United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) (2012). Report of the National Institute 
of Statistics and Geography of Mexico and the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime on a road map 
to improve the quality and availability of crime sta-
tistics at the national and international levels. E/
RES/2012/18.
United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Statistical Commission (ECOSOC SC) (2012). 
Report on the forty-third session (28 February -2 
March 2012): 43/102. E/2012/24. 
United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice (ECOSOC CCPCJ) (2013). Improving the 
quality and availability of statistics on crime and 
criminal justice for policy development. E/
RES/2013/37.
United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Statistical Commission (ECOSOC SC) (2013). 
Joint report of the National Institute of Statistics and 
Geography of Mexico and the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime on a road map to improve crime 
statistics. E/CN.3/2013/11. 
UNODC (2011). Global Study on Homicide. 
UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). Available: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analy-
sis/homicide.html.
UNODC Center of Excellence in Statistical Infor-
mation on Governance, Crime, Victimization and 
Justice. (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) Avail-
163
REFERENCES
able: http://www.cdeunodc.inegi.org.mx/
UNODC_English.html.
United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and 
Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN-
CTS) (2012). (Last accessed: 23 December 2013) 
Available: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-
and-analysis/statistics/crime.html.
World Health Organization ((WHO) 2002). 
World Report on Violence and Health. 
World Health Organization (WHO) (2014). 
Global Health Estimates Summary Tables: Deaths by 
Cause, Age and Sex, 2000-2012. Geneva: World 
Health Organization.
Chapter 7: Methodological annex
Department of Health Statistics and Informatics, 
World Health Organization (2011). Causes of 
death 2008: data sources and methods. (Last 
accessed: 30 June 2013) Available: http://www.
who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/cod_ 
2008_sources_methods.pdf.
IHME (2012). (Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation). Global Health Data Exchange (GDHx). 
Available: http://www.healthmetricsandevalua-
tion.org.
Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) 
Regional Core Health Data Initiative dataset. (Last 
accessed: 30 June 2013) Available: http://www.
paho.org/fep/index.php?option=com_content&vi
ew=article&id=34&Itemid=164. 
UNODC (2011). Global Study on Homicide.
UNODC Homicide Statistics (2013). Available: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analy-
sis/homicide.html.
United Nation Population Division (2012). World 
Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision.
World Health Organization (WHO) (2014). 
Global Health Estimates Summary Tables: Deaths by 
Cause, Age and Sex, 2000-2012. Geneva: World 
Health Organization.
World Health Organization (WHO) – Europe 
(2013). European Health for All Database. (Last 
accessed: 30 June 2013) Available: http://www.
euro.who.int/en/data-and-evidence/databases/
european-health-for-all-database-hfa-db.
World Health Organization (WHO) Mortality 
Database. (Last accessed 22 January 2014) Avail-
able: www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality_data/en.

